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tic considerations that make explicit under what conditions evidentials can co-occur, making explicit how
different evidential meanings can be combined in a single clause, and extend the analysis to other languages
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M.A., University of Connecticut, 2018
A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the










Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation
On the Semantics of Evidentials in Southern Aymara
Presented by













The dissertation is perhaps the biggest product somebody writes down when pursuing a Ph.D. It is the
product of the work somebody has undertaken in the last couple of years in order to hopefully make a
contribution to their field. That somebody graduating, however, is not just that piece of writing. But getting
a Ph.D. is more than just the work presented in a dissertation, it is the transformation of a student to a
scholar. These acknowledgment pages aim at showing what is normally a hidden transformation by making
explicit some of the landmarks of my life as a graduate student at UConn in connection to the people who
were crucial in the process. Without their help, things would have been much more difficult to say the least.
In my case, everything starts with a good dose of belief—but not in a religious way. I must have believed
in myself; otherwise, things would not have happened. In the absence of self-confidence, a Ph.D. does not
occur. Here is where my family has been, perhaps, the most important. I come from a small city in South
America, Guayaquil, in Ecuador (although my work might suggest to some people that I am Peruvian),
where people have traditional occupations (doctors, lawyers, etc.). Being a linguist, an uncommon and
misunderstood career, is something that needs explanation. While this is common with the Humanities in
general, as is well-known, Linguistics is not Philosophy. This is where my family comes in. My parents,
Pablo and Maribel, my siblings, Pablo and Marı́a Fernanda, and, more generally, my extended family,
including my grandparents, Diego, Hada, Gilberto and Cuty, my aunts and uncles, Lizzie, Diego, Claudia,
David, Tania and Martha, and my cousins, Sebastian, Diego, Marı́a Belén, Analucı́a, Camila, Marı́a del Mar,
Isabella, Jorge Ignacio, Rafael and Juan Carlos, have always believed in me and have always taught me to
believe in myself. They encouraged me to pursue my dreams, including becoming a linguist. More recently,
my family has expanded including my mother-in-law, Amparo, and my siblings-in-law, Gisela and Andrés,
as well as my nieces Rafaela and Lucı́a, and my nephews, Pablo Joaquı́n and Martı́n. Importantly, they all
share this belief, which has been fundamental in my upbringing. Gracias, mi querida familia, por creer en
mı́ y por darme las herramientas para que yo también crea en mı́ mismo.
While I have started chronologically, the last twelve years of my life would not have been the same
without my wife, Tania. She is the one by my side everyday encouraging me to keep going. She has always
encouraged me to pursue my ideas and to never discard what I think is worth pursuing regardless of the
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reactions of other people, even when I encounter a lot of rejection in the process. She has always been there
believing in me. Gracias, Tañita, por acompañarme en todo este proceso.
UConn has been an ideal place for me. Both the faculty members and my peers have been very support-
ive. I would like to thank the faculty members for making an effort so that graduate students feel comfortable
and supported. This has been ideal for me. I personally work better in an environment where people support
each other, and this has certainly been the case at UConn. My time here was also made easier with Tamara
Cohen in the mix: she knows exactly how to make things work in an expedite way, which suits me very
well, because I am just like that.
Here, I would like to mention some specific people at UConn. First and foremost, I would like to thank
Jon Gajewski. Of all the things I could say about him, here are a few highlights. First, he takes me seriously.
When I had gone to his office as a first year and told him that I wanted to do semantics, his response was
for us to have weekly meetings for the rest of the semester reading classical papers in the field. Maybe this
ended up being a nightmare for him, because we have been having weekly meetings ever since. A lot of the
linguistics that I do now was learned in these meetings which goes to show the part that Jon played in this
process. Second, he believes in me. Even when I had doubted my skills during a particular moment in my
second year, Jon never lost faith in me. Third, he is a good listener. I sometimes speak a lot; I like to express
my ideas out loud. Jon always made the effort to understand what I was trying to say and ask the questions
that would make me think deeper.
My Ph.D. experience would not have been the same without Željko Bošković. He has been fundamental
as well. First and foremost, I would like to thank him for strongly encouraging me to not stop doing syntax—
this was, after all, my background before UConn. Because of Željko, I have become interested in islands.
Željko has taught me a number of things that I will carry with me for life. The first one was how to write
anything and everything. He has read and corrected my abstracts and papers countless times. Because of
him, I know how to structure my writing. The second thing is that Željko keeps it real. He would always give
me an honest opinion as to what I could expect from anything (e.g., whether a paper is likely to be accepted,
etc.). The third thing I have learned from Željko is that you can make something out of the smallest things:
no matter how ridiculous you think an idea you had is, Željko can always spin it in a way that becomes
interesting. While this is a good approach for linguistics, it is also good more generally: you can always
make something out of what you think is trivial.
I would also like to especially thank Magda Kaufmann. She has taught me different ways of looking at
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problems. Whenever I come in with an idea, she has a way to make me think about it in a different light. I
have deeply enjoyed our conversations, and I appreciate that she has always read my work very carefully.
Her incisive comments have always been spot on; she has trained me on how to be explicit when discussing
things. I would also like to thank Stefan Kaufmann. Talking to Stefan has always made me curious about
things. He has helped me think about the connections between my research and other phenomena, inviting
me to look for deeper explanations. His suggestions have shaped my way of looking at problems, always
looking for more.
Although Jon, Željko, Magda and Stefan have played a perhaps more decisive role during the last few
years, there were more faculty members involved. I would like to thank Jonathan Bobaljik, Jon Sprouse and
Susi Wurmbrand for, among other things, encouraging me to come to UConn. Their true interest in me was
one of the decisive factors when making a decision back then. Many thanks as well to Andrea Calabrese,
Diane Lillo-Martin, William Snyder and Harry van der Hulst: I took classes with all of them and, fortunately,
built a relationship beyond the classroom with all of them. I know that I can count on them, which makes
me truly happy. I can say this about Diane and Harry in particular, because they supported me in ways one
cannot imagine when my family went through something particularly difficult. As I said, UConn has been a
great place for me!
I would also like to express my gratitude to the friends I have made in these years (with one exception)—
a Ph.D. is not feasible, in my opinion, without friends. It has been a real pleasure to meet a bunch of people
that I trust and who also trust me back, and have fun with. I have split my time between Storrs, CT, and
Chicago, IL, and thus would like to acknowledge two different groups of people. Starting with the former,
I would like to thank Pietro Cerrone, my good friend with whom I share a number of cultural references.
Talking to him and laughing together have been great. Thanks also to Christos Christopoulos. It was always
great talking to him, even when we never get past the first sentence whenever I want to share a story with
him. I would also like to thank Alex Göbel. It would have been great if we had been at the same school.
We would have watched football a lot more! Thank you for helping me out preparing for the interview
that became my first job. I would like to especially thank Sabine Laszakovits. Her kindness was always
immense, and going out for lunch or dinner was always great. Because of her, I also got to know Roman
Reitschmied. His kind heart is as big as Sabine’s, not to mention our shared interest in technology (he does
know much more than I do though). I would like to express my gratitude to Cynthia Meléndez as well, who
was there from the very beginning, when Tania and I arrived to the UConn area. Amiga, hay que juntarnos a
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chismear. Many thanks to Emma Nguyen as well, who was my first (!) American friend. We have supported
each other throughout the years, which have been really special. It has been my pleasure having her as
friend. I hope she does not mind appearing kind of low in this list—the order is alphabetical. I would also
like to thank Hiromune Oda. He has introduced me to the Japanese culture in a Western friendly manner.
I appreciate his generosity and honesty. José Antonio Ribas deserves a special acknowledgment. My good
friend José Antonio was really helpful when he lived in Boston. He hosted us and helped us with everything
he could. Gracias, doc. Finally, thanks to Yuta Tatsumi: it is nice having him as friend, because, with him,
it is so easy to communicate a lot with just a couple of words.
Life has made it so that I get to Chicago a lot. I have met some great people there. I would like to thank
Meloddye Carpio, who has a big heart and is always welcoming. Many thanks to Daniel Mendoza as well:
I love watching and talking about football with him. Both Melo and Dani are the greatest hosts, and have
been the closest thing I have had to family while in the US. Gracias por recibirnos siempre en su casa. I
would also like to thank Gianfranco Languasco, who always wanted to watch Alianza Lima matches, even
though they were not very good. He has been my strongest link to humor in the last couple of years. Many
thanks to Victoria Tissera; I love her brutal sincerity, which is paired with enormous generosity. I would also
like to thank Fabrizio Moreno and Megan Marshall. The very least that I can say is that they are awesome
friends. It does not get better than that. Gracias por siempre estar presentes para Tania y para mı́. A todos
ustedes, muchas gracias por su amistad. Es lindo tener un contingente latinoamericano cerca; hace que
uno extrañe menos nuestro suelo sudamericano.
Finally, I would like to thank, for different reasons, the following people: Alejandra Calderón, Gustavo
Calderón, Male Carrillo, Juan Pablo Cuesta, Rafael Cuesta, Marcin Dadan, Niels Falkentoft, Kevin Flaherty,
Yoshiki Fujiwara, Roger Gonzalo, Shengyun Gu, Emilio Guerrero, Pavel Koval, Renato Lacerda, Sonia
Maquera, Troy Messick, Mario Montalbetti, Ricardo Ortega, Jayeon Park, Jorge Pérez, Roberto Petrosino,
Miguel Rodrı́guez, Hiroaki Saito, Yuta Sakamoto, Liliana Sánchez, Natalia Sánchez, Nicolaus Schrum,
Zheng Shen, Edwin Vásquez, Claudia Vásquez-Caicedo, Janett Vengoa, Emily Vizcarra, Muyi Yang, Héctor
Yépez, and Shuyan Wang. Thanks for making this process all the more enjoyable.
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Introduction
Evidentiality is a grammatical category whose core meaning encodes the source of information an individual
draws on regarding a given piece of information (Aikhenvald 2004) (see also Aikhenvald 2018). For illus-
tration, consider (1.1) in Cheyenne (Murray 2010, 2017). This sentence has an evidential marker, namely,
-sėstse. This is a reportative evidential that indicates that some individual, the speaker here, was told that
Sandy sang. The piece of information for which some individual has evidence is commonly referred to







ep: ‘The speaker was told that p.’
(Murray 2017:10)
This dissertation addresses a number of phenomena in the semantics and syntax-semantics of evidentiality
focusing on Southern Aymara within a cross-linguistic perspective. Southern Aymara is an Andean language
spoken in southern Peru, western Bolivia and northern Chile. It belongs to the Aymara language family,
which comprises two major languages, i.e., Southern Aymara, which is the focus here, and Central Aymara,
which is spoken in the highlands of Lima in central Peru (Adelaar 2004; Cerrón-Palomino 2000). Hereafter,
I only focus on Southern Aymara, mainly, on the variety of Pomata (province of Chicuito, department of
Puno), which is spoken by 13,637 (Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica e Informática 2010). In what follows, I
refer to the language under study as Aymara (for descriptions of different varieties of Aymara, see Cépeda
2011; Cerrón-Palomino 2008; Coler 2014; Hardman 2001).
Typologically, Aymara is a suffixal and agglutinative language whose sentences show an SOV order. An
example appears in (1.2), where an SOV order can be identified. The verb in particular shows the suffixal
and agglutinative nature of this language: next to the adjective llusk’a ‘straight’, several suffixes are added.
The causative -cha turns llusk’a ‘straight’ into the verb llusk’a-cha ‘straighten’. An aspectual marker is
added to this, i.e., the durative -ska. The agreement morpheme -i appears at the end.








‘Mariya was straightening the hair.’
Turning to the evidential system in Aymara in particular, previous work indicates that this language has three
evidential markers, i.e., the direct evidential enclitic =wa, the indirect evidential tense marker -tay and the
reportative evidential free morpheme siwa (Hardman et al. 1988; Hardman 2001; Cerrón-Palomino 2008).
Examples with these markers, including their intuitive evidential meanings, appear in (1.3).
(1.3) a. Jallu-ska-i=wa.
rain-DUR-3=wa
p: ‘It was raining.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
b. Jallu-ska-tay-na.
rain-DUR-tay-3
p: ‘It was raining.’





p: ‘It was raining.’
ep: ‘The speaker was told that p.’
The example in (1.3a) has the direct evidential =wa. Sentences with =wa are felicitously uttered whenever
the speaker has the best possible grounds for some piece of information (Martı́nez Vera 2019). This generally
means that the speaker’s source of information is the result of direct (visual) perception. (1.3b) is an example
with the indirect evidential -tay. Sentences with -tay are, in general, felicitously uttered whenever the
speaker has reportative or inferential evidence for some piece of information. Thus, the speaker can utter
(1.3b) if she was told that it was raining or if she draws a conclusion based on some clues (e.g., suppose
that the speaker saw the wet ground in the city she is in, which normally means that it had been raining
there). (1.3c) is an example with the reportative evidential siwa. Sentences with siwa are felicitously uttered
whenever the speaker was told that it had been raining.
Taking this characterization of the Aymara evidential system as starting point, I discuss a number of
issues that have been unobserved or unaccounted for before in the domain of evidentiality, and propose
a number of cross-linguistic generalizations in this domain. Specifically, this dissertation focuses on four
issues, each of which is addressed in a specific chapter:2
2Each chapter is conceived of as an independent paper, which means that they can be read on their own. It is clear that there
are connections among them, but the reader may well concentrate on the chapter of interest only. See additional comments about
this below.
2
(1.4) Issues addressed in this dissertation in a nutshell
a. Chapter 2 focuses on the the association of evidentiality and focus in the same marker, namely,
the direct evidential =wa. This is a topic that has been previously acknowledged (Muysken
1995; Faller 2002), but has remained unaccounted for. More generally, =wa is likened to focus
particles, such as English even, in an approach that makes explicit how an evidential meaning
fits with a focus meaning.
b. Chapter 3 analyzes the discourse contrasts in sentences involving direct evidentiality. By
showing that there is a contrast between sentences with and without =wa, I make the novel
observation that sentences with and without =wa differ with regard to who is held responsible
for the evidence that is available, and discuss the consequences of this contrast, which is tied
to, e.g., storytelling.
c. Chapter 4 discusses indirect evidentiality and mirativity. Adopting a comparative approach
contrasting Cuzco Quechua and Aymara, two Andean languages that are typologically nearly
identical, I discuss different analyses that account for indirect evidentiality and argue that an
analysis that introduces a learning time (i.e., a time at which the speaker acquires relevant
evidence) is more appropriate. I extend the analysis to account for cases involving mirativity.
d. Chapter 5 focuses on clauses with more than one evidential in Aymara. I provide an analysis
that involves syntactic and semantic considerations that make explicit under what conditions
evidentials can co-occur, making explicit how different evidential meanings can be combined
in a single clause, and extend the analysis to other languages for which this phenomenon has
been reported.
Below, I provide a more detailed discussion of the issues discussed in each chaper. Chapter 2,“Evidentiality
and focus association: the case of =wa in Aymara,” discusses the direct evidential enclitic =wa in Aymara.
This chapter makes two main contributions. On the empirical side, I show that =wa is a direct evidential
that is simultaneously a focus marker. This means that, in addition to conveying the meaning that the
speaker has the best possible evidence (Faller 2002; McCready 2015) for a relevant scope proposition,
which is the contribution of the direct evidential under discussion (Hardman 2001), =wa is also involved
with the calculation of focus, i.e., whenever it is present, there is a set of focus alternatives that are triggered
which vary depending on the constituent =wa focalizes. I argue that =wa is a focus marker by using
examples involving question-answer pairs, contrastive focus and interaction with superlatives. Consider, for














p: ‘Mary bought a car.’








p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
(1.6) shows that =wa appears next to the new information, the subject NP here; attaching =wa to another
constituent yields infelicity. Importantly, the evidential contribution of =wa is still present. On the theoret-
ical side, this chapter makes explicit how direct evidentiality and focus can be made compatible. I further
liken =wa to focus sensitive items, such as English even, arguing that it is discourse sensitive and that it
induces an ordering whereby the alternative for which there is evidence is to be preferred over the other
alternatives.
Chapter 3, “Direct evidentiality and discourse links in Aymara,” discusses the discourse contrasts that
arise in connection to direct evidentiality in Aymara. I argue that this language has two direct evidentials,
i.e., in addition to the enclitic =wa, I propose a the covert morpheme -[e]—thus, my proposal enriches
the Aymara evidential system by adding one more evidential to it. I make the novel observations that a
sentence with =wa can be felicitously uttered if only the speaker is in a position to utter such a sentence
(i.e., she has the relevant evidence for the proposition the sentence denotes), and there is some previous
discourse to which the proposition such a sentence denotes can contribute, whereas a sentence with -[e] can
be felicitously uttered if the speaker and somebody else is in a position to express the proposition such a
sentence denotes (the presence of previous discourse is not required); in addition, sentences with -[e] imply
that what is expressed is uncontroversial. Consider the examples in (1.6).
(1.6) a. Jallu-ska-i=wa
rain-DUR-3=wa
p: ‘It was raining.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
b. Jallu-ska-i-[e]
rain-DUR-3-[e]
p: ‘It was raining.’
ep: ‘The speaker (and somebody else) has the best possible grounds for p.’
Roughly speaking, (1.6a) is felicitously uttered when only the speaker has the relevant evidence for stating
that it was raining and there is some previous discourse to which the speaker’s statement contributes (e.g.,
somebody asks about the weather). (1.6b), in contrast, does not require that there be some previous discourse
(e.g., (1.6b) can be used as a conversation opener); in addition, the speaker knows that somebody else is
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in a position of conveying the relevant propositional meaning—in connection to this, the speaker implies
that the information is uncontroversial. I further show that this split in direct evidentiality has a thus far
unattested effect on direct challengeability possibilities to sentences with evidentials. I further identify
which construction can be used in different discourse settings (e.g., conversation openers and narration
of stories) and what the effects of these constructions are on the hearer in connection to confirming and
challenging the proposition the speaker proposes. I implement a formal analysis based on Farkas & Bruce
(2010) (see also Murray 2017; Faller 2019) that makes explicit what the links between evidentiality and
discourse are.
Chapter 4, “Indirect evidentiality and past mirativity in Quechua and Aymara,” discusses tense markers
in connection to indirect evidentiality. Specifically, this chapter comparatively analyzes sentences with the
past tense suffixes -sqa in Cuzco Quechua (henceforth, Quechua) and -tay in Aymara. Examples with these
markers appear in (1.7). Roughly speaking, these sentences are felicitously uttered when the speaker has




p: ‘It was raining.’
(Quechua)
ep: ‘The speaker was told/inferred that p.’
b. Jallu-ska-tay-na.
rain-DUR-tay-3
p: ‘It was raining.’
(Aymara)
ep: ‘The speaker was told/inferred that p.’
Three contributions are made in this chapter. (i) I provide a means to tease apart two different analyses of
tense markers in connection to indirect evidentiality that have been proposed in the literature, namely, one in
which the speaker’s perception plays a crucial role, which is used by Faller (2004) to analyze sentences with
-sqa, and one in which the notion of a learning time is incorporated (i.e., a time at which the speaker acquires
relevant evidence that makes her learn something), which is used by Klose (2014) to analyze sentences with
-tay (I propose that the learning time analysis is to be preferred); (ii) I provide the first systematic comparison
between Quechua and Aymara from a formal perspective, which gives support to the well-known descriptive
statement in the Andean literature that the grammars of these languages are very similar (Cerrón-Palomino
2008); and (iii) I make the novel empirical observation that, in addition to the expression of surprise in
connection to the present as a result of something unexpected occurring (Rett & Murray 2013), it is possible
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to express surprise about something that occurred in the past with these sentences, i.e., the expression of
surprise towards something unexpected need not be tied to the here and now of the speaker; the learning
time analysis is extended to account for these cases as well.
Chapter 5, “On clauses with multiple evidentials: examining the case of Aymara and beyond,” discusses
the phenomenon of the co-occurrence of multiple evidentials in the same (matrix) clause. The focus is on
Aymara and the three evidentials that have been proposed in the previous literature (i.e., the direct -[e] is
not discussed in this chapter): the direct =wa, the indirect -tay and the reportative siwa. After providing an
overview of the Aymara evidential system, I discuss the issue that the Aymara evidentials can co-occur in
the same clause, in particular, that all the three Aymara evidentials can co-occur in the same clause, which







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
possible grounds, which are indirect evidence).’
The evidential contributions together are to be understood as follows (roughly speaking): the speaker has
reportative evidence for the proposition that mary was sick (the contribution of the reportative evidential);
the report has solid grounds (the contribution of the direct evidential), which are indirect, i.e., either another
report or an inference (the contribution of the indirect evidential). I propose a semantic analysis that makes
explicit how the different evidential meanings involved are compatible with each other. I then discuss the
cross-linguistic variation in this domain (here I take Aikhenvald 2004 as the starting point for the discussion),
and propose an account that derives the attested variation. This account builds on the peculiarity of some
reportative evidentials, namely, that there can be two evidence holders in their presence (the speaker and the
source of the report). In addition, I incorporate an appendix to this chapter, where I address some issues
in connection to the grammaticalization of reportative evidentials, as well as evidentiality in Spanish; this
discussion sheds additional light on topics discussed in this chapter.
The Aymara data discussed in this dissertation are based on two sources of information: previous liter-
ature, in particular, Cépeda (2011), Cerrón-Palomino (2008), Coler (2014) Faller (2004), Gonzalo Segura
(2011), Hardman (2001) and Klose (2014, 2015) (see also Adelaar 2004; Cerrón-Palomino 2000; Hardman
2001; Klose 2015), and original fieldwork with two consultants. The Quechua data discussed in chapter 4
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in particular is mainly based on Faller (2004) (see also Adelaar 1977, 2004; Cerrón-Palomino 1987, 2008;
Cusihuaman 1976;Lefebvre & Muysken 1988; Weber 1987, 1989). All the examples included in that chap-
ter have been double-checked with a native Quechua speaker. The methodology used for the fieldwork
interviews involved the presentation of contextual scenarios using Spanish as an auxiliary language, which
was followed by a request for a felicity judgment on a particular grammatical sentence given that contex-
tual scenario (see Matthewson 2004; Davis et al. 2014; and Bochnak & Matthewson 2015 for discussion
regarding the soundness and validity of the aforementioned methodological choices).
Before turning to the discussion of the issues that were mentioned above, I would like to briefly mention
two aspects of a different nature, namely, some comments in connection to readability and some comments
with regard to the notion of the best possible grounds. With regard to the first matter, as mentioned in
footnote 2, each chapter is conceived of as an independent paper, which means that the reader may choose
to read one chapter only or even read them in different order. This is tied to the issue of repetition of
contents. For instance, given that each chapter is thought of as a separate unit, more than one chapter
will contain discussion with regard to common properties that are discussed in connection to evidentiality,
e.g., the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction, negation or commitment. There will be some variations when
discussing each topic in different chapters, which is the case due to the fact that each chapter will emphasize
different aspects. An instance of this, so that the reader can get a concrete grasp of what is meant, is the
case of the discussion of -tay in chapters 4 and 5. In the latter, since the focus is on clauses with more than
one evidential, some details with regard to the peculiarities of -tay in connection to direct evidence are set
aside. In this sense, the challengeability test discussed there, which is tied to the at-issue vs. not-at-issue
distinction, mainly concentrates on cases with indirect evidence. In chapter 4, in contrast, since I take a
closer look at -tay, these details with regard to, e.g., cases where the speaker may have direct evidence, are
addressed explicitly within a discussion that wants to tell apart the analyses that have been proposed in the
literature to analyze markers similar to -tay.
The second issue I want to raise regards the notion of the best possible grounds. The first thing I want to
say in this regard is that this dissertation does not has as purpose to settle the issue with respect to how this
notion should be (properly) understood (see Faller 2002; McCready 2015). It is worth pointing out, however,
that there are two slightly different notions of the best possible grounds that are incorporated. The first one
appears in chapter 2; the second one appears in chapters 3 and 5. The latter is more faithful to Faller’s
idea of the best possible grounds in that this author’s proposal is that an evidential conveys the meaning of
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the best possible grounds relative to the type of information a sentence conveys. That is, if some sentence
conveys, for example, the meaning that it rained in Puno, since this piece of information is observable in
principle, then this is the kind of evidence the speaker must have to be able to use that evidential. The notion
of the best possible grounds discussed in chapter 3 is less restrictive in that, in addition to considering the
type of information a sentence conveys, it is also sensitive to the circumstances of the speaker. For instance,
suppose that the speaker is in Lima and talks to a friend of hers; this friend tells the speaker that it rained in
Puno. In this circumstances, it is impossible for the speaker to have direct perceptual evidence of the rain.
The consultants of mine who were in Lima would claim that the speaker can use the direct evidential when
uttering a sentence that conveys the meaning that it rained in Puno—if the speaker was in Puno, then this
is not the case; what was discussed above would hold. Strictly speaker, however, Faller’s notion does not
leave room for this kind of case where the evidence is a report to somebody who is in Lima—put differently,
the evidence that is good enough would also depend on what is realistically feasible for the speaker. As
mentioned above, the purpose of this dissertation does not lie in settling the discussion with regard to the
best possible grounds; instead, it suffices to have some working notion of it, so that I can focus on other
issues. In this sense, I do not settle this issue in this dissertation, but it is worth pointing out that additional
research is necessary in this regard.
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Evidentiality and focus association: the case
of =wa in Southern Aymara
Abstract: This chapter discusses the direct evidential enclitic =wa in Southern Aymara, an understudied
Andean language. It makes two contributions. On the empirical side, I show that =wa is a direct evidential
that is simultaneously a focus marker. This means that, in addition to conveying the meaning that the speaker
has the best possible grounds (Faller 2002) for a relevant scope proposition, which is the contribution of the
direct evidential under discussion (Hardman 2001), =wa is also involved with the calculation of focus, i.e.,
whenever it is present, there is a set of focus alternatives that are triggered, which vary depending on the
constituent =wa focalizes. I argue that =wa is a focus marker by using examples involving question-answer
pairs, contrastive focus and interaction with superlatives. On the theoretical side, this chapter makes explicit
how direct evidentiality and focus can be made compatible. I also liken =wa to focus sensitive items, such
as English even, arguing that it is discourse sensitive and that it induces an ordering whereby the alternative
for which there is evidence is to be preferred over the other alternatives.
Keywords: direct evidential, focus, superlative, at-issue, not-at-issue, Aymara
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the semantics of the evidential enclitic =wa in Southern Aymara (henceforth, Ay-
mara), an understudied Andean language.1 Evidentiality is a grammatical category whose core meaning
encodes the source of information an individual (hereafter, the speaker) draws on regarding a given piece of
information (Aikhenvald 2004). The given piece of information for which evidence is provided contains a
proposition, and will be referred to as the scope proposition p; the evidential contribution will be referred to
as the evidential proposition ep.
1Typologically, Aymara is a suffixal and to some extent agglutinative language whose unmarked word order is SOV. I focus on
the dialect of the town of Pomata (province of Chicuito, department of Puno) that is spoken by 13,637 people (Instituto Nacional
de Estadı́stica e Informática 2010).
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According to descriptions of Aymara (Hardman 2001; Cerrón-Palomino 2008), =wa is a direct eviden-
tial. I will argue that =wa’s contribution as a direct evidential is to be understood in terms of the notion
of best possible grounds (Faller 2002; McCready 2015), i.e., that the evidence available (to the speaker) is
to be understood in terms of the notion of what counts as the most reliable evidence available for p, which
could be, in principle, variable (e.g., direct perception, a reliable report, etc.); it suffices that such evidence
be the most reliable one.
A matrix declarative sentence with =wa, which is the kind of sentences this chapter focuses on, is
exemplified in (2.1)—I split the translation into two parts, namely, p and ep.2 The scope proposition here
is that Ines visited her sister yesterday; the evidential proposition is that the speaker has the best possible
grounds for p, e.g., the speaker was with Ines when she visited her sister or the speaker talked with Ines’









p: ‘Ines visited her sister yesterday.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Independently, it has also been pointed out that =wa is a focus marker (Klose 2015; Martı́nez Vera 2018b).
However, the same authors have not made the claim that =wa conflates both evidentiality and focus. This is
precisely the empirical contribution of this chapter: I claim that =wa conflates both functions. Thus, (2.1)
conveys a meaning along the following lines: it was Ines who visited her sister yesterday—the evidential
contribution remains along the lines stated in (2.1). I will provide evidence for sentences with =wa display-
ing association with focus, specifically, I will discuss question-answer pairs—the answer being marked with
=wa—, sentences with contrastive focus, and sentences with verbal superlatives and =wa (Martı́nez Vera
2018b). Although the claim that evidentiality and association with focus can be tied to the presence of the
same marker is not new (see, in particular, the discussion of Quechua evidentials in this regard in Muysken
1995 and Faller 2002), to the best of my knowledge, how to bring the evidential and the focus contributions
together semantically is a task that is yet to be undertaken. This chapter aims at filling this gap.
I will propose an analysis of sentences with the direct evidential =wa that assumes the at-issue vs. not-
at-issue distinction (Potts 2005), which has been applied to account for the semantics of evidentials (Murray
2Abbreviations: 1 = first person, 3 = third person, ACC = accusative, COM = comitative, INT = interrogative, LIM = limitative,
LOC = locative, NEG = negation, PART = participial, PST = past, POSS = possessive, PRES = present, PROG = progressive, REFL =
reflexive, TOP = topic.
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2017). I will pair this distinction with an approach to focus in terms of alternatives (Rooth 1992, 2016;
Beaver & Clark 2008). In a nutshell, the at-issue content corresponds to the scope proposition and the
not-at-issue content corresponds to the evidential proposition (in particular, the speaker has the best possible
grounds for the scope proposition such that the latter is one of the focus alternatives). Assuming a movement
approach, the analysis will be made compatible with the interaction with superlatives (Heim 1999; Pancheva
& Tomaszewicz 2012; Tomaszewicz 2015). Ultimately, the goal of filling the gap regarding how to bring
the evidential and the focus contributions together semantically aims to provide a principled answer as to
why evidentiality and focus marking can in fact pattern together in natural language. To this end, I will liken
=wa to focus sensitive items, such as English even.3 I will show that =wa is discourse sensitive and will
propose that it imposes an ordering among the focus alternatives that is based on having the best possible
grounds.
The data discussed in this chapter are based on two sources of information: previous literature, in partic-
ular, Hardman (2001), Cerrón-Palomino (2008) and Klose (2015), and original fieldwork with two consul-
tants. The methodology used for the latter involved the presentation of contextual scenarios using Spanish
as an auxiliary language, which was followed by a request for a felicity judgment on a particular gram-
matical sentence given that contextual scenario (see Matthewson 2004; Davis et al. 2014; and Bochnak &
Matthewson 2015 for discussion regarding the soundness and validity of the aforementioned methodological
choices).
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 argues that direct evidentiality in this case is to be
understood in terms of Faller’s (2002) notion of best possible grounds (see also McCready 2015) and argues
that the evidential meaning of =wa is part of the not-at-issue content. Section 2.3 provides evidence for the
claim that sentences with =wa involve focus marking. Section 2.4 presents a compositional semantics that
makes explicit how evidentiality and focus can be brought together. Section 2.5 I discusses in what sense
=wa is similar to focus sensitive elements, such as English even. Section 2.6 is the conclusion.
3An issue to explore further in connection to this is whether there is a stronger link between evidentiality and focus association.
This chapter takes a conservative approach in this regard in that it shows that evidentiality and focus are compatible. Only then do
I sketch a stronger link between them by likening =wa with focus sensitive markers such as even. A possibility for future research
would be to start with a tight link from the beginning. I would like to thank Jon Gajewski and Stefan Kaufmann for making
suggestions in this direction.
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2.2 =wa as an evidential marker
In this section, I discuss the evidential component of =wa. In section 2.2.1, I discuss in what sense the
descriptive notion of direct evidence applies to =wa, which should be understood in terms of Faller’s (2002)
notion of the best possible grounds. In section 2.2.2, I run some evidentiality tests to sentences with =wa to
show that the evidential contribution of this morpheme is not-at-issue.
2.2.1 Direct evidentiality as the best possible grounds
The evidential =wa is, broadly speaking, a direct evidential. Cerrón-Palomino (2008) describes it as a
morpheme that is used when the speaker has first-hand information. In this chapter, I propose that this char-
acterization of first-hand information should be understood in a broad sense. Traditionally, direct evidentials
have been characterized in terms of the available evidence for the scope proposition being the result of di-
rect perception (e.g., visual perception) (Willett 1988). While =wa is in fact compatible with the available
evidence being the result of direct perception, I will show that it is not restricted to it. Thus, for instance, a
reliable report or a well-grounded inference could also constitute the relevant evidence that is available for
a particular scope proposition. What is of importance is that the relevant evidence is reliable enough with
respect to the information that this conveyed.
What has been briefly described in the previous paragraph is actually very close to the way Faller (2002)
characterizes the Cuzco Quechua direct evidential =mi, which is the baseline I assume for the characteriza-
tion of the evidential contribution of Aymara =wa (see also McCready 2015).4 Thus, what is relevant for the
direct evidential =mi is that the best source of information is the one on which a relevant scope proposition is
based. This is what she calls best possible grounds. Below I exemplify how this notion applies to sentences
with =mi in Cuzco Quechua—the glosses and translations are adapted using the conventions adopted in this
chapter; =mi has an allomorph =n. Regarding (2.2), suppose that the source of evidence is direct (visual)
perception; this is the evidence on which the scope proposition is based, i.e., the speaker saw that Pilar ate
bread. The presence of =mi is possible in the presence of this kind of evidence.
4Throughout section 2.2, I will exemplify the relevant issues under discussion with Cuzco Quechua (a language whose eviden-
tial system has been studied extensively), because it is the closest case to the Aymara one under discussion here, not only when the
direct evidential =wa is considered, but also more generally. Although the literature has not settled the issue of whether Quechua
and Aymara have evolved from the same proto-language, the two languages are parallel in several domains, as has been discussed








p: ‘Pilar ate bread.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
(Faller 2002:18)
Examples (2.3)-(2.4) are different in that, in Faller’s discussion, it is made clear that the sources of evidence
are indirect. For instance, the source evidence for (2.3) is a (reliable) report; the context she gives is one in
which the report was made by the speaker’s sister. The source of evidence for (2.4) is a (solid) inference; the
context she gives is one in which the inference is based on not having seen the relevant item in the backpack,
i.e., the item was not in there. In these cases, nonetheless, it is possible to utter a sentence with =mi. This





p: ‘She traveled to Lima.’








p: ‘It is not in my backpack.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
(Faller 2002:19)
What is relevant for current purposes is that the so-called direct evidential =mi subsumes a wide array of
evidence types as long as they constitute good enough evidence for the speaker for a given scope proposition.
Aymara =wa displays a similar pattern in that it is compatible with different sources of evidence (as long
as they constitute good enough evidence). Below I exemplify this using examples that are comparable to the
ones for Cuzco Quechua in (2.2)-(2.4). I will first provide an example in which there is direct (perceptual)
evidence available. For (2.5), suppose that the evidence is that the speaker saw Joseph sweeping the house.








p: ‘Joseph swept the house.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
As with Cuzco Quechua =mi, however, =wa is not restricted to this kind of evidence. Consider (2.6)-(2.7).
13
For (2.6), suppose that the evidence for Mary being sick comes from Mary herself, who told the speaker that
she is sick. The sentence in (2.6), with =wa, is felicitous even if there is no perceptual sign for the speaker
of Mary being sick; it suffices that Mary says so (and she is a truthful source) for the speaker to be able to





p: ‘Mary is sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Regarding (2.7), suppose that the speaker makes an inference based on perceptual evidence, namely, the wet
floor in the city (i.e., the result of it having rained), in addition to the fact that wet floors in Cuzco normally
mean that it rained. In this case, the speaker can utter the sentence in (2.7), which has =wa, based on the
conclusion drawn. Direct perceptual evidence of a raining event, however, is not needed for the speaker to





p: ‘It rained in Cuzco.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
As has been discussed in the literature (Faller 2002; McCready 2015), although all three kinds of evidence
may be possible, these correspond to an evidence ordering indicating that there is some preference among
evidence types. Thus, in the case of Cuzco Quechua =mi, for instance, unless there is reason to think
otherwise, it will be assumed that the evidence the speaker is basing on the information shared is the result
of direct perception (in particular, the result of direct visual perception). Other forms of evidence, e.g.,
reports and inferences, are not ordered with regard to each other. Thus, if the examples in (2.2)-(2.4) are
uttered in contexts in which there is no particular indication of the kind of evidence available to the speaker,
it will be assumed that the evidence is the result of direct (visual) perception. Aymara =wa is similar in this
regard. Just as Cuzco Quechua =mi, although different kinds of evidence can count as reliable ones, in the
absence of indication of particular types of evidence, it will be assumed that the speaker has direct (visual)
evidence for what is said. This would be the case, for instance, when examples (2.5)-(2.7) are uttered in the
absence of indication of what kind of evidence is being considered.
Recent work, in particular, McCready (2015), discusses a number of issues in connection to the notion
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of reliability in general, and, specifically, in connection to the notion of best possible grounds as discussed
by Faller (2002). Here, since the emphasis is on making evidentiality and focus compatible, indicating how
they can be brought together, I will simply assume the notion of the best possible grounds as primitive. I
assume the evidence ordering in (2.8), where it is made explicit that direct (visual) perception is preferred
over reports or inferences (which are not ordered).
(2.8) Evidence ordering
direct (visual) perception > report, inference
I refer the reader to (McCready 2015) for detailed discussion where reliability and best possible grounds are
modeled making use of probabilities. This approach can, in principle, be made compatible with the current
discussion, but leave this task for the future.
To sum up, the evidential contribution of the Aymara direct evidential =wa is to be understood in terms
of the speaker having the best possible grounds for the relevant scope proposition Faller (2002) (see also
McCready 2015). As indicated in connection to (2.8), in the absence of particular indication of what kind
of evidence is available, it will be assumed that it is the result of direct (visual) perception.
2.2.2 Distinguishing at-issue vs. not-at-issue contents
One of the main issues discussed in the literature addressing evidentiality is what is the layer of meaning to
which the evidential contributes. Following Murray (2017), in this chapter I assume a distinction between at-
issue content (i.e., the proffered content of a sentence) and not-at-issue content (i.e., everything that is not the
proffered content of a sentence) (Potts 2005). The literature has gathered a number of tests that distinguish
at-issue content and not-at-issue content for evidentials (see Murray 2017 for a comprehensive collection of
tests; I will mainly cite this work in this section, as her discussion surveys the literature in this regard up
to this date). Of particular interest here is to run the relevant tests that will settle the following question:
are the scope proposition and the evidential proposition at-issue or not-at-issue content? I will show that,
in the case under discussion, as is the general conclusion of the literature when different evidentials have
been analyzed in the cross-linguistic scenario, the scope proposition constitutes at-issue content, whereas
the evidential proposition constitutes not-at-issue content.5
5In recent work, Korotkova (2016) argues that the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction as discussed for conventional implicatures
in the sense of Potts (2005) cannot be applied in a literal sense for the analysis of evidentials, since, she argues, there are differences
in their distribution. For the purposes of the present discussion, what is relevant is that two distinct layers of meaning need to be
distinguished in the analysis of evidentials: one of them can be (directly) challenged and the other one cannot be (directly) chal-
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In particular, I will focus on two tests, namely, the challengeability test and the projection behavior test
under negation.6 The challengeability test targets the property of whether it is possible to directly challenge
the scope proposition and whether it is possible to challenge the evidential proposition. One such test
involves following up a sentence by a reply (made by a different speaker) with an expression such as That’s
not true or You’re mistaken, and then a correction is proposed, which could target either the scope proposition
or the evidential proposition.7 The literature mentions that, while the scope proposition can be challenged,
the evidential proposition cannot be challenged. This is taken to suggest that the scope proposition is part of
the at-issue content, whereas the evidential proposition is part of the not-at-issue content.
To illustrate the challengeability test, I make use of a sentence with the Cuzco Quechua direct evidential
=mi, which appears in (2.9) (see Faller 2002). For these cases, it has been made clear that the speaker
has direct evidence, coming from direct (visual) perception. This is in accordance with the preference for









p: ‘Ines visited her sister yesterday.’
ep: ‘The speaker saw that p.’
(Faller 2002:157)
Faller (2002) applies the challengeability test to (2.9) and shows that, while the scope proposition can be
challenged, the evidential proposition cannot be challenged. This is shown in (2.10)-(2.11) respectively.
(2.10) challenges the scope proposition by saying that Ines visited somebody else (not her sister). This
challenge is felicitous. (2.11) challenges the evidential proposition by saying that the speaker does not have
the relevant evidence for the scope proposition, which in this case has been agreed on to be evidence coming
from direct perception. This challenge is infelicitous.
lenged, which here I capture by means of the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction. In the semantic literature of evidentials, another
way of stating this is via the distinction between truth-conditional meaning, which corresponds to the former, and presuppositional
meaning, which corresponds to the latter (see, e.g., Matthewson et al. 2007). See Murray (2017) for discussion regarding why the
at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction is to be preferred over the truth-conditional vs. presuppositional distinction (see also Tonhauser
et al. 2013).
6Here I will only discuss the tests the are relevant for the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction, and, more broadly, that are
relevant to address the issue of the relationship between evidentiality and focus, which is the main goal of this chapter. For this
reason, I will have nothing to say with regard to other topics and tests that have been discussed in the literature about evidentiality,
for instance, in relation to the illocutionary vs. modal approaches to evidentials, the embeddability properties of =wa or whether it
is possible for =wa to appear in questions.
7See Korotkova (2016) for potential issues with following up with That’s not true in that it may not fully grasp the complete
range of challengeability possibilities in connection to evidentials. For current purposes, the That’s not true and the You’re mistaken
follow-ups are indistinct in that they illustrate the contrast between two layers of meaning, which is the relevant distinction here























‘That’s not true. You didn’t see this.’
(Faller 2002:158)
This suggests that, while the scope proposition contributes to the at-issue content, the evidential proposition
is part of the not-at-issue content (see Murray 2017).
The Aymara case with =wa is parallel to the Cuzco Quechua case with =mi. (2.12) is the sentence with
=wa that will be subject to challenge. To illustrate the application of this test in Aymara, I follow the Cuzco
Quechua example above where evidence based on direct (visual) perception is the one under consideration









p: ‘Ines visited her sister yesterday.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
As in the Cuzco Quechua case, when the challengeability test is applied to (2.12), only the scope proposition,
but not the evidential proposition can be challenged. (2.13) challenges the scope proposition by saying that
Ines did not visit her sister. This challenge is felicitous. (2.14) challenges the evidential proposition by
saying that the speaker does not have the relevant evidence for the scope proposition, in this case, visual
























8As mentioned, the challenge of the evidential proposition makes reference to a particular kind of evidence. As Jon Gajewski
points out, in principle, it could be the case that challenging the evidential proposition by means of a sentence that refers to visual
perception may not be felicitous due to =wa not really conveying that specific meaning, but a broader one (i.e., best possible
grounds). In this regard, I have further tested sentences such as (2.12) with a continuation that is more general in that it simply
challenges that the speaker has (relevant) evidence for the claim made, as shown in (i)—this continuation is translated to English as











‘You’re mistaken. You don’t have evidence/basis for that.’
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‘You’re mistaken. You didn’t see that.’
This evidence suggests that, with regard to sentences with =wa in Aymara, the scope proposition contributes
to the at-issue content, whereas the evidential proposition makes a not-at-issue contribution.9
The second test is the projection behavior test under negation. The literature on evidentials mentions
that negation only takes scope over the scope proposition, the evidential proposition being unaffected by
negation. In other words, the meaning of scope proposition p with negation and an evidential intuitively
means something like It is not the case that p and The speaker has the relevant evidence for p not being
the case. Since negation takes scope over at-issue material, and the evidential proposition is not modified
by it, it is concluded that the scope proposition contributes to the at-issue content, whereas the evidential
proposition makes a not-at-issue contribution.
To illustrate this test, I will make use of a Cuzco Quechua sentence with =mi here as well. An example
appears in (2.15). This example contains negation; crucially, negation only scopes over the scope proposi-
tion, not over the evidential proposition. A reading whereby the speaker does not have the relevant evidence
for the scope proposition is not attested. This suggests that the scope proposition contributes to the at-issue









p: ‘Pilar didn’t eat bread.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
(Faller 2002:27)
The Aymara case is similar to the Cuzco Quechua one in (2.15). This is exemplified in (2.16)—this sentence
can be uttered felicitously in a context in which it is usual for Ines to visit her sister one day of the week
(the one corresponding to the day before in the example), but this did not happen this particular week
for some reason. This example with negation shows that it only scopes over the scope proposition, not
over the evidential proposition. As in Cuzco Quechua, a reading whereby the speaker does not have the
relevant evidence for the scope proposition is not attested. This suggests that, when sentences with =wa
9The evidential proposition can be indirectly challenged, which is consistent with not-at-issue content, as discussed by Murray
(2017). In the case under discussion, namely, (2.12), an indirect challenge would be as in (i), which is possible, for instance, when
the addressee has grounds to question the speaker (e.g., the speaker usually lies).
(i) Uñja-yä-ta-ti-sti?
see-PST-2-INT-TOP
‘Did you (actually) see that?’
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are considered, the scope proposition contributes to the at-issue content, whereas the evidential proposition











p: ‘Ines didn’t visit her sister yesterday.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Based on the discussion in this section, I conclude that the evidential contribution of =wa (namely, direct
evidentiality understood in terms of the notion of best possible grounds) constitutes not-at-issue content,
whereas the scope proposition (with which =wa combines) constitutes at-issue content.
2.3 =wa as a focus marker
This section discusses =wa as a focus marker. I discuss three main uses involving focus that the literature
has addressed, namely, the presence of a focalized constituent in the answer of a question-answer pair,
which introduces new information (section 2.3.1), instances of contrastive focus, where a correction to some
element of a previous sentence is made (section 2.3.2), and the interaction of focus with superlatives, the
result of which is the availability of relative readings (section 2.3.3).10 It is important to keep in mind that,
throughout the examples to be discussed in this section, the evidential proposition will always be present,
i.e., in addition to the role of =wa as a focus marker, which is the main focus of this section, the evidential
contribution is present as well, which suggests that both evidentiality and focus are relevant for the analysis
of =wa.11
2.3.1 Question-answer pairs
An important feature that is discussed in connection to focus marking concerns the presence of new informa-
tion in discourse. One such instance is the presence of new information in the answer to a question-answer
pair: the answer fills in the gap raised by the question. This is exemplified in (2.17) with a question-answer
10The discussion of focus with regard to these three topics is too extensive to make justice to it in this chapter. See Beaver &
Clark (2008) and Rooth (2016) for an overview; see Rooth (1985), Rooth (1992) and Krifka (1992) for some seminal work on the
topic; see Schwarzschild (1999) and Beck (2006) for initial discussion regarding focus association and its role in the interfaces.
More specific discussion of focus association and superlatives can be found in Heim (1999), Farkas & Kiss (2000), Sharvit &
Stateva (2002), which are classical references. See Pancheva & Tomaszewicz (2012) and Tomaszewicz (2015) for recent discussion
on the topic.
11It is also worth pointing out that there is at most one =wa per matrix sentence, i.e., sentences with multiple foci where each
focalized element is marked with =wa are ungrammatical, other strategies being used for such cases. The topic of multiple foci in
Aymara lies beyond the scope of this chapter.
19
pair in English. In the answer, Mary is the constituent that introduces new information, and is focalized—in
the English examples that are used for illustration, I will mark the focalized constituent with F, adopting a
common convention in the literature, which indicates that the focalized element has prosodic prominence.
(2.17) a. Who bought a car?
b. [Mary]F bought a car.
Before turning to particular examples in Aymara, let me introduce the sentence that will serve as a baseline







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The sentence in (2.18) could serve as the answer to a What happened? question (in Aymara, Kuna-sa
kamacha-i?), where the whole proposition would be focalized. For illustration, throughout section 2.3,
I will discuss focalized NPs in argument (subject and object) position (see Klose 2015 for discussion of
additional cases). I will introduce an additional convention in my glosses, namely, a third line labeled
f, which will make explicit what the focus effect is in the sentences under discussion—to make this focus
effect more apparent, I make use of a cleft construction of the form It was x who... (for x an individual), with
no intention of implying that there is an actual connection between clefts and the cases under discussion.12
The examples in (2.19)-(2.20) illustrate focalized material in the presence of =wa when answering to
subject and object questions respectively. With regard to (2.19), the question asks for the subject. The
answer in (2.19b) is to be understood in terms of the scope proposition that Mary bought a car and the
evidential proposition that the speaker has the relevant evidence for this, and, crucially, there also is a focus
effect stating that it was her the one who bought the car. With regard to this focus effect, note that the
position of =wa is of relevance: it must be attached to the subject; otherwise, the answer is infelicitous, as
12There are two additional issues that are worth mentioning. First, although the discussion in the text will basically be concerned
with focalized argument NPs, the focus effects in relation to =wa are not limited to them; thus, for instance, adjuncts or VPs can
be focalized (see Klose 2015). Second, there is no (obvious) prosodic effect regarding focus marking in Aymara in the cases under
discussion, which would suggest that there is no principled reason to link evidentiality and focus to two different elements in a
given sentence. The absence of prosodic cues is a possibility in many languages of the world where morphological means (among
other means) are the relevant ones to signal focus (see Beaver & Clark 2008). Due to the pandemic, I have been unable to carry
out the relevant fieldwork to provide evidence, in particular, recordings, for this. Nonetheless, Liliana Sánchez (p.c.) has told me
that, in work in progress, she and her collaborators show that there is no (obvious) prosodic prominence effect in connection to
Quechua and Aymara direct evidential markers. This is as expected in these languages, since, as Beaver & Clark (2008) discuss,
such a prosodic effect may not be present in some language. This appears to be the case, in particular, when one looks at languages
that heavily rely on morphological markers. This is clearly the case of Aymara (and also of Quechua) (Cerrón-Palomino 2008).
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(2.19c) shows: =wa appears in a different position, namely, next to the object and not to the subject. This














p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was Mary who bought a car.’ (intended)
The same reasoning holds when the question asks about the object. This is shown in (2.20). In this case, the
scope proposition (that Mary bought a car) and the evidential proposition (that the speaker has the relevant
evidence for this) are identical to (2.19), the only difference lying in the focus effect. Here the felicitous
answer to (2.20a) is (2.20b), where =wa is attached to the object. Note that, as in (2.19), if =wa is attached
to a different constituent, e.g., to the subject, as in (2.20c), the answer becomes infelicitous. This suggests,














p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was a car what Mary bought.’ (intended)
The discussion of (2.19)-(2.20) thus suggests that =wa is a focus marker—in addition to it being an eviden-
tial marker, as discussed in section 2.2.
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2.3.2 Contrastive focus
Another common case which involves focus marking concerns sentences with contrastive focus. An example
in English appears in (2.21). In this case, a contrast (in particular, a correction) involving the subject NPs
is shown. In this case, Joseph is the one making the purchase, not Mary, which creates an environment
involving focalization.
(2.21) Mary didn’t buy a car, [Joseph]F did.
The examples in (2.22)-(2.23) illustrate contrastive focus with argument NPs in Aymara (in particular, the
examples involve a correction; see Klose 2015 for additional discussion)—as in the cases treated in sec-
tion 2.3.1, the focus effects to be discussed are in addition to the evidential contribution. The case in (2.22)
involves a focalized subject. As in the English example in (2.21), the Aymara one in (2.22) involves a con-
trast involving the subject NPs. Crucially, the contrast is tied to the presence of =wa, as shown in (2.22b).
The way (2.22a)-(2.22b) together are to be understood can be translated as It wasn’t Mary who bought a car,










p: ‘Mary didn’t buy a car’







p: ‘Joseph bought a car’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’







p: ‘Joseph bought a car’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible for grounds p.’
f: ‘It was Joseph who bought a car.’ (intended)
The example in (2.23) is similar to (2.22), the difference lying in what NP is involved in the contrast. In this
case, a contrast involving the object NP is shown. Here as well, the contrast is tied to the presence of =wa,
13As can be seen in this sentence, the presence of the negative element jani ‘not’ has an effect on the morphosyntax of Aymara.
Two issues will be noted here in this regard: (i) there are elements that appear to be negative concord-like (here I am assuming
the approach adopted in traditional descriptions, such as Cerrón-Palomino 2008, who categorizes -ti as a morpheme involving
negation); and (ii) negation requires =wa to be located next to it. With regard to (ii), I assume overt movement of =wa from the
constituent that is marked with focus. See section 2.4 with regard to my assumptions about movement of =wa.
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as shown in (2.23b). The way (2.23a)-(2.23b) together are to be understood can be translated as It wasn’t
a car what Mary bought, it was a house. Attaching =wa to a different constituent for the relevant contrast









p: ‘Mary didn’t buy a house.’







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’







p: ‘Mary bought a car’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was a car what Mary bought.’ (intended)
The discussion with regard to (2.22)-(2.23) thus further suggests that =wa is a focus marker—in addition to
its evidential contribution discussed in section 2.2.
2.3.3 Interaction with superlatives
Another realm of grammar in which the discussion of focus has played a major role is in the discussion of
adjectival superlatives. Using English for illustration, a sentence like (2.24) is to be understood in terms of
Mary climbing the highest among mountains. Assuming for simplicity that all mountains are considered,
(2.24) is to be understood as Mary climbing Mount Everest, the highest among mountains.
(2.24) Mary climbed the highest mountain.
The reading just discussed for a sentence like (2.24) is called the absolute reading of superlatives—the one
corresponding to the highest mountain being climbed in this case. In contrast, there is another reading of
superlatives, namely, the relative (or comparative) reading. Crucially, this reading arises in the interaction
with focus, the main interest in this section in connection with =wa. Using English for illustration, consider
a variation of (2.24) involving focus, in particular, focus of the subject NP. For (2.25) to be felicitously
uttered, it need not be the case that the highest among mountains be climbed; instead, it suffices that, among
those who climbed mountains (and are relevant in a given context), Mary was the one who climbed the
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highest one, which need not be Mount Everest.
(2.25) [Mary]F climbed the highest mountain.
Turning to Aymara =wa, the issue then is: if =wa is indeed a focus marker (in addition to it being an
evidential marker), then the relative reading that arises when focus and superlatives interact (in particular)
should be present. This is in fact the case, as Martı́nez Vera (2018b) argues in recent work.
The case discussed in that work concerns verbal superlatives. Verbal superlatives can be intuitively
grasped with examples as in (2.26). The verbal superlative’s contribution corresponds to the underlined
expression, which is added to a sentence with a degree achievement, such as straighten, which conveys the
meaning that there has been an increase in degree (of straightness) for a theme (Hay et al. 1999; Winter
2006; Kennedy & Levin 2008; Pedersen 2015). The greatest degree involved corresponds to a degree of
change, i.e., (2.26) means that the amount/degree to which the hair changed in terms of straightness is the
greatest.
(2.26) Mary straightened the hair to the greatest degree (of straightness).
Verbal superlatives in Aymara involve degree achievements, which are to be understood in very similar terms
to their English counterparts (Martı́nez Vera 2018a,b) (i.e., in terms of an increase in degree for a theme),
to which a verbal superlative is added. Throughout this section, I will make use of the Aymara equivalent
of straighten, i.e., llusk’achaña (-ña is the infinitival marker); the verbal superlative in Aymara is the suffix
-su (see Martı́nez Vera 2018a,b for discussion regarding the morphological make-up of degree achievements
like llusk’achaña ‘straighten’ and why -su is to be analyzed as a verbal degree morpheme).
Before considering a case with a verbal superlative, consider the example in (2.27), which shows a
sentence without it. In the absence of -su, a sentence like (2.27) unambiguously means that the theme is
made straighter, without the greatest degree of straightness (for instance, the maximal degree of straightness







‘Mary straightened the hair (i.e., Mary made the hair straighter).’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:3)
(2.27) differs minimally from (2.28). In the latter, the verbal superlative -su is added. The reading of (2.28)
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(roughly) corresponds to the English sentence in (2.26). Thus, (2.28) means that Mary straightened the







‘Mary straightened the hair to the greatest degree (of straightness).’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:2)
Interestingly, the reading of (2.28) corresponds to what would be expected from a sentence with a verbal
superlative when an absolute reading is considered, as discussed by Martı́nez Vera (2018b). In the case
of adjectival superlatives, as discussed with regard to (2.24), the relevant degree to be considered was the
one corresponding to the highest mountain climbed. In the case of verbal superlatives, the absolute reading
corresponds to a change in degree for the theme, such that the degree reached as part of the change is a
degree of maximal straightness, i.e., (2.28) means that the theme was straightened in such a way that it
ended up fully straight.14,15
For the present discussion, what is of relevance is what happens when =wa is added to sentences like
(2.28). Martı́nez Vera (2018b) discusses this by adding =wa to the subject and object NPs. In addition to the
evidential contribution (which will be added to the examples in (2.29)-(2.30), based on my own fieldwork),
a focus effect arises, which is in fact parallel to the relative reading discussed regarding (2.25). There, it
was mentioned that Mary climbed the highest mountain among the people who climbed mountains; it was
not necessary that Mary climbed Mount Everest. In the case of verbal superlatives in Aymara, considering
first what happens when =wa is attached to the subject NP, the relative reading is as follows: among the
people (in the relevant comparison class) who straightened the hair, Mary was the one who straightened it
the most. Mary need not have straightened the hair to the maximum (making it fully straight); it suffices
that the degree of change reached in her straightening of the hair is greater than what other people (in the
14Even though the discussion in the main text makes use of a verb for which a maximal degree (that representing complete
straightness) is available (see, e.g., Kennedy & Levin 2008), the discussion is extensible to verbs for which no such degree is
available, such as qañuchaña ‘dirty’. The difference lies in that, in the equivalent of (2.28) with this verb, shown in (i), the degree







‘Mary dirtied that table to the greatest degree (of dirtiness).’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:2)
15An issue that arises in the discussion of verbal superlatives concerns what counts as the comparison class. Martı́nez Vera
(2018b) restricts the analysis to the VP-level, which is taken to involve a comparison class formed by degree-event pairs. The
comparison class in the present discussion will be assumed to be formed by elements of type hd, sti, i.e., functions from degrees to
propositions. See section 2.4 for details.
25







p: ‘Mary straightened the hair to the greatest degree (of straightness).’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was Mary (and not anybody else) the one who straightened the hair the most.’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:10)
Turning now to =wa being combined with the object, the relative reading is as follows: among the things
that Mary straightened, the hair was the thing that she straightened the most. In this case, Mary need not
have straightened the hair to the maximum (making it fully straight); it suffices that the degree of change
reached in her straightening of the hair is greater than the degree to which she straightened any other thing







p: ‘Mary straightened the hair to the greatest degree (of straightness).’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was the hair (and not anything else) what Mary straightened the most.’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:10)
The discussion in this and the previous sections thus suggests that =wa is a focus marker, so a focus compo-
nent should be tied to its core semantics. In addition to this, as discussed in section 2.2, =wa also makes an
evidential contribution to be understood in terms of the notion of best possible grounds. In the next section,
I provide an analysis that captures these two properties.
2.4 Proposal
This section proposes an analysis that makes explicit how =wa is a marker that makes an evidential con-
tribution in connection to focus. In section 2.4.1, I provide the core analysis of =wa, which accounts
for its evidential properties, and accounts for the question-answer pair and the contrastive focus cases. In




The basic elements of the proposal are the following: (i) the context of utterance includes a Question Under
Discussion (QUD), (ii) focus is interpreted in connection to the presence of alternatives to the scope propo-
sition, and (iii) there are two layers of meaning corresponding to the at-issue and the not-at-issue content,
such that the scope proposition constitutes at-issue content, and the evidential contribution and the focus
alternatives constitute not-at-issue content. I will spell-out each one of these in turn.16
With regard to (i), the QUD, I assume the question-based model of discourse structure developed by
Roberts (1996, 2004, 2012) (see also Beaver & Clark 2008). In this model, the goal of discourse participants
is to answer the question What is the way things are?. Her model makes use of the common ground and the
context set (Stalnaker 1978). The common ground is the set of propositions that are taken for granted by
speaker and hearer at a given point in discourse. The context set is the intersection of the set of propositions
in the common ground, i.e., the set of possible worlds compatible with what the discourse participants
take for granted. Discourse is understood as the progressive refinement of the context set, which involves
updating it incorporating the content of what is asserted by some discourse participant. Each assertion
expresses a proposition, which is a set of worlds in which it is true. By accepting an assertion, the context
set is updated by intersecting the current context set with the set expressed by that assertion. Ultimately, the
goal is to update the context set up to the point in which a single possible world is reached. In other words,
an answer to the question What is the way things are? is provided.
Roberts proposes that the narrowing down of the context set is driven by questions. Questions are to
be understood in terms of a set of possible answers (Hamblin 1973), and discourse progresses by raising
questions and answering them, which is done by discourse participants. For current purposes, it suffices
to consider simple question-answer exchanges, such that the question constitutes the QUD, which is a set
of possible answers (which are propositions), and the answer provides a proposition that (fully) solves the
QUD, i.e., it contains a proposition that constitutes a complete answer to the QUD (it says which proposition
of the QUD is the answer).17 For illustration, consider the question-answer pair in (2.31) (where I assume
that two distinct discourse participants utter the question and the answer). The QUD in this case are possible
answers to (2.31a), i.e., the set containing propositions that answer the question, such as that Mary laughed,
16I further assume familiarity with the truth-conditional semantics framework, as developed in, e.g., Heim & Kratzer (1998).
17In section 2.4.2, I make reference to a more flexible notion of the QUD when discussing the case of superlatives (see Beaver
& Clark 2008). In section 2.5, I further discuss the issue of whether the answer under consideration provides a complete answer to
the QUD.
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that Bill cried, that Joe died, etc. (i.e., QUD = {q | q 2 Dst}, where s is the type of worlds). (2.31b) provides
a (complete) answer: it contains the proposition that Mary laughed, which narrows down the context set to
the worlds in which Mary laughed.
(2.31) a. What happened?
b. Mary laughed.
As will become apparent below, here I assume an approach in which the QUD can be stated explicitly, as in
(2.31a) or can be accommodated (see Beaver & Clark 2008).
The second issue that needs to be introduced is how focus sensitivity will be understood (i.e., (ii) above).
In this regard, I adopt an approach that follows Beaver & Clark (2008) to a large extent, which in turn is
based on Roberts (1996, 2004) and Rooth (1985, 1992). There are two points to be addressed in connection
to how focus sensitivity will be understood, namely, how is the contribution of focus to be analyzed and
how does it relate to the QUD. With regard to the former, I assume that linguistic expressions, propositions
here, have an ordinary value and a focus value. The former corresponds to the standard meaning of the
proposition under consideration and the latter corresponds to the set of alternatives ALT of the proposition
under consideration (a set of propositions here); the proposition under consideration is a member of this set.
The alternatives are computed based on an element that is marked for focus, i.e., they will be propositions
that will vary in the value of the element marked by focus (the focalized element will be marked with F).
Consider the example in (2.32).
(2.32) [Mary]F laughed.
The original value of (2.32) is the proposition that Mary laughed (i.e., the original value of the sentence
in (2.32) is  w[laugh(m,w)])18 and the focus value of (2.32) is the set of propositions that differ in who
laughed, since Mary is the focalized element (i.e., ALT(J(2.32)K) = { w[laugh(x,w)] |x 2 De}).19 The
denotation of the original value in combination with the focus alternatives implicates that the denotation of
the original value (and not any of the other alternatives) is the one that answers the QUD (and not any other
of the alternatives).
18Throughout this section, I assume that verbal predicates denote relations (as is standard) which hold of some individual(s) in
some world(s) of evaluation. When discussing the superlative case, this will be slightly modified due to the introduction of degrees
and events for the analysis of degree achievements.
19See Rooth (1985, 1992), Beaver & Clark (2008), among others for further details regarding the compositionality of focus
alternatives in connection to examples such as (2.32). See Beaver & Clark (2008) for considerations with regard to the alternatives
involving the denotations of proper names. I set these aside here, as they are not the main focus of my discussion.
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With regard to the relation between focus and the QUD, here I assume that focus alternatives and the
QUD need to be congruent. I adopt Roberts (1996, 2004, 2012) notion of congruence, which states that
the QUD is equal to the alternatives of the proposition under consideration, i.e., the set of propositions that
constitute the QUD and the set of propositions which are the alternatives for a given proposition are equal
(see Beaver & Clark 2008 for a broader notion of congruence in that it does not require that the QUD and
the focus alternatives be equal).
The third issue regards the distinction between at-issue and not-at-issue content (i.e., (iii) above). As
anticipated in section 2.2.2, I assume this distinction in connection to evidentials, as discussed by Murray
(2017) (see also Potts 2005 et seq.).20 At-issue content corresponds to the proffered content of a sentence,
which, in the current discussion, corresponds to the scope proposition a given sentence denotes. As dis-
cussed in section 2.2.2, this content is challengeable and deniable. Not-at-issue content corresponds to
everything else, i.e., everything that is not the proffered content of a sentence. Here I assume that not-at-
issue content corresponds to the evidential contribution (which cannot be challenged or denied, as discussed
in section 2.2.2), and, following the focus literature, also includes the focus alternatives.21
With this setup, I will now turn to the analysis of sentences with the direct evidential =wa. I assume the
L(ogical) F(orm)s in (2.33). Taking the data presented in the previous sections at face value, which show
that =wa’s position is next to the focalized element, I assume that =wa’s base position is located next to the
focalized element. There are two cases to consider in the present discussion. The LF in (2.33a) represents
the case in which the whole sentence is focalized (the case where the propositional content of the sentence
is the answer to a What happened? question). Assuming that =wa takes a proposition as its argument and
that the sister of =wa is a proposition (with =wa being base generated in this position), there is no need for
movement in this case.22 The LF in (2.33b) illustrates the case with a focalized NP. =wa’s base generation
position is next to the relevant NP, which is focalized (marked with F) due to the presence of =wa—this,
I assume, is the role of =wa in this position; for concreteness this can be understood in terms of selection.
Here I assume covert movement of =wa, since its NP sister is not a proposition, creating a type mismatch.23
I further assume that =wa moves to some position in the structure where its sister is of the relevant type (i.e.,
20See Potts (2005 et seq.) for details regarding compositionality considerations of the not-at-issue contribution in particular.
21More precisely, the focus literature generally proposes that focus alternatives are presuppositional, which, in the present
discussion, corresponds to not-at-issue content (see footnote 5).
22In this chapter, it suffices that =wa be located in some position whose sister is an expression of the type of a proposition. It
could be some position in the left periphery, which may be labeled Evid(ential)P. Nothing hinges on this.
23An issue to explore in future research regards island effects in connection to the position of =wa, e.g., in cases involving
conjunction or left branch extraction.
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st) and that the trace left by =wa is vacuous (i.e., it plays no role in the semantic calculation) (see Wilkinson
1996 and Nakanishi 2012 for discussion along similar lines for English even).
(2.33) a. [[↵ ... ]F =wa ] J↵K 2 Dst
b. [[↵ ... [[ ]F t ] ... ] =wa ] J↵K 2 Dst, J K 2 De
Turning now to the denotation =wa, as anticipated, I assume that it takes a proposition as argument. Its
meaning includes at-issue and not-at-issue contents. The at-issue content corresponds to the propositional
denotation of the sentence under consideration (i.e., the scope proposition). The not-at-issue contents are
of particular interest here, as the evidential and the focus roles of =wa are included here. =wa’s evidential
contribution says that the speaker has the best possible grounds for the scope proposition. =wa’s focus
contribution are the focus alternatives of the scope proposition, which will vary depending on the focalized
material in the sentence under consideration (recall that the focus alternatives will be equal to the QUD, as
mentioned above). As a result, a sentence with =wa means that the speaker has the best possible grounds
for the proposition the sentence denotes and that this is the proposition among the alternatives considered
that answers the QUD. This discussion is captured in (2.34).
(2.34) For any sentence S that denotes proposition p, J=waK(JSK) =
at-issue: p
not-at-issue: a. The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.
b. ALT(JSK) = QUD
To illustrate the proposal, I consider three cases, namely, a case in which =wa focalizes the whole proposi-
tion and two cases in which =wa focalizes the subject NP (a question-answer case and a contrastive focus
case).24 Consider (2.35), which repeats example (2.18), to which I add the focus effect (which was included
in the main text only). As discussed in section 2.3.1, this is the case in which =wa appears at the end of the







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘What happened is that Mary bought a car.’
The sentence in (2.35) is the answer to a What happened? question (where the speaker has the evidence
to say so). This question could be stated explicitly or can be accommodated. The QUD is thus a set
24The proposal applied to cases with focalized NP objects is, mutatis mutandis, like the ones in which the subject NP is focalized.
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of propositions, e.g., that Mary bought a car, that Bill danced, that Joe drank water, etc. =wa combines
with the scope proposition that Mary bought a car and denotes the following: the at-issue content is that
Mary bought a car; the not-at-issue content is two-fold: (i) the speaker has the best possible grounds for
the proposition that Mary bought a car, and (ii) the focus alternatives are a set of propositions (which are
congruent with the QUD), e.g., that Mary bought a car, that Bill danced, that Joe drank water, etc. More
intuitively, (2.35) means that what happened is that Mary bought a car and the speaker has the best possible
grounds for this—I disregard tense in the characterization of the meanings in this and the following section.
(2.36) a. QUD = {q | q 2 Dst}
b. J=waK(J[Mary bought a car]FK) =
at-issue:  w[buy(m, c, w)]
not-at-issue: a. The speaker has the best possible grounds for  w[buy(m, c, w)].
b. ALT(J[Mary bought a car]FK) = {q | q 2 Dst}
Consider now a question-answer pair with a focalized NP. (2.37) repeats (2.19), with (2.37b) including a














p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was Mary who bought a car.’
Here the QUD is extractable from the question in (2.37a): it corresponds to the set of propositions saying
who bought a car, e.g., that Mary bought a car, that Bill bought a car, that Joe bought a car, etc. =wa
combines with the scope proposition that Mary bought a car and denotes the following: the at-issue content
is that Mary bought a car (which is just like in (2.36) above); the not-at-issue content is two-fold: (i)
the speaker has the best possible grounds for the proposition that Mary bought a car, and (ii) the focus
alternatives are a set of propositions (which are congruent with the QUD) which differ in the individuals
who bought a car, e.g., that Mary bought a car, that Bill bought a car, that Joe bought a car, etc. More
intuitively, (2.37b) means that it was Mary the one who bought a car and the speaker has the best possible
grounds for this.
(2.38) a. QUD = { w[buy(x, c, w)] |x 2 De}
b. J=waK(J[Mary]F bought a carK) =
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at-issue:  w[buy(m, c, w)]
not-at-issue: a. The speaker has the best possible grounds for  w[buy(m, c, w)].
b. ALT(J[Mary]F bought a carK) = { w[buy(x, c, w)] |x 2 De}
The case of contrastive focus in (2.39), which repeats (2.22), is very similar to (2.37)-(2.38). In addition
to the difference that Joseph is the individual of which the relevant proposition is true, the major difference
here is that the QUD is accommodated, which is done, I assume, based on (2.39a). The analysis of (2.39b)
appears in (2.40). (2.39b) means that it was Joseph the one who bought a car and that the speaker has the









p: ‘Mary didn’t buy a car’







p: ‘Joseph bought a car’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was Joseph who bought a car.’
(2.40) a. QUD = { w[buy(x, c, w)] |x 2 De}
b. J=waK(J[Joseph]F bought a carK) =
at-issue:  w[buy(j, c, w)]
not-at-issue: a. The speaker has the best possible grounds for  w[buy(j, c, w)].
b. ALT(J[Joseph]F bought a carK) = { w[buy(x, c, w)] |x 2 De}
Having proposed how evidentiality and focus can be brought together when sentences with =wa are consid-
ered, I will now turn to how my proposal can be extended to account for the interaction with superlatives.
2.4.2 Extension to the interaction with superlatives
Below I introduce my assumptions with regard to degree achievements. I adopt a scalar approach to degree
achievements (Hay et al. 1999; Kennedy & Levin 2008). In particular, this means that degree achievements
have a scale associated with them; this scale is inherited from some scalar (non-verbal) predicate, e.g., the
degree achievement straighten has a scale associated with it, which comes from the scalar predicate straight.
For simplicity, I will not make reference to the derivation of a verbal predicate from a scalar (non-verbal)
predicate, and will only make reference to degree achievements (see Kennedy & Levin 2008, in particular,
for details regarding how to derive a degree achievement from the respective scalar base; see Martı́nez Vera
2018a, 2020 for a similar discussion addressing the Aymara case).
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More formally, I assume that the scale associated with a degree achievement is a set of linearly or-
dered degrees along some dimension associated with the degree achievement (Cresswell 1976; Kennedy &
McNally 2005; Klein 1991; Pedersen 2015; Martı́nez Vera 2020):
(2.41) The scale S associated with a degree achievement  , i.e., S , is a pairing hS , <i, where < is a
linear order on S .
The minimal and maximal degrees in the scale associated with a degree achievement are defined in (2.42)
(note that if these degrees exist, they are unique, since the scale is linearly ordered):25
(2.42) a. minS  , the minimal degree 2 S , is defined as the degree d such that no degree d0 < d (for
d, d0 2 S ).
b. maxS  , the maximal degree 2 S , is defined as the degree d such that no degree d < d0 (for
d, d0 2 S ).
Adopting an approach which is based on Hay et al. (1999) and Kennedy & Levin (2008), I assume that
the denotation of degree achievements is understood in connection to a measure function. In particular, I
assume that degree achievement   is associated with a measure function µS  , which takes individual x and
eventuality e as input and gives degree d 2 S  as output (i.e., µS (x, e) = d); in other words, x measures
d 2 S  in e. Given that the relevant cases under discussion involve transitive uses of degree achievements,
that degree achievements involve change (more specifically, the degree to which an individual changes)
and that, ultimately, the relevant semantic objects in connection to focus and evidentiality are propositions,
I assume that degree achievements denote a relation   between degree (of change) d, individuals x, y,
eventuality e and world w such that  (x, y, d, e, w) holds iff, in event e in w, x caused that y measures
some degree d0 2 S  at the end of e, where d0 is the result of adding the degree d00 2 S  y measures at
the beginning of e plus d. This is stated in (2.43). For current purposes, in particular, in connection to the
presence of the superlative morpheme -su, I assume that degree achievements, as semantic objects, are of
type hd, he, he, hi, stiiii (where i is the type of eventualities).26
(2.43) For any degree achievement   (based on measure function µS  ), degree d, individuals x, y,
eventuality e and world w,  (x, y, d, e, w) holds iff, in e in w, x caused it to be the case that
µS (y, fin(e)) = d
0, where d0 = µS (y, ini(e)) + d.
I further assume that the relation denoted by degree achievements between degrees, individuals, eventualities
25See Kennedy & McNally (2005) for discussion regarding different kinds of scales that are associated with scalar predicates.
26See Martı́nez Vera (2018b, 2020) for discussion regarding what the compositional make-up of degree achievements in Aymara
is (including the external argument).
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and worlds is downward monotonic:
(2.44) A relation   between degrees, individuals, eventualities and worlds is downward monotonic iff
8d, d0, x, y, e, w[[ (x, y, d, e, w) ^ d > d0] !  (x, y, d0, e, w)].
To exemplify these notions, consider the sentence in (2.45). This sentence includes the degree achievement
straighten and denotes the proposition that Mary caused the hair to increase in straightness. This denotation
is represented, under my assumptions (see (2.43)), as (the at-issue content)  w9d[straight(m,h, d, e, w)].
Moreover, the relation denoted by straighten in this case is downward monotonic, i.e., the degree of change
d the hair has entails any other degree of change d0 as long as d is greater than d0 (see (2.44)).
(2.45) Mary straightened the hair.
I will now address the verbal superlative -su. I assume that the LF of sentences with -su (setting aside =wa
for the moment) is as in (2.46), where EA is the external (causer) argument, IA is the internal (theme) argu-
ment and   stands for degree achievements. As a degree morpheme, -su combines very low in the structure,
next to the degree achievement under consideration (see Martı́nez Vera 2018a, 2020 for evidence for this).
Following Martı́nez Vera (2018b), I assume that -su needs to move (covertly) due to a type mismatch (here I
assume that -su combines with an object of type hd, sti; see below), leaving a trace of type d. For simplicity,
I assume that -su moves all the way up in the tree (but below =wa).
(2.46) [[S  d [↵ ... [ EA [ IA [   t ]]]]] -su ] JSK 2 Dhd,sti, J↵K 2 Dst, JtK 2 Dd
Before introducing the denotation of -su, I will first introduce a MAX operator, which here applies to func-
tions from degrees to propositions (i.e., objects of the type with which -su combines) (Gajewski 2010; Hackl
2009; Heim 1999). This operator picks out that degree to which an object F of type hd, sti applies in a world,
which here I assume is the actual world @ (this will take place in unembedded contexts, which are the cases
discussed here), such that that degree entails any other degree to which F applies in @.
(2.47) MAX(Fhd,sti) = ◆d[F (d,@) = 1 ^ 8d0[F (d0,@) = 1 ! F (d) |= F (d0)]]
The denotation of -su appears in (2.48). As anticipated, -su combines with an object of type hd, sti. The
at-issue content, which is the relevant layer of meaning here, consists of a proposition where some degree
of change is reached; this degree exceeds any other degree of change in the objects in the comparison class.
More concretely, I assume that the comparison class introduced when combining with -su is formed by
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objects of type hd, sti (see below for additional discussion regarding the comparison class in connection to
the QUD). There would be at least two elements in this regard, namely, the argument of -su and some other
object(s) of type hd, sti. Crucially, the degree that is the result of MAX applied to -su’s argument is greater
that the degree that is the result of MAX applied to any other member in the comparison class. I assume that
the comparison class under discussion is tied to the QUD, in particular, the comparison class is formed by
elements that are in the QUD. The issue that arises here is that the elements that I have been discussing in
this regard are of type hd, sti, whereas the QUD is formed by elements of type st (i.e., by propositions). To
address this issue, I incorporate function f , which maps objects of type hd, sti into propositions (i.e., objects
of type st), i.e., for any Fhd,sti, f(F ) = 9d[F (d)]—as a result, f(F ) can be in the QUD.
(2.48) For any JSK 2 Dhd,sti, J-suK(JSK) =
at-issue:  w9d[JSK(d, w) ^ 8Ghd,sti[[JSK 6= G ^ 9d0, w0[G(d0, w0) = 1]^
JSK(d), f(G) 2 QUD] ! MAX(JSK) > MAX(G)]]
not-at-issue: n/a
To make things more concrete, let me illustrate what the denotation a sentence with -su would look like







p: ‘Mary straightened the hair to the greatest degree.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was Mary (and not anybody else) the one who straightened the hair the most.’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:10)
(2.50) includes the LF and the denotation of (2.49) before combining with =wa. The sentence means that
Mary straightened the hair to some degree and that such a degree exceeds any other degree of straightening
the hair in any other element with which the comparison takes place.
(2.50) a. [[S  d [ Mary [ the hair [ straighten t ]]]] -su ]
b. J-suK(JSK) =
at-issue:  w9d[JSK(d, w) ^ 8Ghd,sti[[JSK 6= G ^ 9d0, w0[G(d0, w0) = 1]^
JSK(d), f(G) 2 QUD] ! MAX(JSK) > MAX(G)]]
not-at-issue: n/a
I will now establish the links of the discussion about the superlative and the introduction of focus alternatives
in the denotation of =wa.27 For current cases with superlatives, I assume a more flexible notion with regard
27Beaver & Clark (2008) very briefly sketch an account of how it would look like to link the interaction of adjectival superlatives
and focus with the QUD. The account to follow explores this idea further by considering verbal superlatives.
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to the QUD (than the one discussed in section 2.4.1), in particular, following Beaver & Clark (2008), I
assume that the focus alternatives and the QUD are related via the subset relation (i.e., they need not be
identical, as assumed in section 2.4.1). For illustration, consider the English sentence in (2.51) with an
adjectival superlative and a focalized subject:
(2.51) [Mary]F gave Peter the biggest gift.
The relevant case here regards the reading in which there is a(n independently) salient set of gifts, e.g., a set
of gifts at Peter’s birthday party. The biggest gift is simply one of these gifts; crucially, (2.51) answers the
QUD of who gave Peter that gift.
I now turn to the consideration, in abstract terms, of combining a proposition (the one that results from
combining -su with a function from degrees to propositions) and =wa. This is stated in (2.52). The at-
issue contribution is as stated in (2.48), i.e., a proposition where (roughly speaking) an event of change
takes place such that some degree of change exceeds any other degree of change in the relevant comparison
class (formed by elements in the QUD). The not-at-issue contribution, which is brought in by =wa has two
components, as discussed in section 2.4.1 (see (2.34)). It provides the evidential contribution (stated in
terms of best possilble grounds) and the focus alternatives, which are, as discussed in this section, a subset
of the QUD. What is important here is that the at-issue proposition is the member of this set that is the case
in that the maximal degree of change in this alternative exceeds any other maximal degree in some other
alternative.
(2.52) For any JSK 2 Dhd,sti, J=waK(J-suK(JSK)) =
at-issue:  w9d[JSK(d, w) ^ 8Ghd,sti[[JSK 6= G ^ 9d0, w0[G(d0, w0) = 1]^
JSK(d), f(G) 2 QUD] ! MAX(JSK) > MAX(G)]]
not-at-issue: a. The speaker has the best possible grounds for J-suK(JSK).
b. ALT(J-suK(JSK)) ✓ QUD







p: ‘Mary straightened the hair to the greatest degree.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
f: ‘It was Mary (and not anybody else) the one who straightened the hair the most.’
(Martı́nez Vera 2018b:10)
(2.54) a. QUD= { w9d[straighten(x, h, d, e, w)] |x 2 De}
b. J=waK(J-suK(J[Mary]F straightened the hairK)) =
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at-issue:  w9d[straighten(m,h, d, e, w)^
8Ghd,sti[[ d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)] 6= G ^ 9d0, w0[G(d0, w0) = 1]
^ d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)](d), f(G) 2 QUD] !
MAX( d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)]) > MAX(G)]]
not-at-issue: a. The speaker has the best possible grounds for
 w9d[straighten(m,h, d, e, w)^
8Ghd,sti[[ d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)] 6= G^
9d0, w0[G(d0, w0) = 1]^
 d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)](d), f(G) 2 QUD] !
MAX( d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)]) > MAX(G)]].
b. ALT(J-suK(J[Mary]F straightened the hairK)) =
{ w9d[straighten(x, h, d, e, w)
8Ghd,sti[[ d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)] 6= G^
9d0, w0[G(d0, w0) = 1]^
 d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)](d), f(G) 2 QUD] !
MAX( d00 w00[straighten(m,h, d00, e, w00)]) > MAX(G)]] |x 2 De}
(2.53)’s meaning is characterized as follows: the QUD can be stated in words as Who straightened the
hair?. The at-issue content is the proposition that Mary straightened the hair the most, which provides an
answer to the QUD, as required. There are two aspects in the not-at-issue content. The first one concerns
the evidential contribution of =wa: it is specified that the speaker has the best possible evidence for the
scope proposition, as needed. The second aspect concerns the focus alternatives. This set is congruent
with the QUD, as required by assumption. It makes explicit that the alternatives being considered involve
individuals straightening the hair; crucially, only one alternative is the case, namely, the proposition that
Mary straightened the hair the most, as the degree of change in this case exceeds the degree of change being
considered in any other alternative. This captures the judgment for this and similar sentences (see (2.53)).
Overall, the proposal discussed in the previous section addressing question-answer pairs and contrastive
focus, and the extension of the proposal to account for the superlative case constitute the first account in
the literature of all three cases making explicit what is needed to give a unitary account of all of them.
In general, the previous literature has discussed these two topics involving focus separately: cases such as
question-answer pairs and contrastive focus are not treated on a par with cases involving interaction of focus
and superlatives.
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2.5 =wa and focus sensitive items more broadly
The discussion in the previous sections has provided an answer to the question of whether focus and eviden-
tiality can be both tied in a single marker. Looking at a number of phenomena, I have argued that a single
marker can in fact convey both meanings and have proposed a semantics that makes explicit in what sense
this is possible under current theorizing—in particular, the approach pursued has shown that there is nothing
inherently to evidentiality or focus that makes these categories incompatible. Having settled the issue of it
being possible to conflate evidentiality and focus under the same marker, a question that one could ask is
perhaps a deeper one in that it aims at looking for a reason for the existence of such marker. In particular,
why should it be possible for evidentiality and focus to be conflated under the same marker? This section
provides an initial answer to this question, showing that this conflation is not actually to be unexpected.
The starting point for the discussion was the standard approach to focus, specifically, as was mentioned
in section 2.4.1, that the denotation of the original value in combination with the focus alternatives implicates
that the denotation of the original value is the one that answers the QUD. This section goes one step further
into this direction likening =wa to focus sensitive items more generally (on the latter, see, e.g., Horn 1969,
1996, 2011; Karttunen & Peters 1979; Taglicht 1984; Rooth 1985, 1992, 2016; Atlas 1991, 1993; von
Stechow 1991; Krifka 1992, 1993; Bonomi & Casalegno 1993; Bonomi & Casalegno 1993; von Fintel
1997; Herburger 2000; Geurts & van der Sandt 2004; Fox 2007; Giannakidou 2006; van Rooij & Schulz
2007; Chierchia et al. 2012; Beaver & Clark 2008; Ippolito 2008; Beaver & Coppock 2014).
In addition to triggering focus alternatives, which here are analyzed as not-at-issue and were discussed
in section 2.2.2 within the discussion of the evidential component of =wa, a common approach to focus
sensitive items involves (i) some kind of ordering (e.g., an ordering based on expectations) imposed on fo-
cus alternatives, and (ii) some kind of discourse sensitivity, i.e., some discourse considerations have to be in
place for it to be possible to utter an expression with such an item.28 For illustration, consider the case of
even, a scalar additive. It is commonly agreed that, in this case, there is an ordering in the propositions under
consideration involving the expectations of the addressee, i.e., the addressee would expect some proposi-
tion(s) to be the case over some other proposition(s). Thus, for instance, when considering a sentence like
(2.55), there are a number of propositions under consideration, e.g., that Mary arrived early, that Peter ar-
rived early, that Sue arrived early, etc., such that that Mary arrived early occupies a low position in an scale,
28I would like to especially thank Adrian Brasoveanu for discussion of the contents to follow.
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which is ordered according to the addressee’s expectations as to who would arrive early. This low-ranked
proposition is the one that is uttered, which implies that the other propositions are also the case, given that
if this low-ranked proposition is the case, then the other ones must also be the case.
(2.55) Even [Mary]F arrived early.
The discourse sensitivity mentioned above is here captured by means of the QUD. Thus, for instance, in
the case of (2.55), where Mary is focalized, the QUD would be Who arrived early?, i.e., the set of propo-
sitions represented as { w[arrive-early(x,w)] |x 2 De}. (2.55) comments on the QUD, i.e., it provides
an answer to it. Recall in this regard that the QUD and the focus alternatives must be congruent. For cur-
rent purposes, let us stick to the narrower notion of congruence in section 2.4.1, whereby the QUD and the
focus alternatives are equal. This is in fact the case with regard to (2.55): the focus alternatives are also
propositions stating who arrived early—even is associated with the focalized element, Mary. If the alterna-
tives had been of a different form but the QUD stayed the same, e.g., if instead of alternatives varying for
individuals they would vary for verbal predicates, then congruence would be violated. Thus, (2.56b), which
triggers alternatives varying for verbal predicates, as an answer to (2.56a), which makes the QUD explicit,
is infelicitous.
(2.56) a. Who arrived early?
b. #Mary even [arrived early]F.
Here I propose that =wa is similar to focus sensitive items such as even in that it displays these two properties
as well: (i) there is an ordering involved and (ii) there is discourse sensitivity. Most pieces are in place with















p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
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f: ‘It was Mary who bought a car.’ (intended)
The reasoning in connection to discourse sensitivity is very similar to what was discussed regarding (2.55)-
(2.56) with even. In this case, (2.57a) makes the QUD explicit, which here is { w[buy(x, c, w)] |x 2
De}. (2.57b) comments on the QUD, i.e., it provides an answer to it. This is the case, because the focus
alternatives are congruent with the QUD, which is tied to the locus of =wa, which focalizes the subject NP
(see section 2.3). If the subject NP were not focalized, then infelicity would arise. This is in fact the case
with (2.57c): the focalized expression is the object NP (=wa is located next to it), not the subject NP, so
the alternatives are incongruent with the QUD—the focus alternatives of (2.57c) would be represented as
{ w[buy(m,x,w)] |x 2 De}, where the alternatives vary in the object. Thus, uttering (2.57c) as an answer
to (2.57a) is infelicitous. =wa is thus like even: it displays association with focus, triggering the presence of
alternatives that need to be congruent with the QUD.
In addition to such discourse sensitivity, =wa appears to impose an ordering on the focus alternatives.
The particular kind of ordering is what differs from even. In that case, the ordering was based on expecta-
tions. In the case of =wa, I suggest that the ordering is based on the evidence available to the speaker. The
proposal made here is that evidentiality induces an ordering into the focus alternatives whereby the propo-
sitions for which the speaker has the best possible grounds, the evidential contribution of =wa, stand out or,
more concretely, are stronger for the speaker, because s/he has grounds for these particular alternatives—and
not any of the other ones, as s/he does not have the relevant grounds for them. The evidential effect on focus
alternatives in terms of strength of the evidence is stated in (2.58).
(2.58) Evidential effect on focus alternatives
For any proposition(s) p 6= q 2 ALT(p), speaker S, p is stronger than q for S, represented as
q <S p, iff S has the best possible grounds for p, which is not the case for q.
Thus, the ordering evidentiality imposes on the focus alternatives creates a split between two groups of
propositions: on the one hand, there will a group formed by the propositions for which the speaker has the
best possible grounds; on the other hand, there will be a group formed by all the alternatives that are not
the propositions for which the speaker has the best possible grounds. In particular, evidentiality induces
an ordering with regard to these two groups (it has nothing to say with regard to whether the propositions
in these groups are ordered with respect to each other). In this sense, the speaker is only committed to
having the best possible evidence for some proposition(s) (i.e., the scope proposition(s)), remaining silent
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as to whether there is solid evidence for some other alternative). Based on these grounds, assuming, under
standard Gricean reasoning, that the speaker wants to make a qualitative contribution (i.e., everything for
which s/he has the best possible grounds for in this case), s/he will assert these alternatives (in the cases
discussed in this chapter, what is asserted is an expression whose meaning is the scope proposition, which is
at-issue). This is stated in (2.59), which follows from (2.58) in combination with standard Gricean reasoning.
(2.59) Evidence based assertion corollary
Assert all propositional content for which the relevant individual (i.e., the speaker S) has the best
possible grounds.
This approach is compatible with the discussion thus far. Thus, in an exchange as the one in (2.60) (which
repeats (2.19a)-(2.19b)), the speaker who utters (2.60b) has the best possible grounds for a particular propo-
sition, and asserts it. The speaker is committed to that proposition being the case. This speaker has no
commitments whatsoever as to whether some other proposition (some other alternative) is the case or not.
S/he has only expressed that s/he has the relevant evidence for some proposition and, among a number















p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
This approach makes an interesting prediction with regard to whether sentences with =wa provide complete
and/or strongly exhaustive (henceforth, exhaustive) answers to the QUD (see Dayal 2016; Theiler 2014
for recent overviews). Recall in this regard section 2.4.1, where it was mentioned that the at-issue content
provides a complete answer to the QUD. The discussion in this section gives content to this. To illustrate
(non-)complete and (non-)exhaustive answers, consider the English question in (2.61) in a context with four
relevant individuals: Mary, John, Bill and Sue:
(2.61) Who went to the party?
This question can be answered in different ways, as illustrated in (2.62). The answer in (2.62a) is complete
and exhaustive, i.e., it mentions all the people who went to the party and indicates who did not go as well.
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Indicating all the individuals with a certain property makes the answers complete, while if, in addition, it is
also indicated what individuals do not have that property makes it exhaustive. (2.62b) is a complete answer
in that it only mentions all the individuals with the relevant property, but is non-exhaustive in that it does
not say anything about those who do not have the property. (2.62c) is neither complete nor exhaustive: all
the individuals with a certain property are not mentioned, and not all individuals are characterized in terms
of having or not having the relevant property.
(2.62) a. Mary and John went to the party, but Bill and Sue didn’t.
b. Mary and John went to the party.
c. Mary went to the party.
Turning back to Aymara =wa, proposing a scale that creates a split among alternatives for which there is and
there is not the best possible grounds such that the speaker asserts all the propositional content for which
s/he has the relevant evidence predicts that the speaker will provide a complete non-exhaustive answer. To
illustrate this, I will assume the following setup as baseline. Suppose that there are three people, Mary,
Joseph and Susi. Both the speaker and the addressee know them (and these three individuals are salient in
context) and the issue under discussion involves whether each one bought a car. Suppose further that the
speaker has the best possible grounds for Mary and Joseph having bought a car (I come back to the status
of Susi in this context below, setting aside for a moment whether the speaker does not know whether Susi
bought a car or whether s/he knows that Susi did not buy a car). In this context, (2.66) is a felicitous answer
















p: ‘Mary and Joseph (each) bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
There are three variations in connection to this context that I would like to consider. First, suppose that,
instead of answering (2.63a) as in (2.63b), the speaker decides to only say that Mary bought a car, as in
(2.64), i.e., to provide an incomplete answer. Interestingly, consultants say that such an answer is infelic-
itous, because the speaker is hiding information. This suggests that, when uttering a sentence with =wa,
29The answer in (2.66), with conjoined subjects, could also be stated in several conjoined sentences, i.e., Mary bought a car and
Joseph bought a car (too). Nothing hinges on the expository choice made in this regard.
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the speaker must share everything they have the relevant evidence for, as stated in (2.59). In other words,
sentences with =wa provide a complete answer to the QUD, at least as far as the evidence available to the







p: ‘Mary bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The second and third variations bear on the evidence or lack thereof the speaker has with regard to Susi
buying a car. These variations bear on the issue of exhaustiveness of the answers given, i.e., whether it is
entailed that only what is stated and nothing else is the case. In the case at hand, if sentences with =wa
provided exhaustive answers, then uttering (2.66) would entail that nobody else (in particular, Susi) bought
a car. Suppose first that the speaker does not know whether Susi bought a car or that the speaker has some
grounds (but not the best possible ones) for Susi having bought a car. In this context, the speaker’s answer
to (2.63a) would simply be (2.63b), i.e., s/he would state what s/he knows only. That is, the speaker need
not say anything about Susi in the absence of (the best) grounds. This suggests that answers with =wa are
non-exhaustive.
That this suggestion is on the right track is strengthened when considering the third variation of the
context. In this case, suppose that the speaker knows that Susi did not buy a car. If answers with =wa were
exhaustive, then uttering (2.63b) would already entail that Susi did not buy a car. Thus, overtly stating that
Susi did not buy a car after stating that Mary and Joseph bought a car would be infelicitous.30 Such infelicity
does not arise however. Instead, stating (2.65) after having uttered (2.63b) is possible, which suggests that









‘Susi didn’t buy a car.’
Actually, the claim that answers with =wa are non-exhaustive finds independent support, because in Aymara
there is a morphological marker that would be added to sentence (2.63b) in case it provided an exhaustive
answer. The marker is the limitative suffix -ki. (2.66) does mean that only Mary and Joseph bought a car
30This is the case with English only: (i) entails that nobody else bought a car. A follow-up like (In fact,) Sue didn’t buy a car is
infelicitous.











p: ‘Mary and Joseph (each), and nobody else, bought a car.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The discussion in this section has thus shown that items like =wa are very similar to focus sensitive items.
In addition to being tied to triggering focus alternatives as part of the not-at-issue content, they display
properties that have been independently discussed in connection to focus sensitive items. In particular, I
focused on discourse sensitivity: just like expressions with focus sensitive items, expressions with =wa need
to comment on the QUD. I also concentrated on the presence of an ordering imposed on focus alternatives.
Here is where the peculiarity of items like =wa becomes apparent: the ordering is stated in terms of the
relevant evidence the speaker has. Note, however, that the same components remain, the only difference
being on what makes the ordering in =wa special. Based on the discussion, it would not seem unnatural
for natural language to develop markers that conflate evidentiality and focus marking. Ultimately, such
markers, like =wa, would basically be like any other focus sensitive element which incorporate an evidential
component conveying that the speaker has evidence for some proposition and imposing an evidence based
ordering on the focus alternatives under consideration.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has made the empirical claim that the evidential enclitic =wa in Southern Aymara (an under-
studied Andean language), in addition to being a direct evidential, is a focus marker. To this end, I have
provided evidence that =wa is an evidential which states that the speaker has the best possible grounds for
a scope proposition. I have furthered shown that this evidential contribution cannot be challenged, as is the
case with the evidential contribution of this kind of markers cross-linguistically. I have also provided evi-
dence for =wa as a focus marker by means of the consideration of question-answer pairs, contrastive focus
cases and the interaction with superlatives. I have then provided an analysis of =wa as an evidential which
is simultaneously a focus marker. The analysis has been based on the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction,
where both the evidential contribution and the alternatives triggered by focus are not-at-issue content, the
scope proposition being the at-issue content. Building on the analysis, I have further explored a deeper
reason as to why the presence of a marker that conflates evidentiality and focus should not be unexpected
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cross-linguistically. I have suggested that items like =wa are basically just like focus sensitive items, such
as even. I showed that, in addition to be tied to triggering focus alternatives, =wa displays a discourse sen-
sitivity that is similar to focus sensitive items. I further showed that =wa imposes an ordering on the focus
alternatives under consideration, just like focus sensitive items. The difference only lies in that the criterion
to establish an ordering in the case of =wa is determined by the evidence available to the speaker.
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Direct evidentiality and discourse in
Southern Aymara
Abstract: This chapter discusses the discourse contrasts that arise in connection to direct evidentiality in
Southern Aymara (henceforth, Aymara), an understudied Andean language. Aymara has two direct eviden-
tials, i.e., the enclitic =wa and the covert morpheme -[e]. I make the novel observations that a sentence with
=wa can be felicitously uttered if the speaker alone is in a position to utter such a sentence (i.e., she has the
relevant evidence for the proposition the sentence denotes), and there is some previous discourse to which
the proposition such a sentence denotes can contribute, whereas a sentence with -[e] can be felicitously
uttered if the speaker and somebody else is in a position to express the proposition such a sentence denotes
(the presence of previous discourse is not required). I show that this split has a thus far unattested effect
on direct challengeability possibilities to sentences with evidentials. I further identify which construction
can be used in different discourse settings (e.g., conversation openers and narration of stories) and what the
effects of these constructions are on the hearer in connection to confirming and challenging the proposition
the speaker proposes. I implement a formal analysis based on Farkas & Bruce (2010) (see also Murray
2017; Faller 2019) that makes explicit what the links between evidentiality and discourse are.
Keywords: direct evidentiality, discourse, at-issue, not-at-issue, Aymara
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the discourse contrasts that arise in connection to direct evidentiality in Southern
Aymara (henceforth, Aymara), an understudied Andean language.1 Evidentiality is a grammatical cate-
gory whose core meaning encodes the source of information an individual (hereafter, the speaker) draws on
regarding that piece of information (Aikhenvald 2004) (see also Aikhenvald 2018). In particular, direct evi-
1Typologically, Aymara is a suffixal and to some extent agglutinative language whose unmarked word order is SOV. I focus on
the dialect of the town of Pomata (province of Chicuito, department of Puno) that is spoken by 13,637 people (Instituto Nacional
de Estadı́stica e Informática 2010).
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dentiality is generally characterized in terms of having first-hand evidence, e.g., the evidence an individual
has for a given piece of information comes from direct perception.
Descriptive work on Aymara (Hardman 2001; Cerrón-Palomino 2008; Coler 2014) mentions that this
language has a direct evidential, i.e., the enclitic =wa. =wa is used when the speaker has first-hand evidence
for the proposition being asserted. An example appears in (3.1). This sentence can be felicitously uttered
when the speaker has direct evidence for p, e.g., the speaker saw that it rained in Puno. Throughout this
chapter, the given piece of information for which evidence is provided is to be understood as a proposition—
it will be referred to as the scope proposition p. The evidence the relevant individual has for some proposition





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Interestingly, a speaker may also utter a sentence like (3.2), without =wa, if she has direct evidence for this
proposition, i.e., the evidential contribution making explicit that the speaker has direct evidence is present





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
However, sentences like (3.1), with =wa, and sentences like (3.2), without =wa, are not simply interchange-
able. This chapter argues that sentences with and without =wa differ with regard to their properties in
discourse (see, among others, Stalnaker 1978; Roberts 1996, 2004, 2012; Gunlogson 2001, 2008; Farkas
& Bruce 2010; Murray 2010, 2014, 2017; Anderbois et al. 2015; Faller 2019). Specifically, I show that a
sentence with =wa can be felicitously uttered if (i) only the speaker is in a position to utter such a sentence
(i.e., she has the relevant evidence for the proposition the sentence denotes), and (ii) there is some discourse
structure (i.e., some previous discourse) to which the proposition such a sentence denotes can contribute. In
contrast, a sentence without =wa can be felicitously uttered if the speaker and somebody else is in a position
to express the proposition such a sentence denotes—in this case, there is no need for previous discourse for
2Abbreviations: 1 = first person, 3 = third person, AG = agentive, ACC = accusative, DEP = dependent clause affix, DUR =
durative, INT = interrogative, LIM = limitative, LOC = locative, NEG = negation, PST = past, POSS = possessive, PROG = progressive,
REFL = reflexive, S = subject, SG = singular, SUB = subordinator, TOP = topic.
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it to be possible to utter such a sentence.
I show that this split has an effect on direct challengeability possibilities regarding sentences with eviden-
tials. In addition, I identify which construction can be used in different discourse settings (e.g., conversation
openers and narration of stories) and what the effects of the constructions under discussion are on the hearer
in connection to confirming and challenging the proposition that the speaker proposes. To capture these
properties and contrasts, I implement a formal analysis that is based on Farkas & Bruce (2010) (see also
Murray 2017; Faller 2019). Overall, the discussion in this chapter contributes with a novel distinction in the
domain of (direct) evidentiality that makes explicit some links between evidentiality and discourse.
The data to be discussed in this chapter are based on two sources of information: previous literature, in
particular, Hardman (2001) and Cerrón-Palomino (2008) (see also Cépeda 2011; Coler 2014; Klose 2015),
and original fieldwork with two consultants. The methodology used for the latter involved the presentation
of contextual scenarios using Spanish as an auxiliary language, which was followed by a request for a
felicity judgment on a particular grammatical sentence given that contextual scenario (see Matthewson 2004;
Davis et al. 2014; Bochnak & Matthewson 2015 for discussion regarding the soundness and validity of the
aforementioned methodological choices).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the notion of direct evidentiality in the Aymara
constructions under consideration. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the constructions under discussion in con-
nection to the properties of commitment, direct challengeability and projection. Section 3.5 focuses on the
discourse contrasts in sentences with and without =wa. Section 3.6 proposes a formal analysis that makes
explicit how to capture the properties of the constructions under discussion. Section 3.7 is the conclusion.
3.2 Direct evidentiality
This section characterizes direct evidentiality in Aymara. According to Cerrón-Palomino (2008), direct
evidentiality in this language is to be understood in terms of the speaker having first-hand evidence for some
piece of information. Specifically, direct evidentiality in Aymara is to be understood in terms of the notion
of the best possible grounds, which was first used to characterize the Cuzco Quechua direct evidential -mi
(Faller 2002; see also McCready 2015; Matthewson 2018)—it is worth pointing out that Cuzco Quechua
and Aymara are typologically very similar (see, e.g., Cerrón-Palomino 2008 for extensive discussion).3
3More recently, McCready (2015) discusses a number of issues in connection to the notion of reliability in general, and,
specifically, in connection to the notion of the best possible grounds as discussed by Faller (2002). Here I assume Faller’s notion of
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In a nutshell, direct evidentiality conveys the meaning that the speaker has “the best possible source of
information” relative to the type of information brought in by the proposition under consideration (Faller
2002:123).
The question is what counts as “the best possible source of information.” As is well-known, a major
distinction that have been identified in the evidential literature regards that of direct and indirect evidence
(see Willett 1988 for seminal work in this regard; see Faller 2002 for critical discussion of evidential hierar-
chies; see also Matthewson 2018).4 Direct evidence is tied to direct perception, which can be thought of as
direct visual perception for current purposes. Indirect evidence basically covers reportative and inferential
evidence. As discussed in the literature, while direct evidence is preferable over indirect evidence, repor-
tative and inferential evidence cannot be ranked. As for an evidential conveying the best possible grounds,
what is relevant is to determine what kind of evidence would be best for the proposition under consideration,
where the most direct access to the information is best (Faller 2002:18). Thus, if the information under con-
sideration is, in principle, observable, then direct (visual) perception would have to be the evidence that the
speaker has to use such an evidential. Only in the absence of such a possibility, other sources (i.e., indirect
evidence) may count as the best possible grounds.
As anticipated in section 3.1, there are two kinds of sentences that convey that the speaker has direct
evidence in Aymara, namely, sentences with the overt marker =wa and sentences without this marker. In
what follows, for concreteness, I assume that, in sentences without =wa, there is an empty evidential, which
is represented as -[e].5 As for the evidence available to the speaker, given that (3.3)-(3.4) involve raining
eventualities, which are, in general, observable, these can be felicitously uttered when the speaker’s evidence





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
the best possible grounds, which suffices for current purposes. I refer the reader to McCready (2015) for detailed discussion where
reliability and best possible grounds are modeled making use of probabilities. This approach can, in principle, be made compatible
with the current discussion, but I leave this task for the future.
4In this section, I set aside some additional cases that Faller discusses, which involve authorities, general knowledge, etc. Here
the distinction between direct and indirect evidence as applied to personal information suffices. See section 3.5 for discussion with
regard to those additional sources of evidence in connection to the discourse distinctions between sentences with =wa and sentences
with -[e], which is where these become relevant.
5Assuming this covert marker follows Murray (2010, 2017). She argues that, in Chenyenne, there is a covert direct evidential,






p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
There are cases, however, in which direct perception is unfeasible. Specifically, I address cases where
the best possible grounds are based on indirect evidence. Consider (3.5)-(3.8). With regard to (3.5)-(3.6),
suppose that Mary is sick (and one cannot tell by looking at her that she is indeed sick); Mary herself tells
the speaker that she is sick. Based on Mary’s report, who knows best about her health, the speaker can utter





p: ‘Mary was sick.’





p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The cases in (3.7)-(3.8) involve inferential evidence. Suppose that the speaker looked for a notebook in
her backpack (and did so thoroughly), but did not find it. The absence of the notebook in the backpack is,
strictly speaking, non-observable, but she can safely infer that this is the case. This is the most direct way








p: ‘The notebook wasn’t in the backpack.’







p: ‘The notebook wasn’t in the backpack.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
In what follows, since the ultimate goal of this chapter is to account for the discourse-related properties
of clauses involving direct evidentiality, I use direct evidence or the best possible grounds interchangeably.
Ultimately, what is of relevance here is that there are two constructions in Aymara that involve the same
kind of direct evidentiality—namely, those with =wa and those without =wa (i.e., with -[e]).
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3.3 Commitment
One of the issues that the literature about evidentials has focused on has been pinning down the properties
that, on the one hand, characterize evidentials as a linguistic category, and, on the other hand, distinguish
different kinds of evidentials. For instance, in recent work on evidentiality from a cross-linguistic perspec-
tive, Murray (2017) (see also Korotkova 2016, 2020) discusses how different evidentials fare with regard
to the properties of commitment, direct challengeability, projection, embedding, and interaction with ques-
tions. Two of these properties are especially relevant in that they are connected to discourse-related matters,
which are the relevant ones in the current discussion. These are commitment and direct challengeability.
The former is discussed in this section; the latter is discussed in the next section. In addition, I briefly touch
on the issue of projection in the next section as well.
Commitment is, roughly speaking, a property that is tested in connection to sentences with evidentials
to determine whether the speaker’s position is that the scope proposition and the evidential proposition have
to be the case or not. Ultimately, this is relevant here given that discourse involves making explicit what a
speaker considers to be the case when, e.g., making an assertion in a particular exchange (see, e.g., Stalnaker
1978; Roberts 1996, 2004, 2012; Gunlogson 2001, 2008; Farkas & Bruce 2010; Murray 2010, 2017). The
commitments of the speaker can be tested via continuations to the target sentences that challenge her beliefs
or the evidence she has when uttering such sentences. With regard to the commitment of the speaker to the
scope proposition, one such a continuation is of the form but I don’t think/believe it’s true. This continuation
targets whether the speaker must be committed to the scope proposition (i.e., whether she is committed to
the scope proposition being the case). With regard to the commitment to the evidential proposition, the
continuation makes reference to the kind of evidence the speaker has. Thus, if the evidence is based on direct
visual perception, the continuation could be of the form but I didn’t see that. These kinds of continuations
target whether the speaker must be committed to the evidential proposition (i.e., whether she must have the
relevant kind of evidence to make a particular claim).
As for direct evidentials, the literature shows that, cross-linguistically, there is commitment to both the
scope proposition and the evidential proposition (see Murray 2017 for recent discussion).6 This is also the
6With other evidentials, this picture may vary with regard to the commitment to the scope proposition—in all cases, there
is commitment to the evidential proposition. Thus, in the presence of inferential evidentials, there is commitment to at least the
possibility of the scope proposition being the case. In the presence of reportative evidentials, there may or may not be commitment
to the (possibility of the) scope proposition being the case. In this regard, there is a weaker version of the test that involves the
consideration of the possibility of the truth of the scope proposition, which is helpful to determine whether the evidential under
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case in Aymara: in clauses involving direct evidentiality (both with =wa and -[e]), the speaker is committed
to the scope proposition and to the evidential proposition. This is shown in (3.9)-(3.10)—in the examples,
the relevant continuations are added to sentences (3.3)-(3.4) respectively, which involve evidence that is the
result of direct (visual) perception. Consider (3.9) first, which involves clauses with =wa. (3.9a) adds the
continuation concerning the commitment to the scope proposition; (3.9b) adds the continuation concerning
the commitment to the evidential proposition.7 In both cases, the speaker is committed to both the scope
and the evidential proposition when uttering a sentence with =wa, since both the continuation saying that
the speaker does not believe that it rained in Puno (3.9a) and the continuation saying that the speaker does














‘It rained in Puno, but I don’t think it’s true.’













‘It rained in Puno, but I didn’t see that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for (stating that) it rained in Puno.’
Similar considerations apply in (3.10), which are sentences with -[e]. Specifically, the continuations are
infelicitous, which indicate that the speaker is committed to the scope proposition and to the evidential


























‘It rained in Puno, but I didn’t see that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for (stating that) it rained in Puno.’
This section has shown that, with regard to the commitment to the scope proposition and to the evidential
consideration involves a modal component. This test involves a continuation such as but I’m not sure about it. Here I only focus
on the stronger test in the main text, since, in the Aymara cases under discussion, which conform to what has been found cross-
linguistically with respect to direct evidentials, the weaker test yields infelicity, which suggests that a modal qualification is not
required. See Faller (2002, 2007), Matthewson et al. (2007), Murray (2017) for discussion.
7As can be noted in the continuations, in the presence of negation, the evidential =wa changes position, appearing next to the
negation word jani ‘not’. Addressing this change, triggered in the presence of negation, which is also tied to the presence of other
elements in the verb (see the glosses in (3.9)), lies beyond the scope of this chapter.
8Similar considerations apply in scenarios where the best possible grounds are indirect.
9Similar considerations apply in scenarios where the best possible grounds are indirect.
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proposition, sentences with =wa and -[e] display the same properties, i.e., the speaker has to be committed
to them both. This is another characteristic in which sentences with =wa and -[e] are alike—in addition to
conveying that the evidential meaning is to be understood in terms of the best possible grounds.
3.4 Direct challengeability and projection
An important issue when discussing evidentiality regards the layers of meaning to which the evidential con-
tribute. The discussion takes different shapes, but a common position is that there are two layers of meaning:
the scope proposition and the evidential proposition belong to different layers of meaning. In this chapter,
following Murray (2017), I assume a distinction between at-issue content (i.e., the proffered content of a
sentence) and not-at-issue content (i.e., everything that is not the proffered content of a sentence) (see Potts
2005 et seq.). The general conclusion with regard to the meanings evidentials contribute is that the scope
proposition is at-issue, whereas the evidential proposition is not-at-issue (see Izvorski 1997; Matthewson
et al. 2007; Peterson 2010; Sauerland & Schenner 2007; von Fintel & Gillies 2011).10 To test this dis-
tinction in Aymara, I focus on direct challengeability in section 3.4.1; then I briefly discuss projection in
connection to the issue at hand in section 3.4.2.
3.4.1 Direct challengeability
The direct challengeability test targets the property of whether it is possible to challenge the scope proposi-
tion, i.e., explicitly mentioning that the scope proposition is not the case, and the evidential proposition, i.e.,
explicitly questioning the source of evidence the speaker has for the scope proposition.11 A common test in
this regard involves following up a sentence by a reply (made by a different speaker, i.e., a challenger) with
an expression such as That’s not true or You’re mistaken, and then a correction is proposed, which could
10In recent work, Korotkova (2016, 2020) argues that the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction as discussed for conventional
implicatures in the sense of Potts (2005) cannot be applied literally for the analysis of evidentials, since, she argues, there are
differences in their distribution. For the purposes of the present discussion, what is relevant is that two distinct layers of meaning
need to be distinguished in the analysis of evidentials, which I capture here by means of the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction.
In the semantic literature of evidentials, another way of stating this is via the distinction between truth-conditional meaning, which
corresponds to the former, and presuppositional meaning, which corresponds to the latter (see, e.g., Matthewson et al. 2007). See
Murray (2017) for discussion regarding why the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction is to be preferred over the truth-conditional vs.
presuppositional distinction (see also Tonhauser et al. 2013).
11Murray (2017) also discusses an instance of indirect challengeability, which is not discussed in this chapter (but see foot-
note 17).
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target either the scope proposition or the evidential proposition.12,13 The literature mentions that, while
the scope proposition can be directly challenged, the evidential proposition cannot be directly challenged.
Since only at-issue content can be directly challenged, this is taken to suggest that the scope proposition is
at-issue, whereas the evidential proposition is not-at-issue. While the literature thus far has shown a clear-
cut contrast with regard to challengeability—i.e., the scope proposition can be directly challenged, and the
evidential cannot be directly challenged—, this section shows that this is not always the case. In this regard,
a novel contrast between sentences with =wa and -[e] is discussed.
To illustrate this issue, let me first discuss Aymara sentences with =wa. The sentence to be directly
challenged appears in (3.11) ((5.10a) repeats (3.3), which is a case that involves evidence that is the result
of direct visual perception; see section 3.3 for similar discussion). (3.11b) challenges the scope proposition;
(3.11c) challenges the evidential proposition. In line with what has been found cross-linguistically (Murray
2017), while it is felicitous to challenge the scope proposition, it is infelicitous to challenge the evidential






p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
























‘That’s not true. You didn’t see that.’
The case with -[e] is similar to the case with =wa with regard to challenging the evidential proposition
in that such a direct challenge is infelicitous. This is shown in (3.12). The sentence to be challenged is
(3.12a). The challenge to the evidential proposition appears in (3.12b). This yields infelicity, which is as
12See Korotkova (2016) for potential issues with following up with That’s not true in that it may not fully grasp the complete
range of challengeability possibilities in connection to evidentials. For current purposes, the That’s not true and the You’re mistaken
follow-ups are indistinct in that they illustrate the contrast between two layers of meaning, which is the relevant distinction here
(see Potts 2005); they actually yield the same results in Aymara. In what follows, I make use of the That’s not true follow-up.
13See Tonhauser et al. (2013) for additional discussion with regard to tests in connection to not-at-issue meaning in general. The
challengeability test discussed in the main text suffices to distinguish the scope proposition (which here is characterized as at-issue)
and the evidential proposition (which here is characterized as not-at-issue). See Korotkova (2016, 2017, 2020) and Murray (2017)
for discussion in connection to evidentials in particular.
14Similar considerations apply when the best possible grounds are to be understood in connection to indirect evidence.
15Note that the challenges themselves contain =wa. This is similar to what was mentioned regarding examples (3.9)-(3.10) in
section 3.3 involving commitments, where the continuations had =wa. See section 3.5.2, in particular, footnote 25 for discussion.
54





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’













‘That’s not true. You didn’t see that.’
Interestingly, a direct challenge of the scope proposition does not yield the same results when compared to
the case with =wa—this is a novel case in the cross-linguistic picture. Challenging the scope proposition of











‘That’s not true. It didn’t rain in Puno.’
Even though my consultants mention that it is actually possible to directly challenge the scope proposition,
it is not natural—this is the kind of degradation indicated above. They point out that the addressee would
have to be very skeptical of what has been said and have very solid grounds to make such a challenge. This
suggests that the scope proposition is actually at-issue, since it can be challenged, after all, which is not like
the evidential proposition, which, simply, cannot be challenged.
The discussion raises interesting questions which lie beyond the at-issue and not-at-issue distinction. For
instance, focusing on sentences with -[e] only, why is it that the degradation of the challenge in (3.13) (where
the scope proposition is challenged) is not categorical, as is the case of the challenge in (3.12b) (where the
evidential proposition is challenged), which is simply infelicitous? Another question that arises is tied to
the contrast between challenging the scope proposition denoted by a sentence with =wa vs. challenging
the scope proposition denoted by a sentence with -[e]: why is the former possible, whereas the latter yields
degradation (even though they appear to be, in principle, very similar as direct evidentials)? An explanation
of the facts with regard to the degradation in the challenges to sentences with -[e] is provided in section 3.6.7,
where I provide an account that derives these facts in addition to maintaining the similarities there are in
clauses with =wa and -[e] that have been discussed in this and the previous sections.17
16Similar considerations apply when the best possible grounds are to be understood in connection to indirect evidence.
17As has been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Faller 2002; Murray 2017), the evidential proposition may be indirectly
challenged, which is generally possible with not-at-issue meanings (Potts 2005). An indirect challenge involves uttering a follow-
up that asks the speaker to be explicit about the evidence that she has. In this sense, this challenge does not state that the speaker
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3.4.2 Projection
With regard to projection, I focus on the behavior of the sentences under discussion in connection to the
presence of negation.18 The literature on evidentials points out that sentential operators, such as negation,
take scope over the scope proposition only; in contrast, the evidential proposition remains unaffected by such
operators. In other words, the meaning of a scope proposition p with negation and an evidential intuitively
means something like It is not the case that p and The speaker has the relevant evidence for p not being
the case. Thus, negation takes scope over the scope proposition only, and the evidential proposition is not
modified by it, which is consistent with the claim that the evidential contribution is not-at-issue (as argued
for in the previous section).
The Aymara cases with =wa and -[e] under negation are exemplified in (3.14)-(3.15). These sentences
can be uttered felicitously when it is the rainy season in Puno, but, surprisingly, it did not rain even though it
does not have the relevant evidence (which is what a direct challenge does); instead, it asks for clarification. This is the case when,
e.g., making a question asking for clarification with regard to the evidence the speaker has, such as Did you (actually) see that?
when challenging a sentence with a direct evidential. The idea behind such a challenge is that the information is present (even
though it is not-at-issue) and, as such, is recoverable.
In Aymara, indirectly challenging the evidential proposition of sentences with =wa and -[e] yields an interesting contrast as well.
(i) illustrates a case with =wa. (ia) is the sentence that will be indirectly challenged. (ib) is the indirect challenge. This is felicitous:





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
b. Uñja-ya:-ta-ti(-sti)?
see-PST-2S-INT(-actually)
‘Did you (actually) see that?’
In contrast, in the case of sentences with -[e], indirectly challenging the evidential proposition yields degradation, as shown in (ii).
My consultants mention that, as in the case of the direct challenge of the scope proposition (see (3.13)), it is possible to indirectly
challenge the evidential proposition, but it is not natural. They mention that the addressee would have to have very solid grounds
to make such a challenge. Although an account of indirect challengeability lies beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting
that there is a parallel between the direct and indirect challengeability facts. Even though what is being challenged is either the
scope or the evidential proposition, native speakers raise a similar reservation when asked about why the challenges are degraded:
it is difficult to challenge the content of a sentence with -[e] unless the speaker who is making the challenge has deep reasons to do
so (either content-wise in connection to the scope proposition or evidence-wise in connection to the evidential proposition). This





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
b. ??Uñja-ya:-ta-ti(-sti)?
see-PST-2S-INT(-actually)
‘Did you (actually) see that?’
18I do not touch on projection in other environments (e.g., conditionals, embedding attitude verbs), because Aymara makes use
of nominalizations as a subordination strategy, which are constructions where, crucially, evidentials cannot occur in this language.
See Coler (2014).
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was very cloudy. These examples show that negation only takes scope over the scope proposition, not over
the evidential proposition. A reading whereby the speaker does not have the relevant evidence for the scope
proposition is not attested. These data are compatible with the claim that, when sentences with =wa and







p: ‘It didn’t rained in Puno.’







p: ‘It didn’t rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
3.5 Discourse contrasts
This section discusses a number of novel distinctions in the domain of direct evidentiality in connection to
discourse. In section 3.5.1, I show that sentences with =wa require that there be some previous discourse,
whereas sentences with -[e] do not require this. In section 3.5.2, I further show that sentences with =wa can
be uttered when the speaker only has the relevant evidence for some proposition; in contrast, sentences with
-[e] can be felicitously uttered when, in addition to the speaker, somebody else is in a position to make an
utterance conveying the same proposition.
3.5.1 Previous discourse
The first issue to be discussed is the discourse sensitivity the cases under discussion display focusing on the
presence of previous discourse. In a number of scenarios, it is very common that there is some previous
discourse before an individual utters a sentence, so that the individual’s contribution is linked to it—there
are different ways of capturing this in the literature, e.g., via a Question Under Discussion (QUD) (Roberts
1996, 2004, 2012), via an issue on the Table (Farkas & Bruce 2010), etc. Thus, for instance, in the exchange
in (3.16), there is some previous discourse, i.e., (3.16a), to which (3.16b) contributes: an individual poses a
question and somebody else provides an answer.19
19Here I only focus on complete answers. While partial answers are possible in the cases under discussion as long as they are
relevant for the QUD, I set them aside here for simplicity—I further leave the introduction of refinements to the system adopted in
section 3.6 in this regard for a future occasion.
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(3.16) a. What happened (yesterday)?
b. It rained in Puno.
There are some instances, however, in which there is no obvious previous discourse to which somebody’s
utterance contributes, i.e., there is no issue or question that has been overtly stated or that can be inferred.
A prototypical scenario for this would be the case in which two strangers happen to coincide at some place
(e.g., an elevator), and one of them likes to make small talk—the other one may not need to. In order to
break the silence, the individual who likes to make small talk makes reference to a common topic, e.g., the
weather. In this scenario, this individual can utter (3.17) out of the blue (i.e., the same string in (3.16b)).
(3.17) It rained in Puno.
Although the strings in (3.16b)-(3.17) are the same, their role in discourse is different. The former provides
an answer to a question, and is thus linked to the previous discourse. In contrast, the latter does not seem
linked to some previous discourse in any obvious way.
Sentences involving direct evidentiality in Aymara show an interesting feature in connection to these
scenarios. (3.18) illustrates the case where there is a previous discourse (as in (3.16) above). Somebody
makes a question, as in (3.18a), and somebody else can respond as in (3.18b) or (3.18c).20 This means that
both sentences with =wa (3.18b) and with -[e] (3.18c) may be linked to the previous discourse. This is not












p: It rained in Puno.





p: It rained in Puno.
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
There is, however, a contrast between sentences with =wa and -[e] in connection to the previous discourse.
It becomes apparent in the case in which there is no obvious previous discourse—see the scenario for (3.17)
above. In the case involving two strangers, where one of them likes to make small talk, the only option is to
20In Aymara, as in English, it is possible to, e.g., infer the previous discourse—it does not have to be an explicit question. Here,
for concreteness, I focus on cases with an overt instance of previous discourse.
58





p: It rained in Puno.





p: It rained in Puno.
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The contrasts between (3.18) and (3.19) are suggestive in that they indicate that sentences with =wa require
that there be some previous discourse—i.e., sentences with =wa have to make a contribution to something
that has already been raised. Sentences with -[e], in contrast, do not show this requirement. They may be
uttered in the presence or absence of some previous discourse.
3.5.2 (More than) one evidence holder
The second major contrast involving sentences with =wa and -[e] concerns what people are in a position to
convey some proposition in a given context in which the relevant sentences will be uttered. In a nutshell,
sentences with =wa are uttered when the speaker only is in a position to convey some proposition (in a given
context). Sentences with -[e] are infelicitous when this is the case, where the requirement is that the speaker
and somebody else are in a position to convey some proposition (in a given context).
Consider (3.20); assume a context where there is a small group of people having a conversation, Mary
is not present and people are wondering about her recent whereabouts. Assume further that only the speaker
is in a position to say something about Mary, because, e.g., the other people have not been in touch with
Mary, whereas the speaker is her best friend and is in touch with her frequently. In this particular case,
suppose further that the speaker was with Mary when she visited her sister, so that she has direct evidence
for the scope proposition. Thus, only the speaker is in a position to say something about Mary. Against this










p: ‘Mary visited her sister yesterday.’










p: ‘Mary visited her sister yesterday.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Consider now a small variation of this context. Here, as well, there is a small group of people having a
conversation, Mary is not present and people are wondering about her recent whereabouts. Importantly, in
addition to the speaker, one more person knows about Mary’s whereabouts, because, e.g., in addition to the
speaker, this other person is also a very close friend of Mary. In particular, suppose that both the speaker
and this other person were with Mary the day before and they both were with Mary when she visited her
sister. This means that they both have the best possible grounds to say that Mary visited her sister the day










p: ‘Mary visited her sister yesterday.’









p: ‘Mary visited her sister yesterday.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
It is worth emphasizing that the people in a position of conveying the proposition indicated in the previous
contexts need to have the relevant evidence. It would be expected that the speaker has the best possible
grounds (see section 3.2). A question arises, however, with regard to the evidence other people may have, in
particular, in the case with -[e] in (3.21b). Importantly, their evidence has to be the best possible grounds as
well. In connection to this, suppose a third variation of the context. Specifically, in addition to the speaker,
somebody else has evidence for Mary having visited her sister, but their evidence is the result of a rumor.
In such a scenario, the sentence with =wa, not the one with -[e], would be used—the judgments would be
as in (3.20) then, where the sentence with =wa is the felicitous one, because only the speaker has the best
21Note that this implies that the speaker knows what kind of evidence the other person has (in addition to knowing that the
evidence they have is for the same proposition the speaker is contemplating). Given that the focus here is on the evidence the
relevant individuals have to be able to convey some proposition, I will not touch on the issue of knowledge in this regard any
further, assuming that the speaker knows that the other individuals have the relevant evidence as well for some proposition.
22If one would like to be more precise, then the ep for =wa and -[e] could be (informally) changed as follows. For =wa, the ep
could be ‘Only the speaker (among a non-singleton set of relevant individuals) has the best possible grounds for some proposition
p’. For -[e], the ep could be ‘The speaker and somebody else (among a set of relevant individuals) have the best possible grounds
for some proposition p’. For simplicity, in the examples to follow in this section, I stick to the gloss that has been used throughout
the chapter, i.e., ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for some proposition p’ for both =wa and -[e].
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possible grounds for the relevant proposition.
The discussion with regard to (3.20)-(3.21) has shown that the speaker utters a sentence with =wa when
only she has the best possible grounds for some proposition, whereas the speaker will utter a sentence with
-[e] when she and somebody else have the best possible grounds for some proposition. The discussion has,
however, focused on a very particular context, i.e., a context with a small group of people sharing some
physical space, where one of the addressees may or may not have the relevant evidence. Below, I provide
another context (with a couple of variations) that sheds light on the nature of these salient people that are
taken into consideration by the speaker.
The first variation of this new context involves two people, namely, a father and his child. The father is
telling his child about the time when he rescued a girl from Lake Titicaca; nobody else in addition to the
father and the girl were in the area (suppose that the father is telling the child the story before the latter goes
to bed). The two relevant people in this case are them both; only the father has the relevant evidence for
stating the proposition that he rescued her. As shown in (3.22), in this case, uttering the sentence with =wa















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Suppose now that the child loves it when his father tells them about that time when he rescued the girl
from Lake Titicaca. For instance, suppose that this is the first time the child asks their father to repeat the
story—the two individuals are the relevant ones in this context as well. In such a scenario, the sentence with
-[e] is felicitous, as shown in (3.23b)); the sentence with =wa in is no longer felicitous, as shown in (3.23a).
In this case, something has changed: now the child also has the relevant evidence for the proposition, which
is the result of having their father’s testimony.23 Thus, there is somebody else, not only the speaker, who is
in a position of stating the proposition denoted by the sentences in (3.22). In this case, as in the context for
(3.21), (one of) the addressee(s) has the best possible grounds for the relevant proposition.
23In the case of the child, the best possible grounds consist of their father’s testimony (their father knows best about his where-
abouts; see section 3.2); it would have been unfeasible for the child to have a more direct access to the relevant information, since
















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
There is actually no need for some addressee to be present, however. Consider a third variation of the
context under consideration. Suppose that rescuing the girl became an important part of the community’s
tradition (suppose, for instance, that the child’s father married the girl and the couple became important in
that community, which may be large or small). Because it is an important tradition, the father has told it to
the people in the community. This means that several people have the relevant evidence for the proposition—
i.e., the man’s testimony (see footnote 23). In such a scenario, suppose that the father is going to tell his
child the story for the first time, for instance, before the child goes to bed. In this case, the judgments are
as in (3.23): the sentence in (3.23b), with -[e], is felicitous; the sentence in (3.23a), with =wa, is not. In
this case, no addressee has the relevant evidence (only the father and the child are physically involved in the
exchange). There is, nonetheless, at least somebody else who has the relevant evidence, which is the crucial
factor. For this reason, a sentence with -[e] is used.24
The discussion in this and the previous section has thus shown that (i) sentences with =wa make a
contribution to some previous discourse—it is required that there be some previous discourse—and, among
a set of (relevant) individuals, only the speaker has the best possible grounds for some proposition, and that
(ii) sentences with -[e] may be uttered in the absence of some previous discourse—there is no need for an
issue to have been raised beforehand—and, in addition to the speaker, there must be somebody else with
24There are further expansions that are not discussed in the present context, but raise interesting questions regarding future
research. Specifically, I would like to suggest a link between these cases and discourse particles, such as German ja or wohl (the
literature on this topic is too extensive to make justice to it in a footnote; I refer the reader to Zimmermann 2011 and references
therein for discussion). In general, the literature argues that discourse particles involve an implication that some relevant proposition
is deemed uncontroversial (to a relevant group of people). This is actually very similar to what happens in sentences with -[e].
Recall in this regard the discussion regarding challengeability in section 3.4.1. There, it was shown that it is difficult to challenge
the scope proposition in the presence of -[e]. This section has added that, to felicitously utter sentences with -[e], there must be more
than one evidence holder with relevant evidence for a proposition (more generally, there is a relevant group which has at least two
members, one of which is the current speaker, with relevant evidence for a proposition); in the absence of this, =wa is used (provided
that there is some previous discourse). While I propose a way of tackling these issues in section 3.6.7 by establishing a link between
the number of evidence holders and challengeability possibilities, there is a broader implication here that is worth contemplating:
evidentiality as discussed in this chapter may actually belong to a larger domain involving markers where uncontroversiality plays
a crucial role—in particular, evidentiality may be likened to this kind of discourse particles in this regard. I would like to thank
Stefan Kaufmann for discussion in this regard.
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relevant evidence for some proposition.25
3.6 Proposal
This section is organized as indicated below. For ease of reference, I provide a summary of the discussion
up to this point in section 3.6.1. Sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.7 develop the analysis. Section 3.6.2 introduces the
general setup that is needed for the account. Section 3.6.3 discusses how to introduce not-at-issue content
within the setup in section 3.6.2. Section 3.6.4 discusses the presence or absence of previous discourse in
connection to sentences with =wa and -[e]. Sections 3.6.5 and 3.6.6 turn to the account of the contrast
between the presence of one or more evidence holders. Section 3.6.7 discusses the direct challengeability
contrasts in the cases under discussion.
3.6.1 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the properties that have been identified in connection to direct evidentiality in Aymara
in this chapter. There are three values in Table 1: ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Hard’. ‘Yes’ means that some property
is always the case. For example, the first question asks about the commitment of the speaker to the scope
proposition. Since this is the case whenever a sentence with =wa or -[e] is uttered, the value is ‘Yes’.
The opposite takes place with regard to the fifth question: since the scope proposition does not project
under negation in the presence of =wa or -[e], the value in this case is ‘No’. ‘Hard’ is used when there
is degradation, in particular, in connection to direct challengeability possibilities. For instance, the third
question asks whether the scope proposition can be directly challenged. In sentences with -[e], this yields
degradation (see the judgment ?? in the challenge in (3.13)), i.e., it is difficult or hard to do so.
25The discussion in this section is relevant in connection to the follow-ups discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4.1. Recall the they
included =wa. Based on my consultants’ comments, it seems to be the case that, when questioning some previous statement, the
questioner becomes salient in that she is the one that must indicate why she believes that things should not be as stated in the
questioned statement. For this reason, a follow-up with =wa is the appropriate one. This would mean that a follow-up with -[e]
constitutes a gap in the paradigm. I leave this issue aside for future research.
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With =wa With -[e]
Is the speaker committed to the scope proposition? Yes Yes
Is the speaker committed to the evidential proposition? Yes Yes
Can the scope proposition be directly challenged? Yes Hard
Can the evidential proposition be directly challenged? No No
Does the scope proposition project under negation? No No
Does the evidential proposition project under negation? Yes Yes
Is previous discourse required? Yes No
Is there more than one evidence holder? No Yes
Table 1. Sentences involving direct evidentiality (the best possible grounds) in Aymara
3.6.2 General setup
The analysis to be developed is mainly based on the model of context structure proposed by Farkas & Bruce
(2010)—their work, in turn, is based on Asher & Lascarides (2003), Carlson (1983), Ginzburg (1996, 2015),
Hamblin (1971) and Stalnaker (1978). The reader is referred to Farkas & Bruce (2010) for additional details.
This section provides an overview of this model. The next section introduces some modifications to make
explicit how not-at-issue evidential meanings can be incorporated into it.
As is standard in the work on discourse structure building on Stalnaker (1978), discourse is assumed to
unfold against a (changing) background, which is formed by a set of propositions that have been confirmed
by discourse participants. This is the Common Ground cg, whose intersection is the Context Set cs. This
view of the Common Ground is adopted here. An assertion is viewed as a proposal to change the context by
adding the proposition the sentence asserted denotes to the Common Ground (see Clark & Schaefer 1989;
Clark 1992; Ginzburg 1996, 2015)—in a two discourse participant conversation, the other participant would
confirm, challenge, etc. such a proposal; see section 3.6.7.
In addition to the Common Ground, an important aspect of a model of context structure regards how
discourse commitments of participants are represented. I assume that discourse commitments are proposi-
tions (i.e., sets of worlds) that are publicly taken by the participants in the relevant conversation to be true of
the world of (and from the perspective of) the conversation (see Sacks 1992). In this chapter, the Common
Ground and each discourse participant’s commitments are separated. Specifically, I assume that discourse
structure K contains set of propositions DCX (which may be empty) for each participant X . DCX is
formed by those propositions to which X is publicly committed in the conversation up to some relevant
time—these are not shared by all discourse participants (at least, not yet). K also includes the Common
Ground, a set of propositions that have been confirmed or adopted by all participants in the conversation at
64
some time—in addition to a set of background propositions, if they are present. The total discourse com-
mitments of discourse participant X are DCX [ cg. As Farkas & Bruce (2010) point out, this split makes
it possible to capture that a proposal is being made via asserting a sentence denoting some proposition. In
addition, discourse commitments are assumed to be correct for the purposes of the conversation—i.e., they
are assumed to be true in the world the conversation takes place. This means that a discourse participant is
coherent iff her total discourse commitments are consistent.
I further assume the Table, i.e., a component in discourse that records the questions under discussion
(Beaver & Clark 2008; Büring 2003; Ginzburg 1996; Roberts 1996, 2004, 2012; Faller 2019). For simplicity,
I assume that items on the Table are the syntactic representations of sentences that denote propositions.26
The main focus here is on assertions, although questions are discussed very briefly in connection to the
presence of previous discourse (see below; see section 3.6.4 as well for more details regarding questions).
The Table keeps track of what is at-issue in the conversation—the items on the Table form a stack. When the
Table is not empty, the goal of the conversation is to settle the relevant issue—thus moving towards making
the Table empty. The stack makes it possible to maintain a close link between making a move (e.g., asserting
something) and responding to it (see below). When the Table is empty, the conversation is in a stable state,
which corresponds to the conversation’s natural end.
In connection to the latter, conversations are conceived of as being driven by two forces, i.e., the need
to increase the Common Ground, i.e., the need to put items on the Table, and the need to reach a stable
state, i.e., the need to make the Table empty (which, as a result, increases the Common Ground). Thus, the
need to put an issue on the Table is paired with the need to solve that issue—for instance, assertion requires
confirmation (i.e., that the assertion is accepted) and a question requires resolution (i.e., that the question
be answered). Solving an issue means that such an issue is decided. A proposition p is decided relative to
the Common Ground cg iff p follows from the relevant cg or ¬p follows from that cg. If proposition p is
decided relative to cgK of conversation K, p is decided in K.27
Diagrams as in (3.24) are used in what follows to represent context K of a conversation between dis-
course participants A and B. DCA and DCB are the individual discourse commitments of A and B; they
26I will not touch on issues of anaphora and ellipsis that the model in Farkas & Bruce (2010) can in principle capture. See
Murray (2010, 2014, 2017) for discussion.
27Farkas & Bruce (2010) further discuss that a conversational move placing an issue on the Table projects a set of future Common
Grounds cgs relative to which that issue is decided. It is worth pointing out that Projected Set contains redundant information in
that it can be readily calculated from the Common Ground and the items on the Table, as Farkas & Bruce (2010) discuss. For
simplicity, the Projected Set is not included here. See Faller (2019) for a similar choice.
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have publicly committed to them but are not joint commitments. The Common Ground cg is the set of
propositions which are joint commitments of discourse participants A and B. The contents of the Table are
represented with S, which are items under discussion (see Farkas & Bruce 2010:89)—CG is a shorthand for
Common Ground in the diagrams.




In addition, (3.25) introduces the notation used to characterize relevant notions (e.g., operations) in connec-
tion to stack T , i.e., the Table in a given context structure.
(3.25) a. push(e, T ) represents the new stack obtained by adding item e to the top of T .
b. pop(T ) represents the stack obtained by popping off the top item of T .
c. top(T ) represents the top item of T .
d. remove(e, T ) represents the stack obtained by removing the top-most occurrence of e from
T . If e does not occur in T , T is returned.
(Farkas & Bruce 2010:90)
Having this setup in place, I turn to assertions with declarative mood where there is no evidential contribu-
tion. Following Farkas & Bruce (2010), I assume a declarative feature [D]. The denotation of a declarative
sentence S[D] is the singleton set containing the proposition the relevant sentence denotes. For illustration,
consider the state K1 in (3.26) at the beginning of a conversation. There are no discourse commitments and
the Table is empty (see Farkas & Bruce 2010:91).
(3.26) K1: initial context state
A Table B
CG cg1
Suppose that A asserts the sentence ‘It rained in Puno’ against input context K1. The sentence denotes the
proposition p. The context that results from incorporating this assertion is represented in (3.27). Here p is
added to DCA, the structure of the sentence and its denotation appear on top of the stack in the Table—the
Common Ground stays the same. Given that there is now something on top of the Table stack, this will steer
the course of the conversation—I delay the discussion of this issue until 3.6.7.
(3.27) K2: A asserted ‘It rained in Puno’ against K1
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A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno’[D];{p}i
CG cg2 = cg1
The question that arises is how the change from K1 to K2 comes about. Following Farkas & Bruce (2010)
(see also Krifka 2001, 2014, 2015; Ginzburg 2015), I assume an assertion operation ↵, which is a function
from input context Ki to output context Ko. This is shown in (3.28), where a is the author of the relevant
assertion, DCa,i and DCa,o are the author’s input and output discourse commitments, and Ti and To are the
input and output Tables respectively—the unaffected elements of Ko are not listed.
(3.28) Assertion operation ↵
↵(S[D], a,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCa,o = DCa,i [ p
(ii) To = push(hS[D]; {p}i, Ti)
(Farkas & Bruce 2010:92)
Of particular importance here is that an assertion, as the one indicated above, commits the author to the
proposition denoted by the sentence that has been asserted. It further raises an issue by placing an item on
the Table, and steers the conversation in a particular direction, namely, the resolution of the issue in terms of
confirmation. In what follows, the assertion operation is adapted in connection to sentences with evidentials
in Aymara, which have been discussed throughout the chapter. The discussion around (modifications of)
assertion operation ↵ will play a crucial role in the next sections to capture the properties in Table 1.
3.6.3 Not-at-issue content
Recent work has discussed how to incorporate not-at-issue meanings in a discourse setup as the one intro-
duced in the previous section. In particular, in connection to evidentiality, this has been done by Murray
(2010, 2014, 2017)—see also Anderbois et al. (2015), Asher (2000), Ciardelli et al. (2009), Faller (2002,
2007, 2012, 2019), Jayez & Rossari (2004), Matthewson et al. (2007), Portner (2004), Potts (2005), Rett
(2014), Simons et al. (2010), Tonhauser et al. (2013) for relevant discussion. I mainly follow Murray’s work
in this section with regard to the incorporation of evidentials meanings in a setup that makes reference to
discourse context (see also Faller 2019).
Given that not-at-issue content has the property of not being readily accessible for, broadly speaking,
manipulation (e.g., it cannot be readily confirmed, challenged or rejected), its status is different from at-
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issue content, which, in contrast, is readily available for manipulation (e.g., it can be readily confirmed,
challenged or rejected) (see section 3.4; see also section 3.6.7). Following Murray (2010, 2014, 2017),
who builds on the literature addressing not-at-issue content, I assume that not-at-issue content, regardless of
whether it brings in new information, which is the case with evidentials, is directly added to the Common
Ground. Since the Common Ground is what is taken for granted, the evidential not-at-issue content has to
also be taken for granted, and, in this sense, becomes non-negotiable—i.e., it is not readily accessible for
manipulation.
The gist of the implementation of this in the setup discussed in the previous section is that the evidential
meaning is directly added to the Common Ground—it is imposed (Anderbois et al. 2015) or it constitutes
an evidential restriction on the Common Ground (Murray 2017)—, which is done by adding this as one
of the effects of applying the assertion operator to some sentence with an evidential against a particular
context. Specifically, to revise (3.28), I identify two elements in the denotation of a declarative sentence
with an evidential. Suppose that such a sentence’s meaning, in addition to proposition p, also incorpo-
rates an evidential proposition. The evidential proposition contains the worlds in which some individual x
(e.g., the discourse participant asserting the relevant sentence) has evidence for the proposition denoted by
the sentence; following the convention used by Murray (2017) with regard to evidential propositions, this
proposition is represented as BPG(x, p). Recall that direct evidence is the relevant kind of evidence here,
which is to be understood as the best possible grounds (see section 3.2). More concretely, the evidential
proposition BPG(x, p) is to be understood in terms of that piece of evidence x has for p such that this piece
of evidence constitutes the most direct source of evidence x has access to for p. As a result of applying the
assertion operator, BPG(x, p) is added to the Common Ground directly—so it is non-negotiable.
The assertion operator ↵ is revised in (3.29) (see Rett 2014)—p is the at-issue proposition denoted by
the sentence with an evidential S-ev[D] (where the evidential can either be =wa or -[e]) and BPG(a, P ) is
S-ev[D]’s evidential proposition; recall that a is the author of the assertion, K is the discourse context, i
stands for input, o stands for output and T is the stack). The crucial addition is (3.29iii), which states that
the evidential proposition is directly added to the Common Ground.
(3.29) Assertion operation ↵
↵(S-ev[D], a,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCa,o = DCa,i [ p
(ii) To = push(hS-ev[D]; {p}i, Ti)
(iii) cgo = cgi [ {BPG(a, p)}
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Skipping the initial context state (see (3.26) above), (3.30) illustrates how asserting sentences with =wa
(3.30a) and -[e] (3.30b) is represented in this system ((3.30a) repeats (3.3) and (3.30b) repeats (3.4))—the
discourse participants and cg are assumed to be kept constant); p is the scope proposition that it rained in
Puno; BPG(A, p) is the evidential proposition that the speaker (discourse participant A here) has the best





p: It rained in Puno.





p: It rained in Puno.
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
c. K: A asserted (3.30a)/K 0: A asserted (3.30b)
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno=wa/-[e]’[D];{p}i
CG cg [ {BPG(A, p)}
This analysis already accounts for several properties that sentences with =wa and -[e] have (see Table
1). Specifically, (3.30c) makes explicit that the speaker, discourse participant A here, is committed to
the scope proposition, as it is one of her discourse commitments. It is also shown that this participant is
committed to the evidential proposition, since it is part of the Common Ground, which represents the joint
commitments of the participants, with participant A crucially being one of them. It follows from these
that the follow-ups questioning the commitments of the speaker to the scope or evidential propositions are
infelicitous—see section 3.3 for the examples. (3.30c) also captures the at-issue and not-at-issue distinction
identified with regard to direct challengeability and negation, which was discussed in section 3.4.2. At-issue
and not-at-issue contents are included in different parts of the representations of discourse context, as in
(3.30c), in that the former is an issue on the Table, whereas the latter is not, as it is added to the Common
Ground directly without further ado. Finally, the ground is also set for the direct challengeability possibilities
discussed in section 3.4.1, in particular, challenging the scope proposition is in principle possible, because
what is challenged is an issue on the Table—challenging the evidential proposition is not possible, since
it is added directly to the Common Ground. A more detailed discussion with regard to challenging the




Having discussed how to capture what is common in sentences with =wa and -[e] in the previous sections,
this and the next sections turn to the differences between them. This section focuses on the links of the
sentences under consideration to previous discourse. Recall that, in section 3.5.1, it was shown that sentences
with =wa have to be tied to previous discourse in that there must be an issue that have already been raised
to which a sentence with =wa contributes. In contrast, there is no need for there being an issue for it to be
possible to utter a sentence with -[e], i.e., such an issue may or may not be present.
Recall first the kind of case in which there is an issue that has been raised—recall as well that such an
issue can be stated explicitly or be inferred; for concreteness, I model the case with an explicit formulation
of such an issue (see footnote 20). This is illustrated in (3.31) ((3.31) repeats (3.18)). In (3.31), some
discourse participant raises the question in (3.31a) (an issue). In this case, uttering a sentence with =wa, as













p: It rained in Puno.





p: It rained in Puno.
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
To account for this case, I introduce question operator  , which makes explicit what it means to raise an
issue via a question. This is done in (3.32). I assume an interrogative feature [I] to be incorporated to the
relevant sentence being considered (this is parallel to the [D] feature, which is used for declaratives, which
was discussed in section 3.6.2) (see Farkas & Bruce 2010). I assume that questions as in (3.31a) denote a set
of propositions, which are the possible answers to the question at hand (in a given context) (Hamblin 1971;
see Dayal 2016 for a recent overview of the literature about questions). For simplicity, I assume that there
are only two possible answers (two propositions), and that only one of them is true (for the purposes of the
conversation), i.e., only one of them answers the question. Thus, the denotation of the question S[I] under
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consideration is the set formed by two propositions, which I call here p and q—in this sense, the resolution
of the question will be done in a future move by providing p or q as answer.
(3.32) Question operation  
 (S[I], a,Ki) = Ko such that To = push(hS[I]; {p, q}i, Ti)
The representation of the context state where a discourse participant, B here, asks (3.31a) appears in (3.33).
Crucially, there is now an issue on the Table.
(3.33) K1: B asked (3.31a)
A Table B
h‘What happened (yesterday)’[I];{p, q}i
CG cg1
Given that one of the driving forces in conversation is to empty the Table (see section 3.6.2), the natural move
following the question would be to provide an answer to it. Assuming that the other discourse participant,
A here, knows the answer to the question, A will assert a declarative sentence whose denotation will be one
of the possible answers to the question (which is assumed to be true in the conversation; see section 3.6.2).
Assertion operation ↵ in (3.29) is already appropriate in this regard. Thus, it can already be captured that
A may utter (3.31b) (a sentence with =wa) or (3.31c) (a sentence with -[e]). The representations of the
relevant context states appear in (3.34).
(3.34) K2: A asserted (3.31b) against (3.33)/K 02: A asserted (3.31c) against (3.33)
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno=wa/-[e]’[D];{p}i
h‘What happened (yesterday)’[I];{p, q}i
CG cg2 = cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)}
Recall now the sentences in (3.19), which capture the judgements with regard to uttering sentences out of
the blue—i.e., in the absence of an issue being already under discussion. In this scenario, uttering a sentence





p: It rained in Puno.





p: It rained in Puno.
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
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The analysis pursued thus far makes it possible already to account for the case in (3.35b), i.e., it is possi-
ble to utter a sentence with -[e] in the absence of an issue being already on the Table. (3.36) shows the
representation capturing the case in which (3.35b) is uttered against a context in which there is no issue on
the Table. In this case, the revised version of assertion operation ↵ in (3.29) applies with no problem—the
relevant evidential is -[e], K1 is the input context and K2 is the output context.
(3.36) a. K1: initial context state
A Table B
CG cg1
b. K2: A asserted (3.35b) against K1
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno-[e]’[D];{p}i
CG cg2 = cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)}
The analysis, however, does not preclude the option of asserting a sentence with =wa in the absence of
an issue on the Table, i.e., the analysis does not account for the infelicity of (3.35a). I propose a revision
of the assertion operator for sentences with =wa. In particular, I propose that, in this case, there is an
input context condition, which restricts when the operation may apply (see Farkas & Bruce 2010), stating
that there is an issue on the Table. Since the system already incorporates a general driving force whereby
discourse participants try to empty the Table (see section 3.6.2), that there is an issue on it suffices for current
purposes, as somebody else will try to solve it—this is tied to making a contribution that is relevant in that
trying to solve an issue on the Table requires that this be the case, which I assume here, following a standard
practice.28 Thus, it becomes possible to assert a sentence with =wa. For the cases under discussion, which
focus on conversations in which there is one relevant context state preceding another context state in which
a sentence with an evidential is asserted, this condition is captured by stating that there actually is an item
on top of the stack. The assertion operation in (3.29) is revised as ↵0 in (3.37) for sentences with =wa—I
assume that ↵0 selects (an expression with) =wa.
(3.37) Assertion operation ↵0 (for sentences with =wa)
a. Input context condition: top(T ) exists.
b. When the input context condition is met, ↵0(S=wa[D], a,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCa,o = DCa,i [ p
(ii) To = push(hS=wa[D]; {p}i, Ti)
(iii) cgo = cgi [ {BPG(a, p)}
28I would like to thank Magda Kaufmann for raising this issue.
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Thus, assertion operation ↵ in (3.29) only applies to sentences with -[e], as indicated in (3.38)—I assume
that ↵ selects (an expression with) -[e].
(3.38) Assertion operation ↵ (for sentences with -[e])
↵(S-[e][D], a,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCa,o = DCa,i [ p
(ii) To = push(hS-[e][D]; {p}i, Ti)
(iii) cgo = cgi [ {BPG(a, p)}
It is now possible to capture why asserting (3.35a) is infelicitous if no issue has been raised—asserting
(3.35b) is the felicitous case here, as shown in (3.36b). Context K1 represented in (3.36a) cannot be followed
up by the context in (3.39), because K1 does not satisfy the input context condition indicated in (3.37), i.e.,
there is no issue on top of the Table, so that the relevant sentence with =wa cannot be asserted against this
context.
(3.39) #K 02: A asserted (3.35a) against K1
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno=wa’[D];{p}i
CG cg02 = cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)}
3.6.5 (More than) one evidence holder
This section discusses the second major contrast with regard to sentences with =wa and -[e], namely, that,
in the case of the former, the only evidence holder who has the relevant evidence for some proposition is
the individual asserting a sentence denoting that proposition. In contrast, in the case of the latter, there is, in
addition, at least one more evidence holder with the relevant evidence for some proposition—for simplicity,
I will focus on cases where there are at most two evidence holders.
For illustration, recall examples (3.22)-(3.23), which are repeated below in (3.40)-(3.41)—here I assume
that there is some previous discourse, so it is possible to assert sentences with =wa; this is not made explicit
in this section, however, for ease of exposition (see section 3.6.4; a similar input context to (3.33), with a
What happened? question, can be assumed in what follows). (3.40) is tied to a context in which only the
discourse participant making the assertion has the evidence for the relevant proposition. In this case, the















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’
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p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
In contrast, for (3.41), the context is that both discourse participants have the relevant evidence for the propo-
sition. In this case, the judgments are reversed: asserting a sentence with -[e], as in (3.41b), is felicitous; in















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’















p: ‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I rescued her (lit. I took her out of the water).’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
To account for cases like (3.40)-(3.41), I incorporate two elements into the analysis proposed in the previous
sections. The first one is to revise assertion operation ↵ in (3.38), which applies to cases with -[e], to
make explicit that there are two individuals with the relevant evidence. The revised version of the operation
appears in (3.42). The crucial addition is stated in (3.42iii), where, in addition to the author of the assertion,
there is some (contextually salient) individual x, which is not the author, who also has relevant evidence
with regard to the proposition under consideration being the case.29
(3.42) Assertion operation ↵ (for sentences with -[e])
↵(S-[e][D], a,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCa,o = DCa,i [ p
(ii) To = push(hS-[e][D]; {p}i, Ti)
(iii) cgo = cgi [ {BPG(a, p)} [ {BPG(x, p)} (where x 6= a)
This revision captures why a sentence with -[e] cannot be asserted when only the individual making the
assertion has the relevant evidence, as in (3.40b). There must be somebody else as well, which is the case
in the felicitous (3.41b). The state where (3.41b) is asserted is represented in (3.43).30
29With regard to (3.42iii), while here I adopt an approach where the discourse participant that is not the speaker who also has
the relevant evidence is incorporated as a free variable, an alternative would be to represent this as follows: 9x[cg0 = cg1 [
{BPG(a, p)} [ {BPG(x, p)} ^ x 6= a].
30Note that the discourse commitments of B have not changed. There is still the need for some kind of confirmation on her part.
See section 3.6.7 for discussion.
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(3.43) K: A asserted (3.41b) (A and B have direct evidence)
A Table B
p h‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I
rescued her-[e]’[D];{p}i
CG cg [ {BPG(A, p)} [ {BPG(B, p)}
3.6.6 =wa and -[e] as alternatives
While the analysis proposed captures the differences with regard to the number of evidence holders, it does
not account for why it is infelicitous to assert a sentence with =wa when two evidence holders have the
relevant evidence—in such a scenario, in principle, it could be possible for a discourse participant to assert
a sentence based on her evidence only. To account for this, I propose that sentences with =wa and sentences
with -[e] are alternatives, so that asserting a sentence with =wa implicates that there is only one evidence
holder with the relevant evidence (namely, the one asserting the sentence with =wa)—the literature on
alternatives and the implications they carry is extensive (see, e.g., Heim 1991; Sauerland 2001, 2004, 2012;
Percus 2006; Potts 2005; Katzir 2007; Fox & Katzir 2011; Walczak 2016).
To get an intuitive grasp of the direction in which the discussion is going, consider the sentences in
(3.44), which illustrate a classical example involving scalar implicatures:
(3.44) a. Bill smokes and drinks.
b. Bill smokes or drinks.
(3.44b) implicates that Bill only does one between smoking and drinking, i.e., (3.44b) implicates (3.45).
(3.45) Bill doesn’t smoke and drink.
The reasoning is as follows: (3.44a) and (3.44b) are alternatives, since they are identical except for one
lexical item, and in (3.44a) and or in (3.44b). (3.44a) entails (3.44b), and, in this sense, (3.44a) has a
stronger meaning than (3.44b). Because of the presence of a stronger alternative, the expression with or in
(3.44b) implicates that the stronger alternative, i.e., (3.44a), is not the case (this is the implication stated in
(3.45)).
The algorithm in (3.46) captures in what sense sentences with =wa and -[e] constitute alternatives— 
and  are sentences with evidentials.
(3.46) Sentences with =wa and -[e] as alternatives
a. Let =wa and -[e] form lexical alternatives in scale R such that R = h=wa, -[e]i.
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b.  is an alternative of   if
(i)  6=  ;
(ii)  is the result of replacing one occurrence of =wa with -[e];
(iii)   and  each propose the same issue to the top of the stack and add an evidential
proposition to the Common Ground; and
(iv) the input context condition for assertion operation ↵0 applied to   is met.
c. That  ’s evidential proposition is not the case is an implication of   if
(i)  is an alternative of  ; and
(ii) the Common Ground that results of asserting  asymmetrically entails the Common
Ground that results of asserting   (i.e., the latter is a proper subset of the former).
Some comments are in order. Alternatives are defined as usual, i.e., they differ in that one of the two elements
in the scale appear in each expression. Note, however, that here I make explicit that there are at-issue and
not-at-issue meanings, which is relevant in the presence of evidentials, and that sentences with =wa and
-[e] are not always alternatives, since it must be the case that the input context condition of asserting a
sentence with =wa is met, i.e., these sentences may only be alternatives if there is an issue on the Table
(see the assertion operation ↵0 in (3.37); see Gajewski & Sharvit 2012; Sharvit 2017; von Fintel 1999 for
relevant discussion). Lastly, it is worth discussing the nature of the implication under consideration. The
implication concerns the evidential proposition of the the alternative with -[e], which is not the case. This is
empirically accurate in that the sentences with =wa and -[e] under consideration put the same issue on the
Table. The relevant difference lies in the evidential proposition. In this regard, it is also worth noting that
the implication is non-cancellable, which is as expected given that it is tied to the evidential proposition (see
section 3.5.2; note that the contrast between sentences with =wa and -[e] has always been stated in terms of
a felicity vs. infelicity contrast; there is no cancelability in these cases). This is captured in (3.46) based on
where the relevant entailment relation holds. It applies to non-negotiable content, in particular, at the level
of the Common Ground, so it is simply assumed to be the case—specifically, the entailment relation holds
of the evidential propositions, which are added to the Common Ground as a result of asserting the sentences
with the evidentials (see the assertion operations in (3.37)-(3.38)).31
31In principle, there is an alternative analysis that incorporates the meaning that only one discourse participant has the relevant
evidence for some proposition—i.e., sentences with =wa would be analyzed as there only being one evidence holder, namely, the
one asserting the sentence with =wa under consideration. An analysis in this direction, however, will make sentences with =wa
and -[e] completely independent from one another, which seems inappropriate, in that there would not be any relation whatsoever
between expressions with direct evidentials—that sentences with =wa and -[e] involve direct evidentiality would be accidental.
The analysis pursued in the main text, which makes explicit in what sense sentences with =wa and -[e] are alternatives, captures
what the relation between sentences with =wa and -[e] is.
This kind of analysis begs a more general question in connection to the presence of covert evidentials cross-linguistically, and,
even more generally, in connection to the present of covert elements cross-linguistically. A common case in this regard would be
the discussion with regard to tense in languages such as Chinese, where there is no overt marking of tense. This begs the question
as to tense is marked in this language at all in ways that are similar to languages like English, which have dedicated tense markers
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As a result, asserting a sentence with =wa implicates that only the individual making the assertion has
the relevant evidence. This derives the contrast in (3.40a) and (3.41a): in (3.40a), there is only one evidence
holder (the one making the relevant assertion), so uttering it is felicitous; in contrast, in (3.41a), there are
two evidence holders, so uttering it is infelicitous—the sentence with -[e] has to be used instead (which was
represented in (3.43)). For illustration, consider (3.47), which represents the context for asserting (3.40a),
which, in combination with (3.46), implicates that only A has the relevant evidence.
(3.47) K 0: A asserted (3.41b) (A has direct evidence)
A Table B
p h‘Seeing a girl drowning in the lake, I
rescued her=wa’[D];{p}i
CG cg [ {BPG(A, p)}
A question arises here as to whether there is a natural link between the two properties that have been dis-
cussed for sentences with =wa in this and the previous sections, namely, (i) that there must be an issue
on the Table that needs to be solved and (ii) that only the speaker has the relevant evidence for asserting a
sentence solving the issue on the Table.32 Here I suggest that these two properties are in fact linked—i.e.,
they are not simply accidentally bundled in the cases under discussion. Specifically, I suggest that the link
lies in the nature of the issue on the Table: a sentence with =wa solves an issue that is open. This contrasts
with sentences with -[e], where there is no open issue in that the speaker knows that there are more people
who already know how the relevant issue is solved—even if it is the case that not everybody knows how the
issue is solved, there is no real novelty in what the speaker says, because more people know how to solve
it. In this sense, uttering a sentence with =wa puts forward an answer to something—so there is a need for
something (which has been previously raised) to be there that needs to be solved—, where the speaker is in
a privileged position in that she is the one who can solve it. This need is absent in the case of sentences with
-[e] in that there is no open issue—nothing needs to be solved.
3.6.7 Directly challenging an issue
This section discusses the contrast that arises in sentences with =wa and -[e] when directly challenging
the scope proposition they denote, which was discussed in section 3.4.1. There, it was shown that, while
(see Liu 2015 for an overview). The analysis of =wa and -[e] is interesting in this regard in that it makes explicit how a covert
element is tied (i.e., is in competition) with an overt one. The stronger claim in this regard would be one way implication whereby
a language may have covert evidentials only if it also has overt ones. I would like to thank Željko Bošković.
32I would like to thank Stefan Kaufmann for discussion on this issue.
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it is possible to challenge the scope proposition when a sentence with =wa is uttered, it becomes hard to
do so when a sentence with -[e] is uttered. The relevant contrast appears in (3.48)-(3.49) ((3.48) repeats





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
















p: ‘It rained in Puno.’











‘That’s not true. It didn’t rain in Puno.’
Before formalizing the notion of challengeability as a move in a conversation, for thoroughness, let me first
discuss a possible move after an issue has been put on the Table by means of a sentence with =wa or -[e].
As expected, if some discourse participant asserts (3.48a) or (3.49a), it is possible for the other discourse
participant to simply confirm or accept the proposal made. A possible reaction confirming or accepting the
issue raised by (3.48a) or (3.49a) in Aymara is Ah ‘Ok’ (among other expressions or an approbatory gesture).
Such a move is captured in Farkas & Bruce’s (2010) model by means of an assertion confirmation
operation,   here, which is defined in (3.50)—(3.50) is slightly modified from Farkas & Bruce’s (2010:98)
assertion confirmation AC. (3.50) is a function that captures that, provided that there is an issue on the Table
that denotes proposition p to which discourse participant a has committed herself in some relevant context,
discourse participant b incorporates that proposition to her commitments as well.33
(3.50) Assertion confirmation operation  
a. Input context conditions
(i) top(T ) = hS-ev[D]; {p}i
(ii) p in DCa,i
b. When the input context conditions are met,  (b,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCb,o = DCb,i [ {p}
33See Farkas & Bruce (2010) for more discussion regarding assertion confirmation. See that paper as well with regard to how to
capture the change that takes place in the Common Ground after confirmation takes place, since there is a new joint commitment.
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For illustration, consider (3.51). A sentence with =wa is asserted (here I use (3.48a) for illustration), so,
crucially, its denotation, p, is in A’s discourse commitments in context state K1—I set aside the need for
an issue being on the Table before making this assertion for ease of exposition (see section 3.6.4). Then B
accepts or confirms A’s proposal, so p becomes a commitment of B as well.
(3.51) a. K1: A asserted (3.48a)
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno=wa’[D];{p}i
CG cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)}
b. K2: B’s confirmation
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno=wa’[D];{p}i p
CG cg2 = cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)}
Discussing confirmation illustrates how a discourse participant may react to the issue that some other partic-
ipant put on the Table. Of special interest here are reactions that question an issue on the Table, in particular,
a reaction challenging that the issue on the Table is actually the case. Based on Farkas & Bruce’s (2010:101)
total denial move, I propose a total challenge operation  , which captures a reaction from a discourse partici-
pant saying that the issue the other participant put on the Table is not the case. This move can be instantiated
via several strings, for instance, via strings that involve some kind of tacit negation of what was stated, e.g.,
No way!, That’s not true, or You’re mistaken, or via strings that overtly negate what was stated. Operation  
is defined in (3.52).
(3.52) Total challenge operation  
a. Input context conditions
(i) top(T ) = hS-ev[D]; {p}i
(ii) p in DCa,i
b. When the input context conditions are met,  (b,Ki) = Ko such that
(i) DCb,o = DCb,i [ {¬p}
(ii) To = push(hS0=wa[D];¬pi, Ti)
(iii) cgo = cgi [ {BPG(b, p)}
(3.52) makes explicit that there must be an issue on the Table and discourse participant a is committed to p,
which is the relevant denotation (here, it must have been the case that a asserted some declarative sentence).
When the input conditions are met, the context is changed such that ¬p becomes a discourse commitment of
discourse participant b and there is a new item on top of the stack that denotes such a negated proposition.34
34I do not focus on the actual string of words here. In particular, the challenges in (3.48b) and (3.49b) are assumed to denote
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Importantly, note as well that challenging, in Aymara, involves =wa (see (3.48b) and (3.49b)), which means
that b brings in the evidential proposition that she has the best possible grounds for the negated proposition.
Turning to the account of the cases in (3.47)-(3.49), (3.53) represents the challenge in (3.47), which
is felicitous. The sentence to be challenged includes =wa, as represented in (3.53a). The challenge is
represented in (3.53b).
(3.53) a. K1: A asserted (3.48a)
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno=wa’[D];{p}i
CG cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)}
b. K2: B’s total challenge
A Table B
p h‘That’s not true=wa’[D];{¬p}i ¬p
h‘It rained in Puno=wa’[D];{p}i
CG cg2 = cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)} [ {BPG(B,¬p)}
The question is why the challenge represented in (3.53b) is felicitous. The intuition that is captured here is
that it has to be determined whether there is symmetry between the discourse participants, i.e., whether both
discourse participants’ contributions are leveled. My claim is that this is in fact the case in (3.53). There are
two aspects involved in symmetry in my approach. The first one, which is inherited from Farkas & Bruce
(2010), is that each discourse participant is committed to either p or ¬p (and they are not both committed
to p or ¬p). The second one, which is the novelty here, involves the evidential proposition. There is
symmetry in this case as well: A adds to the Common Ground that she has the best possible grounds for the
proposition that it rained in Puno; B adds to the Common Ground that she has the best possible grounds for
the proposition that it didn’t rain in Puno. Thus, this is a situation in which there are two pieces of evidence
that make A and B make opposite claims—this means that the pieces of evidence for a proposition and its
negation balance each other out.35 In this sense, there is symmetry, so challenging A’s claim is possible.
To make the notion of symmetrical challenge explicit, I render it explicitly in the condition in (3.54)—I
assume that (3.54) may be subject to pragmatic considerations (see below).
(3.54) Symmetrical challenge condition
An issue proposed by discourse participant A in context state K1 involving a declarative sentence
with a direct evidential (S[D]-ev) denoting at-issue proposition p and (at least) not-at-issue eviden-
¬p.
35It is worth noting that the quality of the evidence does not appear to be a crucial factor here. As shown in section 3.2, both
=wa and -[e] make the same kind of evidential contribution, which means that the evidence provided is considered to be of equal
quality (i.e., the best possible grounds here).
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tial proposition BPG(A, p) is felicitously challenged by an issue proposed by discourse participant
B in context state K2 involving a declarative sentence with =wa (S0[D]=wa) denoting at-issue
proposition ¬p and not-at-issue evidential proposition BPG(B,¬p) iff there is symmetry, i.e.,
a. A is committed to p and B is committed to ¬p; and
b. the evidence A and B bring in for the propositions they are committed to balance each other
out (i.e., there are the same number of individuals with relevant evidence for p and ¬p).
Crucially, when considering the degraded challenge in the exchange in (3.49), which involves a case with
-[e], symmetry is violated. The representation of (3.49) appears in (3.55). Here I assume that there are two
evidence holders, A and C, which have the relevant evidence for the proposition that it rained in Puno—this
is what asserting the sentence with -[e] contributes with in terms of evidence for the relevant proposition.
What is crucial here is that there is no symmetry, in particular, the evidence the discourse participants bring
in do not balance each other out (i.e., (3.54b) is violated)—specifically, there are more individuals with the
relevant evidence for p than there are individuals with the relevant evidence for ¬p. Thus, the challenge
represented in (3.55b) is degraded.
(3.55) a. K1: A asserted (3.49a)
A Table B
p h‘It rained in Puno-[e]’[D];{p}i
CG cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)} [ {BPG(C, p)}
b. ??K2: B’s total challenge
A Table B
p h‘That’s not true=wa’[D];{¬p}i ¬p
h‘It rained in Puno-[e]’[D];{p}i
CG cg2 = cg1 [ {BPG(A, p)} [ {BPG(C, p)} [ {BPG(B,¬p)
A final comment needs to be made. The challenge represented in (3.55b) is not completely out; it is de-
graded. This means that, under some circumstances, the challenge may be possible (or, at least, the judg-
ment may indicate less degradation). What is needed in this case is that the evidence the challenger provides
is a real contender to the evidence that have been already added to the Common Ground. This would mean
that the challenger needs to provide more information as to why she is committing herself to ¬p—her move
cannot just be the simple one discussed above in connection to the total challenge operation, but a more
complex one. For instance, she would have to show why everyone else’s evidence is inaccurate. Showing
how this can be implemented, however, is left for a future occassion.36
36Characterizing such more complex moves could also shed light on the contrast in indirect challengeability that was briefly
discussed in footnote 17. Indirectly challenging a sentence with -[e] is degraded (in contrast to indirectly challenging a sentence
with =wa, which is possible), but the challenge may improve if more information is added, perhaps asking more about who else
has direct evidence for the relevant proposition and what their grounds are.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on direct evidentiality in Southern Aymara (an understudied Andean language)
in connection to discourse. This language has two direct evidentials, i.e., the enclitic =wa and the covert
morpheme -[e]. Sentences with =wa and -[e] are associated with the same evidential meaning (namely,
direct evidence) and display the same distribution when the commitments of the individuals uttering such
sentences are considered. I have made the novel observations that a sentence with =wa can be felicitously
uttered if the speaker alone is in a position to utter such a sentence (i.e., she has direct evidence for the
proposition the sentence denotes), and there is some previous discourse to which the proposition such a
sentence denotes can contribute, whereas a sentence with -[e] can be felicitously uttered if the speaker and
somebody else is in a position to express the proposition such sentence a denotes (the presence of previous
discourse is not required). I have shown that this split has an effect on direct challengeability possibilities
regarding sentences with direct evidentials. I have further identified which construction can be used in
different discourse settings (e.g., conversation openers and narration of stories) and what the effects of
these constructions are on the hearer in connection to confirming or challenging the proposition the speaker
proposes. To account for these properties, I have implemented an analysis that is based on Farkas & Bruce
(2010). I have further enriched their model with properties that are tied to evidentials (Murray 2017; Faller
2019). The analysis has made explicit what the links between evidentiality and discourse are.
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Indirect evidentiality and past mirativity in
Quechua and Aymara
Abstract: This chapter discusses tense markers in connection to indirect evidentiality. Specifically, this
chapter comparatively analyzes sentences with the past tense suffixes -sqa in Cuzco Quechua and -tayna in
Southern Aymara. Three contributions are made. (i) I provide a means to tell apart the two different analyses
of tense markers in connection to indirect evidentiality that have been proposed in the formal literature,
namely, one in which the speaker’s perception plays a crucial role, which is used by Faller (2004) to analyze
sentences with -sqa, and one in which the notion of a learning time is incorporated, which is used by Klose
(2014) to analyze sentences with -tayna. I argue that the learning time analysis is to be preferred. (ii) I
provide the first systematic comparison between Quechua and Aymara from a formal semantics perspective,
which gives support to the well-known descriptive statement in the Andean literature that the grammars of
these languages are parallel (Cerrón-Palomino 2008). (iii) I make the novel empirical observation that, in
addition to the expression of surprise that extends into the speaker’s current speech as a result of something
unexpected occurring (Rett & Murray 2013), it is possible to express surprise about something that occurred
well before the speaker’s current speech with sentences with -sqa and -tayna. The learning time analysis is
extended to account for these cases as well, making explicit a link between learning and (un)expectedness.
Keywords: indirect evidential, learning time, perception, mirativity, Quechua, Aymara
4.1 Introduction
Descriptively, evidentiality is a grammatical category whose core meaning encodes the source of information
an individual (hereafter, the speaker) draws on regarding that piece of information (Aikhenvald 2004) (see
also Aikhenvald 2006, 2018). For instance, in (4.1), which is a sentence in Mapundungun (isolate spoken
in Chile), the speaker says that s/he arrived, and the source for that information is reportative (i.e., the





‘S/he arrived (they said).’
(Mapundungun)
As is well-known, evidential meanings can be realized by different kinds of elements in a sentence, such
as illocutionary markers, modal markers, tense markers, etc. (Aikhenvald 2004, 2006, 2018; Aksu-Koc &
Slobin 1986; van der Auwera & Plungian 1998; Chung 2006, 2007; Şener 2011; Demonte & Fernández-
Soriano 2013, 2014; Faller 2002, 2004, 2007, 2012; Garrett 2001; Izvorski 1997; Johanson 2000; Kalsang
et al. 2013; Koev 2011, 2017; Lee 2011; Klose 2014, 2015; McCready & Ogata 2007; Matthewson et al.
2007; Murray 2010, 2014, 2017; Peterson 2010; Sauerland & Schenner 2007; Slobin & Aksu-Koc 1982;
Smirnova 2013; Tatevosov 2001). This chapter focuses on the evidential meaning associated with tense
markers in particular. The specific focus is on the tense markers that give rise to an evidential implication in
Cuzco Quechua (henceforth, Quechua) and Southern Aymara (henceforth, Aymara), the two major dialects
in the Quechuan and Aymaran language families. The relevant markers are the past tense suffixes -sqa in
Quechua and -tayna in Aymara. These suffixes are normally characterized as implicating indirect evidential-
ity (see, e.g., Adelaar 2004; Cerrón-Palomino 2008; among others), i.e., when the speaker utters a sentence
with these suffixes, it is meant that she does not have first-hand evidence, for instance, the evidence that she
has is a report or is based on an inference (see Willett 1988).
Examples with these suffixes appear in (4.2)-(4.3)—(4.2) is taken from Faller (2004:46). These sen-
tences can be felicitously uttered if, for instance, somebody told the speaker that it was raining or if she goes
outside and sees the wet ground, which normally means that it was raining in the environment where she
is—on the contrary, these sentences are infelicitous if the speaker saw the whole raining eventuality.
(4.2) Para-sha-sqa.
rain-PROG-sqa




‘It was raining, I infer/I was told.’
(Aymara)
This chapter provides a comparative analysis from a formal semantics perspective of Quechua sentences
1Abbreviations: 1 = first person, 2 = second person, 3 = third person, ABL = ablative, ACC = accusative, BEN = benefactive,
CAUS = causative, CIS = cislocative, CONT = continuative, DAT = dative, DECL = declarative, DIM = diminutive, DIR = direct
evidential, ILLA = illative, INT = interrogative, INTER = interjection, LIM = limitative, NAR = narrative evidential, NEG = negation,
NMLZ = nominalizer, PROG = progressive, PST = past, REFL = reflexive, REP = reportative evidential, SURP = surprise, TOP = topic.
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with -sqa and Aymara sentences with -tayna.2 The motivation for such an approach lies in the following
considerations. Each suffix has been independently investigated. Faller (2004) analyzes Quechua sentences
with -sqa in terms of the speaker’s perception of the eventuality under consideration (see also Garrett 2001;
Hanks 1984; Matthewson 2011). In particular, she claims that the eventuality’s time and location cannot
totally overlap with the speaker’s perception of that eventuality; this gives rise to an indirectness implication,
namely, that the speaker’s source of evidence is indirect—I refer to this analysis as the perception analysis.
Thus, the speaker can felicitously utter (4.2), because she has not directly perceived that it rained (in the
case of a report) or she has only perceived the effects of the rain (in the case of the inference based on the
wet ground).
Klose (2014), on the other hand, analyzes Aymara sentences with -tayna in terms of a learning time,
i.e., the time at which the speaker learns about something (based on some evidence) (see also Koev 2011,
2017; Lee 2011, 2013; Smirnova 2013). In this case, it is important that the learning time does not totally
overlap with the eventuality time—I refer to this analysis as the learning time analysis. Thus, the speaker
can felicitously utter (4.3), because she learned afterwards (via a report or in inference) that it had rained.
Importantly, it is a well-known fact in the Andean literature (see, e.g., Adelaar 2004; Cerrón-Palomino 1987,
2000, 2008; among many others) that, with regard to their morphology, syntax and semantics, Quechua and
Aymara are strikingly similar—in most domains of grammar, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the languages. If these languages are so similar, then the question arises as to whether Quechua sentences
with -sqa and Aymara sentences with -tayna should in fact be analyzed in different terms, as the previous
literature suggests.
In this chapter, I propose that Quechua sentences with -sqa and Aymara sentences with -tayna should
actually be analyzed in the same way—i.e., the same analysis accounts for them both. Specifically, I show
that while both analyses can account for most of the data reported by Faller (2004) and Klose (2014), there
is a particular kind of piece of data that the learning time analysis, but not the perception analysis, can
accommodate, thus suggesting that the learning time analysis is to be preferred. The contribution of this
chapter in this regard is then two-fold: (i) I provide a means to tell apart the two different analyses of tense
markers in connection to indirect evidentiality that have been proposed in the literature, and (ii) I provide the
first systematic comparison between Quechua and Aymara from a formal semantics perspective, which gives
2The suffix -tayna can actually be split into -tay and -na, where the former is the tense marker and the latter is an agreement
marker. For simplicity, I treat -tayna as a single unit. Nothing hinges on this.
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support to the descriptive statement that Quechua and Aymara are parallel by closely analyzing a particular
domain of grammar. In addition, I extend the learning time analysis by considering the mirativity possi-
bilities that Quechua sentences with -sqa and Aymara sentences with -tayna allow. This is where the third
(and final) contribution of this chapter lies: (iii) I make the novel empirical observation that, in addition to
the expression of surprise that extends into the speaker’s current speech as a result of something unexpected
occurring (Aikhenvald 2004; Castroviejo-Miró 2006; DeLancey 1997, 2001; Dickinson 2000, 2001; Lau &
Rooryck 2017; Rett 2008, 2009, 2011; Rett & Murray 2013; Slobin & Aksu-Koc 1982; Smirnova 2013;
Torres Bustamante 2012, 2013), it is possible to express surprise about something that occurred well before
the speaker’s current speech with sentences with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna. This phenomenon is
referred to as past mirativity. I will extend the learning time analysis to account for these cases as well
making explicit what the link between leaning and (un)expectedness is.
The data discussed in this chapter are based on two sources of information: previous literature, in par-
ticular, Faller (2004) and Klose (2014) (see also Adelaar 1977, 2004; Cépeda 2011; Cerrón-Palomino 1987,
2000, 2008; Coler 2014; Cusihuaman 1976; Hardman 2001; Klose 2015; Lefebvre & Muysken 1988; We-
ber 1987, 1989; among others), and original fieldwork with two consultants, namely, the Quechua speaker
Janett Vengoa Zúñiga and the Aymara speaker Roger Gonzalo Segura. I have corroborated all the exam-
ples to follow, which have appeared in the previous literature for the most part, with them. In the absence
of a reference, the judgments reported are theirs. The methodology used for the fieldwork interviews in-
volved the presentation of contextual scenarios using Spanish as an auxiliary language, which was followed
by a request for a felicity judgment on a particular grammatical sentence given that contextual scenario
(see Matthewson 2004; Davis et al. 2014; and Bochnak & Matthewson 2015 for discussion regarding the
soundness and validity of the aforementioned methodological choices).
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the analyses under consideration, namely,
the perception analysis (Faller 2004) and the learning time analysis (Klose 2014). Section 4.3 discusses a
number of cases that both analyses can account for. Section 4.4 discusses the decisive data in that they can
be accounted for by the learning time analysis but not by the perception analysis. Section 4.5 turns to the
discussion of mirativity. Section 4.6 revises the learning time analysis so that the mirativity cases can be
accounted for. Section 4.7 is the conclusion.
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4.2 The analyses
This section presents the perception analysis (Faller 2004) and the learning time analysis (Klose 2014).
Section 4.2.1 presents the aspects of the standard neo-Reichenbachian approach to tense and aspect within
an event semantics approach that are relevant for the discussion of both analyses. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3
discuss the perception analysis and the learning time analysis respectively.
4.2.1 Temporal reference and event semantics
The temporal reference of an expression corresponds to the time interval at which the eventuality description
that is denoted by that expression is temporally interpreted. In standard neo-Reichenbachian approaches,
temporal reference involves an understanding of tense and aspect involving three temporal parameters (see
Dowty 1986; Hinrichs 1986; Kamp & Reyle 1993; Kiparsky 2002; Klein 1994; Kratzer 1998; Partee 1984;
Reichenbach 1947 for relevant discussion). These are the following intervals: eventuality time E, which is
the time at which an eventuality (an event or a state) holds, the topic or reference time T , which is the time
about which a claim is made—it can be indicated by overt temporal expressions—, and the utterance time
U , which is the time at which the relevant claim is made. Aspect markers indicate what the relation between
E and T is, whereas tense markers indicate what the relation between T and U is.
With regard to aspect, it is assumed that there are three possibilities with regard to the relation between
E and T . It may be that T is included in E. This is the case in the presence of a progressive form, as in
It was raining. It may be that E is included in T . This is the case in the presence of a perfective form,
as in It rained. While the inclusion relation is used to characterize the temporal relation between E and T
when events are considered, for states, it is commonly assumed that E and T overlap. For instance, in the
sentence Bob was ill on Sunday, where T is Sunday, it may well be the case that T is included in E or E
is included in T . As for the former, suppose that Bob’s illness spans from Saturday to Monday. As for the
latter, suppose that Bob was only ill for four hours on Sunday. However, it may also be the case that neither
hold. This would be the case if Bob started being ill at, e.g., late at night on Saturday, but recovered on
Sunday at noon. In such a case, there is overlap, but not inclusion.
With regard to tense, of relevance here is the past tense—as is discussed in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3,
Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna are analyzed as past tense markers. Simply put, in languages like English,
this means that T precedes U (see, e.g., Abusch 1998 or Condoravdi 2002 for extensive discussion of the
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past tense in English). Thus, both sentences It was raining and It rained indicate that the there is some time
(i.e., T ) prior to now (i.e., U ) where a raining event took place. Something similar takes place with regard
to the sentence Bob was ill on Sunday: there is some time, namely, Sunday (which is T here), which is prior
to now (i.e., U ) where Bob was ill. It is worth pointing out, however, that, while Quechua -sqa and Aymara
-tayna are past tenses, they differ from languages like English in that there are some instances in which T
and U coincide—these will become explicit in the next sections, in particular, when discussing mirativity in
section 4.5 (see, among others, Bochnak 2016; Chung & Timberlake 1985; Comrie 1985; Dahl 1985; Enç
1996; Gennari 2003; Matthewson 2006; Mucha 2013; Ogihara 1996; Sohn 1999; Tonhauser 2011, 2015).
The tense and aspect approach briefly sketched above is incorporated within the event semantics frame-
work.3 I assume a domain of (object) individuals, a domain of eventualities (which subsumes events and
states; I use e for eventualities), and a domain of (convex) temporal intervals (I use t for temporal intervals).
With regard to temporal intervals, the conventions tT and tU , where T is indicative of the topic time and
U is indicative of the utterance time, are adopted. Throughout this chapter, I further assume, for simplicity,
that tU is to be understood as the relevant speech’s situation now—tU is assumed as a parameter of the in-
terpretation function. I further assume Krifka’s (1989, 1998) temporal trace function of an eventuality ⌧(e),
which maps e to its temporal trace or run time. I further assume that any two time intervals t1 and t2 can
be related to each other in terms of inclusion, t1 ✓ t2, overlap, t1   t2 (i.e., t1 and t2 are not disjoint), and
precedence, t1   t2 (i.e., t1 can either precede or be equal to t2; this relation is assumed to be transitive,
which is relevant in section 4.2.3)—this kind of precedence relation is important for the analysis of Quechua
-sqa and Aymara -tayna as anticipated above.
For illustration, consider the English-like toy example It be-PAST (⇡was) raining (on Sunday) under this
approach, where the denotation of PAST is as in (4.4):
3When discussing evidentiality, it is, in general, standard to make use of propositions (see Koev 2011, 2017 for discussion
with regard to why these are the relevant semantic objects to be considered). For simplicity, the discussion of the two analyses in
sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 is stated in terms of eventualities, which suffices to show how each analysis works and how they differ
from each other—this methodological option basically follows Faller (2004). The learning time analysis, which is the one adopted
in the end, is revised in section 4.4 and in section 4.6. In those sections, worlds are incorporated into the analysis. The second
simplification that is worth mentioning is that, in the discussion of the two analyses in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, I do not make an
at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction (see Korotkova 2016, 2020; Murray 2017 for recent overviews), treating the meanings involved
as at-issue, which suffices for current purposes (for instance, challengeability possibilities or the scope of negation are not discussed
when comparing the analyses). In section 4.6, once mirativity has been discussed, different layers of meanings are also incorporated.
The third simplification is that I do not make explicit reference to a speech eventuality (or a learning eventuality) in the sense of
Koev (2011, 2017) or Rett & Murray (2013), limiting myself to mentioning the relevant time intervals at which these eventualities
would happen. This refinement would be easy to incorporate, but is not done for ease of exposition: the crucial properties under
discussion do not need to make reference to such eventualities.
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(4.4) JPASTKtU =  tT P e[P (tT , e)& tT   tU ]
The denotation of this toy example appears in (4.5).4 Assuming that existential closure over open variables
applies (Krifka 1998), this example conveys the meaning that there is a raining eventuality whose run time
includes Sunday, where Sunday precedes or is equal to the utterance time (i.e., the now of the speech).
(4.5) JIt be-PAST raining (on Sunday)KtU = 9e[rain(e)& tT ✓ Sunday& tT ✓ ⌧(e)& tT   tU ]
4.2.2 The perception analysis
Faller (2004) proposes an analysis of Quechua -sqa as a past tense marker, which incorporates a past mean-
ing that is similar to the one defined in (4.4).5,6 In addition, her analysis of -sqa incorporates a spatial
component—thus, in addition to individuals, eventualities and time intervals, which were introduced in sec-
tion 4.2.1, she incorporates spatial locations in her system; l is used for spatial locations. In particular, the
main contribution of her analysis of markers such as Quechua -sqa lies in “specifying that the eventuality
took place (at least partially) outside the speaker’s perceptual field during topic time.” As she continues,
“The perceptual field of a person at time t is defined as the set of locations l that (s)he has perceptual access
to at t, where perception may involve any of the senses, not just sight” (Faller 2004:69) (see also Koev 2017;
Matthewson 2011). The link between this approach and indirect evidentiality lies in the intuition that the
speaker only has indirect evidence for some eventuality that happens outside of what she perceives.
In this regard, two spatio-temporal trace functions play a crucial role, namely, e-trace and mP -trace
(see also Verkuyl & Zwarts 2009). The former, e-trace, maps an eventuality to its time and space coordi-
nates. That is, each interval t included in the run time of the eventuality ⌧(e) is paired with the location of
4I leave the compositional details with regard to the (verbal) predicate combining with aspect markers aside, as the main focus
is on a particular kind of past tense marker. Specifically, the abstract Logical Form (LF) I assume appears in (i) (see Faller 2004);
the compositional details regarding the denotation of AspectP are not discussed here.
(i) [TenseP Tense [AspectP Aspect VP ]]
An overt expression indicating the topic time (e.g., on Sunday) would combine with Tense; AspectP would then combine with the
object resulting from combining those two. The P argument in (4.4) is saturated by the denotation of AspectP in the sentence under
consideration.
5The difference between (4.4) and Faller’s PAST lies in that she assumes a precedence relation  , which excludes the possibility
of the topic time being equal to the utterance time. This is done, because she does not account for cases where the latter may be the
case (e.g., cases involving mirativity). Since discussion of mirativity is incorporated later on in this chapter, where the topic time
may be equal to the utterance time, the precedence relation adopted here is  . See sections 4.5 and 4.6 for discussion.
6See Faller (2004) for discussion of -sqa within the larger tense paradigm in Quechua, for discussion as to why -sqa is better
analyzed as a (simple) past tense marker (and not as a perfect), as well as discussion as to the absence of a modal meaning under
this marker. In a similar vein, see Klose (2014) for discussion of -tayna within the larger tense paradigm in Aymara, for discussion
with regard to why -tayna should be analyzed as a past tense marker, as well as discussion regarding a belief implication that may
arise in the presence of -tayna.
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that eventuality at t. The output of e-trace is the set of time-location pairs ht, li, i.e., the run time-space of
the relevant eventuality (see Faller 2004 for additional discussion with regard to the definition of this trace).
This is made explicit in (4.6), where the predicate at follows Verkuyl & Zwarts’s (2009) proposal in that it
is true of eventuality e iff e takes place at time t and location l (Faller 2004:70).
(4.6) For any eventuality e, e-trace(e) = {ht, li | t ✓ ⌧(e)& at(e, t, l)}
The second function, mP -trace, is the one concerned with the perceptual field of the speaker. Specifically,
it is a function that maps an individual, the speaker here, to what she perceives at some time and location
during her run time ⌧(sp) (i.e., her lifespan). Faller (2004:70) understands perception (the perceptual field)
as “the physical space surrounding, and including, the speaker.” This excludes locations that are too far away
or that are too tiny for the speaker to perceive. It also excludes locations that may be within the perceptual
reach of the speaker, but she is not paying attention to (at the relevant time). Faller introduces a final aspect
with regard to perception, which concerns the memory that the speaker has of what is perceived (see also
Garrett 2001). This becomes important in cases in which the speaker perceived some eventuality in the past
but does not remember it (for instance, if something happened to the speaker, but she was a small child, so
she has forgotten it; see section 4.3 for discussion). What it means for mP -trace to apply to speaker sp
is made explicit in (4.7), where the predicate m-perceive holds of sp, time interval t and location l iff sp
perceived l at t and has a current memory of having perceived l at t (Faller 2004:75).
(4.7) For any speaker sp, mP -trace(sp) = {ht, li | t ✓ ⌧(sp)&m-perceive(sp, t, l)}
Based on these functions, the spatial meaning of Quechua -sqa can be incorporated, in particular, it is
required that e-trace(e) is not contained in mP -trace(sp) (for eventuality e and speaker sp). In the spirit
of Klein (1994), Faller argues that only the part of the run time of the eventuality falling within the topic
time is relevant—for both its temporal and spatial location. This further means that the part of the speaker’s
perception that is relevant lies within this frame. As a thought example, suppose that Quechua -sqa is added
to an English sentence like Bob was ill on Sunday: in this case, what is of interest is whether the speaker
had evidence for Bob being ill on Sunday, regardless of whether Bob was ill on Saturday already (and the
speaker knew this).
Importantly, that e-trace(e) is not contained in mP -trace(sp) (for eventuality e and speaker sp) gives
rise to an indirectness evidential implication, i.e., that sp does not have (all) the relevant direct evidence
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for what is being discussed. In particular, this implication is “deictically induced,” as it arises from the
spatio-temporal meaning of -sqa in combination with “the speech act participants’ knowledge of the general
physical laws” (Faller 2004:80).7
The denotation of Quechua -sqa, which here is extended to Aymara -tayna, is stated in (4.8) (see Faller
2004:71,75). Applying -sqa or -tayna to topic time tT , predicate P and eventuality e is true iff P applies to
tT and e, tT precedes or is equal to the utterance time tU (the speech’s now), and the run time-location of e
is not (totally) contained in the perception field of the speaker—as done with tU , I assume that speaker sp is
a parameter of the interpretation function.8
(4.8) J-sqaKsp,tU /J-taynaKsp,tU =  tT P e[P (tT , e)& tT   tU &
¬8ht, li[t ✓ tT & ht, li 2 e-trace(e) ! ht, li 2 mP -trace(sp)]]
For illustration, consider the examples in (4.9)-(4.10), which repeat (4.2)-(4.3).
(4.9) Para-sha-sqa.
rain-PROG-sqa




‘It was raining, I infer/I was told.’
(Aymara)
Their denotation under this analysis appears in (4.11). (4.9)-(4.10) are true iff there is a raining event e that
took place at some topic time tT , where tT precedes or is equal to the utterance time tU (the speech’s now),
and the speaker did not perceive at least some of e—which implicates indirecteness.
(4.11) J(4.9)Ksp,tU /J(4.10)Ksp,tU = 9tT9e[rain(e)& tT ✓ ⌧(e)& tT   tU &
¬8ht, li[t ✓ tT & ht, li 2 e-trace(e) ! ht, li 2 mP -trace(sp)]]
The perception analysis correctly captures why it is felicitous to utter (4.9)-(4.10) in reportative and inferen-
tial contexts. For instance, if somebody told the speaker that it rained some day in the past, then the speaker
did not perceive the rain at all, which is possible under the analysis in (4.11). A similar reasoning holds in
the case of an inference made by the speaker based on seeing the wet ground. She did not see the rain, but
can conclude that it rained some time in the past based on the effect of the rain (in a particular location).
This analysis also accounts for why uttering (4.9)-(4.10) in a context in which the speaker perceived (e.g.,
7See Faller (2004:80) for further discussion.
8Note that direct perception is not excluded in principle, i.e., in the presence of direct evidence, it should be possible to utter
sentences with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna as long as the speaker does not have direct perception (and recollection) of the
whole eventuality under consideration. This is in fact the case, as will be discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.5.
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saw) the whole raining eventuality is infelicitous: in such a scenario, the run time-location of the eventuality
would be contained in the perceptual field of the speaker, which is excluded. This, in turn, accomodates why
there is an indirectness flavor in sentences as those in (4.9)-(4.10).
4.2.3 The learning time analysis
In section 4.2.1, the standard neo-Reichenbachian ontology was introduced; there are three temporal param-
eters, i.e., the eventuality time (here, the run time of the eventuality e under consideration, i.e., the output of
⌧(e), the topic time tT and the utterance time tU ). While aspect locates ⌧(e) relative to tT , tense locates tT
relative to tU . The proponents of the learning time analysis enrich this ontology with an additional temporal
parameter, namely, a learning time tL, i.e., the time at which the speaker acquires the relevant evidence for
or learns that the eventuality under consideration is happening or happened (see Klose 2014 for a proposal
for Aymara -tayna; see also Koev 2011, 2017; Lee 2011, 2013; Smirnova 2013). The evidential implication
of evidential markers (such as Quecha -sqa and Aymara -tayna) is tied to the learning time. Specifically,
instead of establishing a relation between tT and tU directly, tT is related to tL and tL is related to tU ,
i.e., sentences with evidentials like the ones under discussion here bear two tenses. The main insight of an
analysis that includes a learning time is that indirectness can follow from the presence of a learning time (in
relation to the other times). Importantly, this approach can be flexible enough to capture instances where the
notion of indirectness does not suffice, as will be discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.6.
For the learning time adopted in what follows, I assume that tT can precede or be equal to tL, and that
tL can precede or be equal to tU—the relation between the run time of an eventuality ⌧(e) (for eventuality e)
and tT remains as discussed in section 4.2.1. In addition, I assume a three-place relation learn, which takes
individual x (the speaker in the cases under discussion), eventuality e and time t as arguments, and holds iff
x learned based on some kind of evidence at t that e is occurring or occurred.9 Lastly, in the spirit of Faller
(2004) (see section 4.2.2), I incorporate the meaning that the run time of the eventuality under consideration
is not included in tL. The denotation of Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna under the learning time analysis
appears in (4.12):10
9See section 4.4 for additional details with regard to the learn relation.
10In a similar vein to what was mentioned in footnote 8, note that, under this approach, the type of evidence is not specified,
so, in principle, it is possible for the speaker to learn something based on direct evidence. What is ruled out is a case in which the
speaker witnesses the whole eventuality under consideration (which is the case when the learning time includes the run time of that
eventuality). This becomes relevant in the discussion in sections 4.3 and 4.5, where the speaker does have direct evidence and is
actually possible to utter a sentence with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna.
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(4.12) J-sqaKsp,tU /J-taynaKsp,tU =  tT P e9tL[P (tT , e)& tT   tL   tU &
learn(sp, e, tL)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL]
For illustration, consider the examples in (4.13)-(4.14), which repeat (4.2)-(4.3).
(4.13) Para-sha-sqa.
rain-PROG-sqa




‘It was raining, I infer/I was told.’
(Aymara)
Their denotation under this analysis appears in (4.15). (4.13)-(4.14) are true iff there is a raining event e that
took place at some reference time tT , where tT precedes or is equal to the learning time tL, which in turn
precedes or is equal to the utterance time tU (the speech’s now) but does not include the run time of e, and
the speaker learned that e at tL.
(4.15) J(4.13)Ksp,tU /J(4.14)Ksp,tU = 9tT9tL9e[rain(e)& tT ✓ ⌧(e)&
tT   tL   tU & learn(sp, e, tL)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL]
As the perception analysis that was discussed in the previous section, the learning time analysis can also cor-
rectly capture why it is felicitous to utter (4.13)-(4.14) in reportative and inferential contexts. For instance,
if somebody told the speaker that it rained some day in the past, then the speaker learned that it rained based
on reportative evidence, which is possible under the analysis in (4.15). A similar reasoning holds in the
case of an inference made by the speaker based on seeing the wet ground. She has evidence that makes it
possible for her to conclude that it rained some time in the past based on the effect of the rain. This analysis
also accounts for why uttering (4.13)-(4.14) in a context in which the speaker was present during the whole
raining eventuality is infelicitous: in such a scenario, the run time of the eventuality would be included in the
time when the speaker learns about the rain, which is excluded. This, in turn, provides a principled account
for why there is an indirectness flavor in sentences like (4.13)-(4.14).
4.3 Applying the analyses more extensively
This section discusses in more detail how the perception analysis and the learning time analysis apply to a
number of cases in which Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna are felicitously used. The first two cases to be
discussed involve reportative evidence. Consider first examples involving folktales or myths, as in (4.16)-
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(4.17)—the Quechua example in (4.16) is taken from Cusihuaman (1976:170). These examples involve past
eventualities. The speaker did not witness them; in fact, she did not participate in them at all. The speaker
got to know about these eventualities through report—this is overtly indicated by means of the reportative





























‘In this way, this girl gave birth to a bear cub.’
(Aymara)
Both analyses can account for this case. Under the perception analysis, (4.16)-(4.17) convey the meaning
that there is an eventuality of giving birth to a bear cub by a bear that occurred some time in the past and was
out of the perceptual field (and recollection) of the speaker. If the speaker got to know about the eventuality
through a report, then it is out of the perceptual field of the speaker; this analysis can thus account for these
cases, thus giving this kind of cases the indirectness flavor they have. Under the learning time analysis,
(4.16)-(4.17) convey the meaning that there is an eventuality of giving birth to a bear cub by a bear that
occurred some time in the past, and the speaker learned about that eventuality after that time. This analysis
can thus account for these cases as well: if the speaker learned about the eventuality through a report, then
the eventuality is not included in the learning time, thus giving this kind of cases the indirectness flavor they
have.
The examples in (4.18)-(4.19) also involve reportative evidence. Here the topic time is made explicit,
namely, when the speaker was a baby, which here means that the speaker cannot remember the eventuality of
her uncle having died. In this case, somebody tells the speaker about this eventuality—the Quechua example





















‘My uncle died when I was a still a baby.’
(Aymara)
11In the cases to follow in this and the following sections, there are some instances in which the reportative or the direct
evidentials in Quechua and Aymara appear. The discussion of a semantics of how the co-occurrence of Quechua -sqa and Aymara
-tayna works in detail lies beyond the scope of this chapter. See Faller (2004) and Klose (2015) and for relevant discussion.
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Both analyses can also account for these examples. Under the perception analysis, (4.18)-(4.19) convey the
meaning that there is an eventuality of the speaker’s uncle having died, which happened when the speaker
was a baby and, as such, could not be remembered by the speaker. This is, again, an instance of a case
implicating indirectness. Under the learning time analysis, (4.18)-(4.19) convey the meaning that there is an
eventuality of the speaker’s uncle having died, which happened when the speaker was a baby, and the speaker
learned about that eventuality after that time. This is, again, an instance of a case involving indirectness,
which this analysis can also accommodate.
The examples in (4.20)-(4.21) involve inferential evidence.12 The context for these sentences involve
the speaker knowing that a friend of hers would paint her house. Afterwards, the speaker sees her friend,











‘She painted (it) white (lit., caused it to become white).’
(Aymara)
Both analyses can account for these examples as well. Under the perception analysis, (4.20)-(4.21) convey
the meaning that there is an eventuality of her (the speaker’s friend here) having painted it (which is the
house here) some time in the past that is outside the perceptual field (and recollection) of the speaker. This
analysis can thus accommodate these cases involving indirectness (an inference here). Under the learning
time analysis, (4.16)-(4.17) convey the meaning that there is an eventuality of her (the speaker’s friend
here) having painted it (which is the house here) some time in the past, and the speaker learned about that
eventuality after that time. This analysis thus accommodates these cases involving indirectness as well.
The examples in (4.22)-(4.23) involve making an inference based on the result of an eventuality—
the Quechua example in (4.22) is taken from Faller (2004:52); see Klose (2014:119) for a similar case in
Aymara. The context here is one in which the cup broke, but the speaker was not there when this happened.
What she sees afterwards is the result of the eventuality, namely, that there are pieces of the cup scattered
all over the floor. (4.22)-(4.23) can be uttered in this context.
12Faller (2004:53) reports that the example in (4.20) is infelicitous. I have checked it with my consultant, who finds it felicitous.














Here, again, both analyses can accommodate the data. Under the perception analysis, (4.22)-(4.23) convey
the meaning that there is an eventuality of the cup breaking some time in the past that is outside the percep-
tual field (and recollection) of the speaker—the speaker only witnesses the effects of the eventuality having
occurred. This analysis can thus accommodate these cases involving an inference (thus, indirectness). Under
the learning time analysis, (4.22)-(4.23) convey the meaning that there is an eventuality of the cup breaking
some time in the past, and the speaker learned about that eventuality after that time by looking at its result.
This analysis can thus accommodate these cases involving an inference.
The examples in (4.24)-(4.25) are different from the previous ones in that they are uttered against a con-
text in which the speaker actually has direct evidence—the Quechua example is taken from Faller (2004:54);
see Klose (2014:126) for a similar case in Aymara. Suppose that the speaker visited Mario and he was well—
the speaker saw him well. A couple of weeks after the visit, the speaker talks to somebody else and tells















Both the perception analysis and the learning time analysis can accommodate these data. Under the percep-
tion analysis, (4.24)-(4.25) convey the meaning that there is an eventuality (a state) of Mario being fine some
time in the past. Crucially, this state extends beyond the time when the speaker visited Mario, i.e., only some
of it is in the perceptual field (and recollection) of the speaker (e.g., Mario was fine before the speaker’s ar-
rival and was fine once she left). This analysis can thus accommodate these cases involving direct evidence.
Under the learning time analysis, (4.24)-(4.25) convey the meaning that there is an eventuality (a state) of
Mario being fine some time in the past. The speaker learned about this personally, based on direct evidence,
as she visited Mario. Crucially, the state’s temporal trace is not included in the learning time: Mario was
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fine before the speaker’s arrival and was fine once she left. This analysis can thus accommodate these cases
involving direct evidence as well.
4.4 Making a choice
The discussion in the previous section has shown that both the perception analysis and the learning time
analysis can accommodate the same data with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna. In this section, I provide
evidence that becomes crucial in teasing apart the empirical scope of the analyses. Ultimately, I argue that
the learning time analysis is more adequate than the perception analysis.
Faller (2004:54) discusses the exchange in (4.26) in Quechua—the Aymara counterpart appears in
(4.27). She mentions that this exchange actually occurred to her: she was doing fieldwork in Cuzco and
interrupted it to travel to a conference in Sweden (she also traveled to Germany). When she went back
to Cuzco, a consultant asked her the question in (4.26a). Importantly, a felicitous answer to this question























Focusing first on the perception analysis, (4.26b) and (4.27b) convey the meaning that there is an eventuality
(a state) of Sweden being beautiful, which extends beyond the speaker’s perceptual field (and recollection)
of it.13 The analysis can thus accommodate this piece of data in the scenario that Faller discusses. The
learning time analysis can also accommodate this piece of data. Under this analysis, (4.26b) and (4.27b)
convey the meaning that there is an eventuality (a state) of Sweden being beautiful. The speaker learned
about this personally, based on direct evidence, as she went to Sweden. Crucially, the run time of the state
is not included in the learning time, so the analysis correctly predicts these sentences to be felicitous when
13Here I set aside the discussion of the questions in (4.26a) and (4.27a) for simplicity.
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uttered in the scenario under consideration.
Consider now a novel variation of Faller’s context. Suppose that the speaker has visited Sweden twice in
three months, which means that she has experienced Sweden being beautiful in the first trip. The second trip
happened two weeks ago; Sweden remains beautiful, i.e., nothing has changed (at least from the speaker’s
point of view). Upon the speaker’s return to Peru, somebody asks her how Sweden was, i.e., she is asked
Quechua (4.26a) or Aymara (4.27a). Interestingly, it would be infelicitous for the speaker to reply with











The question that arises is whether the analyses under consideration can rule out this case. Here I argue that
the learning time analysis, but not the perception analysis, can rule it out. Consider the perception analysis
first. Under this analysis, what is crucial is that there is some distance between the speaker’s perception
(and recollection) of an eventuality and the run time-location of that eventuality (i.e., that the latter is not
totally included in the former). Importantly, this distance is present in both scenarios, because the run time-
location of the eventuality extends beyond the speaker’s perception. Thus, under this analysis, there should
be no difference with regard to how the speaker answers the relevant question. Thus, the perception analysis
incorrectly rules in (4.28)-(4.29), i.e., uttering these sentences in the second scenario.
In contrast, the learning time analysis predicts something different. Intuitively, given that the speaker
has already learned that Sweden was beautiful in her first trip (and nothing has changed at least from the
speaker’s point of view), it would be untruthful for her to state that she learned that Sweden was beautiful
after her second trip, thus ruling out (4.28)-(4.29). Interestingly, in this regard, my consultants made the
comment that answering with Quechua -sqa or Aymara -tayna is possible in cases like the one under discus-
sion only if it is the case that what is being communicated is new to the speaker, i.e., if she had not learned
about it beforehand.15
14In this scenario, the suffix that would be used is the so-called near distant or experienced past suffix, which is -rqa in Quechua
and -ya:na in Aymara—recall here that Aymara -na is the third person marker. See Cerrón-Palomino (2008) for an overview; see
also Faller (2004) and Klose (2014).
15It is worth pointing out that the discussion is not limited to the consideration of states, but it extends to predicates involving
other kinds of lexical aspect (e.g., activities, accomplishments). Here I discuss a case involving an accomplishment. Consider the
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In what follows, I provide an explicit way of capturing this intuition. Recall first that in section 4.2.3 I
defined learn as a three-place relation that takes individual x (the speaker in the cases under discussion),
eventuality e and time t as arguments, and holds iff x learned based on some kind of evidence at t that e is
occurring or occurred. To make this more explicit, I introduce worlds (see Kratzer 1981 and much related
work in semantics involving possible worlds, which includes evidentiality). As is standard, I assume an
accessibility relation R and a function that is related to R. This is stated in (4.30)—W is the domain of
worlds.
(4.30) Let R ✓ W ⇥W . f is that function from W to }(W ) such that,
for any world w, f(w) = {w0 |wRw0}.
As for revising the learn relation, I adopt a view where learning about something involves a change from not
believing (or knowing) something to believing (or knowing) it—for current purposes, whether it is belief or
following scenario: suppose that Roberto and Roger talked on Monday and wondered about Rosa’s activities, who is a mutual
friend; on Tuesday, Roger walks by Rosa’s place and sees that she is building a house (there is still a long way to go in the
construction). On Wednesday, Roberto asks Roger Quechua (ia) or Aymara (iia); he replies Quechua (ib) or Aymara (iib).
(i) a. Imana-sha-rqa-taq?
what-PROG-PST-INT








‘She was building a house.’
(ii) a. Kamacha-ska:na-sa?
what-PROG-PST-INT








‘She was building a house.’
As expected, both the perception analysis and the learning time analysis can handle this case: the eventuality’s run time-location is
not (totally) included in the perception of the speaker (in the case of the perception analysis) and the eventuality’s run time is not
included in the learning time (in the case of the learning time analysis).
Consider the following variation for the scenario under consideration. A week later, Roberto talks to Roger again and wonders
what is up with Rosa (he has tried to reach out to her without success), so he asks Quechua (ia) or Aymara (iia); the day before,
Roger saw that she was still working on the house; uttering the sentences in (iii) (which involves the same strings as in Quechua















‘Rosa was building a house.’
(Aymara)
Importantly, as in the case of the examples in the main text, the learning time analysis can rule out this case (because the speaker
had already learned that Rosa was building a house); the perception analysis cannot (because the requirement of the eventuality’s
run time-location not being included in the perception of the speaker is met).
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knowledge is not crucial; I make use of belief in what follows. Beliefs are modeled based on (4.30). Thus,
as is standard, I assume that beliefs include what individual x believes about the past, present and future
(what x believes can be determined in terms of a prior probability above a relevant standard of credence, a
task that is not undertaken here). In particular, beliefs Dox is a function that applies to a world relative to
some individual and time and gives as output the set of worlds that conforms to what that individual expects
at that time in that world. This is stated in (4.31).
(4.31) For any world w, individual x and time t,
Doxx,t(w) = {w0 |w0 conforms to x0s beliefs at t inw}
I further assume that individuals and eventualities are in a world (such as the actual world @), and that
individuals and eventualities can be in several worlds (see, e.g., Hacquard 2006)—I further assume a single
timeline that holds across worlds.16 Thus, learn applies to an individual (the speaker sp here), eventuality
e, learning time tL and a world (the actual world @ here) that holds iff for all sp’s belief worlds w that are
accessible from @ at tL, e is in w, and before tL e is not in w. The revised denotation of Quechua -sqa and
Aymara -tayna is as follows—I assume that actual world @ is a parameter of the interpretation function and
eventualities and individuals (such as the speaker) are located in a world (@ here):
(4.32) J-sqaKsp,tU ,@/J-taynaKsp,tU ,@ =  tT P e9tL[P (tT , e)& sp, e in@& tT   tL   tU &
learn(sp, e, tL,@)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL]
In addition to making explicit what is understood by learning, a peculiarity of the sentences (4.26b), (4.27b),
(4.28) and (4.29) needs to be discussed. Specifically, they include an individual-level predicate, namely, be
beautiful. As is well-known, this kind of predicates tend to hold across the whole existence of an individual,
which is how native speakers understand the sentences under discussion. Common tests that are used to
identify an individual-level predicate involve the impossibility of adding a locative expression, such as in
Cuzco, or a time expression, such as yesterday. This is exemplified in (4.33), with the individual level
predicate be intelligent.
(4.33) Mary is intelligent *in Cuzco/*yesterday.
In Quechua and Aymara, the same holds, as shown in (4.34)-(4.35).
16The issue of individuals (and other objects) being in worlds falls under the topic of transworld identity. Here, for simplicity, I



























‘Mary is/was beautiful in Cuzco/yesterday.’
(Aymara)
To account for the cases involving a second visit to Sweden, it becomes relevant to make explicit what is
understood here with regard to individual level predicates in connection to replies with -sqa and -tayna: if
the speaker experienced Sweden being beautiful, this will be assumed to be the case in the future as well.
For concreteness, here I adopt a view where individual-level predicates are to be understood in connection
to genericity (see, among others, Carlson 1977; Chierchia 1995; Kratzer 1995 for foundational work in this
regard; see Leslie & Lerner 2016 for a more recent overview). In particular, I assume that individual-level
predicate P applies to individual x and eventuality e and holds iff, relative to world w, x is in a P state e in
w (at ⌧(e)), and for any w0 similar to w (normal circumstances being considered), there is such a state in w0.
Based on this approach to learning and individual-level predicates, the learning time analysis correctly
rules out (4.28) and (4.29). Specifically, the speaker learned in her first trip that Sweden was beautiful, which
means that any state of Sweden being beautiful is incorporated into her belief worlds (normal circumstances
being considered). Importantly, uttering (4.28) and (4.29) after the second trip to Sweden would mean that
the speaker incorporates that Sweden was beautiful into her beliefs, which is not the case given that this is
already part of what she beliefs, thus yielding the required infelicity.
The denotation of (4.28) and (4.29) appears in (4.36)—I use   to represent the overlap relation. The
problem here is that it is being stated that the speaker is only now coming to the state of believing that
Sweden was beautiful, which is not the case, as she already believes so due to her previous trip to Sweden,
i.e., the problem arises in connection to the learn relation.
(4.36) J(4.28)Ksp,tU ,@/J(4.29)Ksp,tU ,@ =
9tT9tL9e[be-beautiful(s, e)& s, e in@& ⌧(e)   tT & tT   tL   tU &
learn(sp, e, tL,@)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL]
The discussion in this section has thus shown that the learning time analysis is to be preferred over the
perception analysis in connection to markers such as Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna. Specifically, I have
tested the predictions each analysis makes in connection to some pieces of data to show that the learning
time analysis can correctly rule them out, whereas the perception analysis incorrectly rules them in. For this
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reason, the learning time analysis is adopted in what follows.
4.5 Indirect evidentiality and mirativity
Markers such as Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna belong to a broader cross-linguistic class of so-called
indirect evidential markers, which normally convey reportative or inferential evidence (see sections 4.1
and 4.3; see Aikhenvald 2004 for an overview). This kind of markers may also convey mirativity—regardless
of evidence type. Mirativity, as Rett & Murray (2013:454) put it,“is the linguistic encoding of exceeded
expectation or surprise on the part of the speaker” (see also Aikhenvald 2004; Castroviejo-Miró 2006;
DeLancey 1997, 2001; Dickinson 2000, 2001; Lau & Rooryck 2017; Peterson 2010; Rett 2008, 2009,
2011; Slobin & Aksu-Koc 1982; Smirnova 2013; Torres Bustamante 2012, 2013).
Mirativity is exemplified in (4.37), which repeats (4.1). In addition to having an interpretation in which
the speaker has reportative evidence for stating that s/he arrived (see sections 4.1), (4.37) has another in-




‘S/he arrived (they said).’
(Mapundungun)
Quechua and Aymara sentences with -sqa and -tayna respectively can also express mirativity. This is exem-
plified in (4.38)-(4.39)—(4.38), in Quechua, is taken from Faller (2004:53). These sentences are felicitously
uttered in a scenario in which the speaker arrives to a place where she did not expect to see Mary, but she is















17In recent work (see, e.g., Salanova & Carol 2017; Simeonova 2015), it has been claimed that indirect evidentiality as discussed
in this section and mirativity should be dissociated in that the latter can be tied to the presence of, e.g., prosodic cues. In this sense,
there would be different means to convey these meanings, and, as such, the two categories should not be conflated. Interestingly,
in the case of Quechua and Aymara, mirativity arises in the sole presence of the markers under discussion, i.e., there is no need to
incorporate additional (prosodic) means to convey it, the sole morphology being necessary and sufficient in this regard. For this
reason, a unitary analysis is pursued in this paper (see section 4.6.2). I would like to thank Liliana Sánchez for discussion about
this issue in Quechua and Aymara.
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As the literature points out, mirative constructions are naturally extended to making compliments—Slobin
& Aksu-Koc (1982) refer to this as a ‘pragmatic extension’ of mirative constructions. The reasoning is the
same as before: the speaker’s expectations are exceeded, so uttering the relevant sentences conveys surprise.
These uses are also attested in Quechua and Aymara sentences with -sqa and -tayna respectively, as shown
in (4.40)-(4.41)—the Quechua example is taken from Faller (2004:53). These sentences, which express
surprise, are felicitously uttered in a scenario in which the speaker finds the soup really good. Here, as
well, the speaker’s expectations are exceeded—she need not believe that the cook was bad (so the soup was













‘Your soup is very tasty!’
(Aymara)
The expression of surprise or unexpectedness in mirative constructions is commonly characterized as arising
when the speaker recently learns about what causes her surprise. This generalization has been captured by
Rett & Murray (2013) as the recency restriction. They make a proposal that is characterized aspectually,
namely, in terms of a relationship between a speech event and the target state of a learning event (see
Nikolaeva 1999; Koev 2011, 2017). In the spirit of Parsons (1990), the target state of an individual learning
about something (e.g., a proposition) is the temporary effect of that something on that individual, i.e., the
change of state in the speaker’s knowledge and expectations. In mirative constructions, if the speaker did not
expect that something to happen, this has an effect of something like surprise on the speaker, and the target
state of the speaker’s learning of what happened lasts as long as the speaker’s surprise. Rett & Murray’s
(2013:465) recency restriction is stated in (4.42).
(4.42) For any event es of a speaker i uttering a form with at-issue content p, and for the event el of i
learning that p, es satisfies the recency restriction iff es 2 TARGET(el).
For illustration, consider the sentence in Cheyenne (Algonquian) in (4.43), involving a mirative interpreta-
tion in the presence of the narrative evidential -neho—(4.43) is taken from Rett & Murray (2013:457). This
example is felicitously uttered if the speech event is in the target state of surprise, i.e., if the speaker learned
recently about the rain. If the speaker learned about the rain long before she utters (4.43), infelicity arises,
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The recency restriction in (4.42) can also accommodate the sentences (4.38)-(4.41) discussed above: the
speaker learns about something she did not expect when (or very close to when) the sentences are uttered,
i.e., the target state of surprise TARGET(el) contains the speech event es.
Sentences involving Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna are especially interesting with regard to the re-
cency restriction in (4.42). What is crucial in (4.42) is that the speech event is contained in the state of
surprise. Importantly, the Quechua and Aymara examples with -sqa and -tayna respectively in (4.44)-(4.45)
show that this is not necessarily the case. The context for these sentences is the following: the speaker works
for a man, Montesinos, and went into his office one day, where she saw him erasing some videos. This was
unexpected to her. Several days later, the speaker talks to a friend of hers and tells her about what happened
then. In such a scenario, (4.44)-(4.45) can be felicitously uttered. They convey the meaning that the speaker
was surprised (then) towards what happened. Thus, in this scenario, recency is violated. I refer to cases like























‘When I entered the office, Montesinos was deleting videos!’
(Aymara)
More generally, while the recency restriction in connection to mirativity seems to hold in a number of cases,
as the literature shows (see the references above; see the discussion about the Cheyenne example in (4.44)
for a concrete example), Quechua and Aymara constitute an instance in which recency does not seem to
play a role (or at least a decisive role), thus constituting an exception to this generalization. When this
18Rett & Murray (2013) point out, more generally, that recency in mirativity scenarios requires that the speaker’s contribution is
relevant and is sharing the relevant information with some interlocutor for the first time. Relevance can be assumed to apply more
generally, as part of what makes an exchange felicitous, as is standard in Gricean reasoning. Sharing the information for the first
time is somewhat trickier. Importantly, in the Quechua and Aymara cases under discussion, as long as the contribution is relevant,
the speaker can communicate the same information (including the surprise component) to the same interlocutor more than once.
19There is also no specific requirement with regard to the evidence available to the speaker in mirative constructions with
Quechua -sqa and Aymara -sqa. The context can make reference to reportative evidence (e.g., the speaker was told by a co-worker
about what happened), for instance, and uttering, to the speaker’s surprise, that Montesinos erased videos would also be possible.
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requirement is lifted, then the expression of surprise or unexpectedness becomes less constrained, making
it possible for it to arise in a number of different scenarios, such as past mirativity here, as long as what the
speaker communicates goes against the expectations she had at some point.20
4.6 Revisiting the learning time analysis
This section revisits the learning time analysis introduced in section 4.2.3 in a discussion that makes explicit
the link between learning and mirativity, thus shedding light on the deeper issue as to why markers such
as the ones under discussion can implicate indirectness and (un)expectedness. The revision of the learning
time analysis also involves the incorporation of more recent discussion in evidentiality, in particular, with
regard to distinguishing at-issue and not-at-issue layers of meaning (at the propositional level). Section 4.6.1
introduces the distinction between at-issue and not-at-issue content and applies relevant tests to sentences
with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna to identify what is at-issue and not-at-issue in them. Section 4.6.2
proposes a revised formal analysis that distinguishes at-issue and not-at-issue meanings, and can account
for the mirativity cases in the sentences under discussion within the learning time analysis.
4.6.1 At-issue and not-at-issue meanings
A common distinction that is assumed in sentences with evidentials involves the split between a scope
proposition and an evidential proposition. To illustrate these notions, recall examples (4.2)-(4.3)—based on
the discussion above using a learning time, I revise the translations using ‘I learned’ instead of ‘I infer/I
was told,’ which was used in section 4.1. The scope proposition in these cases is the ‘It was raining’ part,
whereas the not-at-issue content is the ‘I learned’ part.
20This is not to say that some variant of the recency restriction, perhaps less restrictive, may not be needed. Specifically, in cases
like (4.38)-(4.41), which are tied to the here and now, a mirativity effect is likely to arise. What becomes more cumbersome is the
expression of mirativity towards things that occurred in the past, where recency appears not to be the decisive factor. For instance,
(4.44)-(4.45) express past mirativity, which is the novelty here.
It is worth pointing out that it is not the case that every time the speaker utters (4.44)-(4.45) the mirativity effect need be present.
Suppose, in this regard, that the speaker tells the same story many times (perhaps over several years). What seems to be relevant here
is that the speaker may choose to express surprise in some cases and not in others depending on other issues (including relevance
and her communicative intentions). This suggests that actually conveying mirativity in Quechua and Aymara depends on a number
of factors. Put differently, while the presence of something unexpected for the speaker is necessary, it may not be sufficient, other
elements (in discourse) becoming of importance. The discussion to follow focuses on capturing the necessary elements in the
expression of mirativity, establishing an explicit connection between learning and mirativity. The discussion of other elements,
including how they would be captured in a model that involves discourse exchanges and intentions of the speaker, lies beyond the








‘It was raining, I learned.’
(Aymara)
The distinction between scope and evidential proposition is closely tied to the at-issue and not-at-issue
distinction. The at-issue content corresponds to the proffered content of a sentence and the not-at-issue
content corresponds to everything that is not the proffered content of a sentence (Potts 2005). With regard
to evidentials, cross-linguistic research shows that the scope proposition is at-issue, whereas the evidential
content is not-at-issue (Murray 2017).21 As for the surprise or unexpectedness component involved in
mirative constructions, languages differ: while in some cases it is at-issue, in other cases it is not-at-issue
(Peterson 2017). Of interest here is to determine what is at-issue and what is not-at-issue in the sentences
with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna. To do so, I make use of two tests that have been discussed in the
literature, namely, the (direct) challengeability test and the projection behavior test under negation, which
are discussed in what follows.22
Challengeability
The challengeability (or assent/dissent) test indicates what meaning components of a sentence can be di-
rectly challenged, i.e., what meanings can be questioned. A common test involves following up a sentence
by a reply (made by a different speaker with grounds) with an expression such as That’s not true or You’re
mistaken (or a similar expression), and then a correction is proposed, which here will target the scope propo-
sition, the evidential proposition and the surprise component.23 Based on a survey of different languages,
21In recent work, Korotkova (2016, 2020) argues that the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction as discussed for conventional
implicatures in the sense of Potts (2005) cannot be applied in a literal sense for the analysis of evidentials, since, she argues, there
are differences in their distribution. For the purposes of the present discussion, what is relevant is that two distinct layers of meaning
need to be distinguished in the analysis of evidentials, which here are captured by means of the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction.
In the semantic literature of evidentials, another way of stating this is via the distinction between truth-conditional meaning, which
corresponds to the former, and presuppositional meaning, which corresponds to the latter (see, e.g., Matthewson et al. 2007). See
Murray (2017) for discussion regarding why the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction is to be preferred over the truth-conditional vs.
presuppositional distinction (see also Tonhauser et al. 2013).
22Here I only discuss two tests, since they suffice to make an argument with regard to the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction, as
the main purpose is to give an analysis that makes more precise the locus of the meanings the sentences under discussion convey. For
this reason, I have nothing to say with regard to other topics and tests that have been discussed in the literature about evidentiality,
for instance, in relation to the illocutionary vs. modal approaches to evidentials or the commitments of the speaker.
23See Korotkova (2016, 2020) for potential issues with following up with That’s not true in that it may not fully grasp the
complete range of challengeability possibilities in connection to evidentials (in particular, regarding the scope and evidential propo-
sitions). For current purposes, the That’s not true and the You’re mistaken follow-ups are indistinct in that they illustrate the contrast
between two layers of meaning, which is the relevant distinction here (see Potts 2005). At any rate, when applying the relevant
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the literature indicates that, while the scope proposition can be challenged, the evidential proposition and
the surprise component cannot be challenged (Murray 2017; Peterson 2017; see also Anderbois 2016; Rett
& Murray 2013). The challengeability possibilities are interpreted as follows: what can be challenged is
at-issue; what cannot be challenged is not-at-issue.
For illustration, consider a sentence with the Cheyenne reportative evidential -séstse, which appears in







‘Mókéé is from Lame Deer, I hear.’
(Cheyenne)
Murray (2017) applies the challengeability test to (4.48) with regard to the scope and evidential propositions.
She shows that, while the former can be challenged, the latter cannot be challenged. This is shown in
(4.49)—these examples are taken from Murray (2017:13); -; represents the null direct evidential in this















‘That’s not true. Nobody said that.’
(4.49a) challenges the scope proposition by saying that Mókéé is not from Lame Deer. This challenge
is felicitous. (4.49b) challenges the evidential proposition by saying that the speaker does not have the
relevant evidence for the scope proposition. This challenge is infelicitous. This suggests that, while the
scope proposition is at-issue, the evidential proposition is not-at-issue (see Murray 2017).
Turning to the Quechua and Aymara cases with -sqa and -tayna, (4.50a) and (4.51a) are the sentences that
are challenged. (4.50b) and (4.51b) challenge the scope proposition, whereas (4.50c) and (4.51c) challenge
the evidential proposition—the surprise component is discussed below. As can be noted, while challenging
the scope proposition is possible, challenging the evidential proposition is not, just as in Cheyenne. This
suggests that the former is at-issue, whereas the latter is not-at-issue.
(4.50) a. Para-sha-sqa.
rain-PROG-sqa
test to Quechua and Aymara, I make use of the more general challenge that is similar to the You’re mistaken follow-up to avoid
Korotkova’s concerns.
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‘It’s not like that. You didn’t learn that.’
(4.51) a. Jallu-ska-tayna.
rain-PROG-tayna



















‘You’re mistaken. You didn’t learn that.’
As for challenging the mirativity component, I make use of the sentences in (4.50a) and (4.51a) incorporating
undexpectedness, i.e., the speaker expresses surprise towards it having been raining, since she did not expect
it—in this regard, suppose that the speaker saw the wet streets. (4.52b) and (4.53b) challenge the surprise
meaning—suppose further that the challenger knows that the other individual is not normally surprised by
it having been raining (because this is quite common in the place where they are). These challenges are
infelicitous, which suggests that the surprise meaning is not-at-issue.
(4.52) a. Para-sha-sqa!
rain-PROG-sqa










‘It’s not like that. You weren’t surprised by that.’
(4.53) a. Jallu-ska-tayna!
rain-PROG-tayna










‘You’re mistaken. You weren’t surprised by that.’
Projection test involving negation
The second test used here is the projection test under negation. The literature on evidentials mentions that
negation only takes scope over the scope proposition, the evidential proposition and the surprise meaning
being unaffected by negation. Since negation takes scope over at-issue material only, it is concluded that
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the scope proposition contributes to the at-issue content. As for the evidential proposition and the surprise
meaning, that they are not affected by negation is compatible with them making not-at-issue contributions.
For illustration, consider the Cheyenne example in (4.54), which includes a reportative evidential. This
example contains negation; crucially, negation only scopes over the scope proposition, not over the evidential
proposition. A reading whereby the speaker does not have the relevant evidence for the scope proposition is
not attested. This suggests that the scope proposition contributes to the at-issue content; this is compatible





‘Annie didn’t sing, they say.’
(Cheyenne)
The Quechua and Aymara cases appear in (4.55)-(4.56)—the examples involve mirativity. The examples
show that only the scope proposition scopes under negation. The evidential proposition and the surprise
meaning remain unaffected by it. Thus, the sentences can only mean that it was not raining, which the
speaker learned to her surprise. These sentences do not convey meanings such as that the speaker did not
learned that it was raining or that the speaker was not surprised that it was raining. In line with the discussion
in the previous section, this suggests that the scope proposition is at-issue; this is also compatible with the











‘It wasn’t raining, I learned!’
(Aymara)
4.6.2 A revised analysis
This section revises the learning time analysis introduced in section 4.2.3. In a discussion that adopts the
at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction, an explicit link between learning and mirativity is established. I will
first incorporate the at-issue vs. not-at-issue distinction into the denotation of Quechua -sqa and Aymara
-tayna in (4.32) in section 4.4. I will then discuss modeling expectations within a setup that makes use of a
domain of worlds (see section 4.4). Finally, I will discuss the incorporation of expectations into the learning
time analysis.
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Recall the denotation of Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna in (4.32), which is repeated below.
(4.57) J-sqaKsp,tU ,@/J-taynaKsp,tU ,@ =  tT P e9tL[P (tT , e)& sp, e in@& tT   tL   tU &
learn(sp, e, tL,@)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL]
Based on the discussion in section 4.6, I adopt the distinction between two layers of meanings, namely,
at-issue and not-at-issue meanings. In that section, I provided evidence showing that the scope proposition
is at-issue, whereas the evidential component, which is understood in terms of learning here, is not-at-issue.
(4.57) is revised accordingly, as shown in (4.58).
(4.58) For any topic time tT , predicate P and eventuality e, there is some learning time tL such that
J-sqaKsp,tU ,@(tT , P, e, tL)/J-taynaKsp,tU ,@(tT , P, e, tL) =
at-issue: P (tT , e)& e in@
not-at-issue: tT   tL   tU & sp in@& learn(sp, e, tL,@)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL
For illustration, consider the examples in (4.59)-(4.60), which repeat (4.2)-(4.3).
(4.59) Para-sha-sqa.
rain-PROG-sqa




‘It was raining, I infer/I was told.’
(Aymara)
Their denotation appears in (4.61). (4.59)-(4.60) convey the at-issue meaning that there is, in the actual
world @, a raining eventuality e whose run time includes the topic time tT . (4.59)-(4.60) also convey the
not-at-issue meaning that tT precedes or is equal to the learning time tL, which in turn precedes or is equal
to the utterance time tU (the speech’s now) but does not include the run time of e, and the speaker, who is in
@, learned about e at tL.
(4.61) There is a topic time tT , a learning time tL and an eventuality e such that
J-sqaKsp,tU ,@(Jit was rainingKsp,tU ,@, tT , tL, e)/J-taynaKsp,tU ,@(Jit was rainingKsp,tU ,@, tT , tL, e) =
at-issue: rain(e)& e in@& tT ✓ ⌧(e)
not-at-issue: tT   tL   tU & sp in@& learn(sp, e, tL)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL
The split between these two layers of meaning captures the discussion in section 4.6.1: only the at-issue
content can be challenged or denied, whereas the evidential component (tied to the learning time in the
current analysis), which is not-at-issue, cannot.
Turning to expectations, these are modeled here in a similar way to beliefs (see section 4.4), i.e., as
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a function that builds on an accessibility relation on W , the domain of worlds (see, e.g., Rett & Murray
2013). Following Rett & Murray (2013), the account of mirativity that is proposed in what follows makes
use of expectations (not of knowledge per se) to avoid potential issues regarding factivity. Following these
authors as well, I assume that expectations include the expectations (per se) of an individual x in addition
to what x believes (and knows) about the past, present and future (what x expects and beliefs/knows can be
determined in terms of a prior probability above a relevant standard of credence, a task that is not undertaken
here). In particular, expectations Exp is a function that applies to a world relative to some individual and
time and gives as output the set of worlds that conforms to what that individual expects at that time in that
world. This is stated in (4.62).
(4.62) For any world w, individual x and time t,
Expx,t(w) = {w0 |w0 conforms to x0s expectations at t inw}
In what follows, the world to which Exp applies is the actual world @, the relevant individual is the speaker
sp that utters the sentence under consideration and the relevant time is the learning time tL (relative to
the meaning of that sentence). Thus, for current purposes, what is determined are the expectations of the
speaker in the actual world at the time when she learns something. These are the ones that will not be met
with regard to mirativity (see below).
As in section 4.4, here I assume that individuals and eventualities are in a world (such as the actual
world @), and that individuals and eventualities can be in several worlds (see, e.g., Hacquard 2006)—
a single timeline is assumed. This means that, just as with belief worlds, individuals and eventualities
are also in expectation worlds (relative to an individual and a time). It is worth pointing out that this
assumption simplifies things to an extent, but is adopted here, because it suffices for current purposes, where
the emphasis is on establishing a link between learning and expectations. Thus, for instance, under this
view, a particular raining eventuality is the same across worlds. This is arguably not accurate enough when
discussing, for instance, expectations in that an individual may say that that raining eventuality conforms to
her expectations even though what she expected may be somewhat different from what is actually happening
(e.g., the individual may have expected lighter rain).24
As for mirativity in Quechua and Aymara, the discussion in section 4.5 showed that it is not tied to,
24An approach that would allow for more flexibility in this regard would be one inspired by Lewis’s (1968) Counterpart Theory
(see also Lewis 1971, 1973, 1979, 1983, 1986), where individuals (and eventualities) are in a world, and that nothing is in two
worlds; instead, individuals (and eventualities) have counterparts in different worlds, where, intuitively, some individual (or some
eventuality) in a world has a counterpart in a different world iff the latter is similar to the former.
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simplistically put, the here and now (see Rett & Murray’s 2013 recency restriction in (4.42)). The speaker
can express surprise towards something that happened in the past (see footnote 20 for additional issues).
Here I suggest that there is a link between learning and mirativity, in particular, I suggest that the speaker’s
surprise or unexpectedness is the result of a clash between what the speaker has come to believe (i.e.,
what she has learned) and what she has expected. Crucially, this clash takes place at the learning time.
Specifically, recall that I defined a learn relation whereby there was a change in the speaker’s belief worlds:
the relevant eventuality was not in these worlds prior to the learning time, but such an eventuality is in these
worlds at the learning time (see section 4.4). With regard to expectations, in line with what was discussed
above, an eventuality conforms to the speaker’s expectations relative to a time (the learning time here) and
world (the actual world here) if such an eventuality is in the speaker’s expectation worlds; in contrast, an
eventuality does not conform to the speaker’s expectations relative to a relevant learning time and the actual
world if such an eventuality is not in the speaker’s expectation worlds. Here I propose that unexpectedness
or surprise arises if it is the case that some relevant eventuality is in the speaker’s belief worlds but is not in
the speaker’s expectations worlds relative to some learning time (both belief and expectation worlds being
accessible from the actual world), i.e., if there is a clash between what the speaker believes vs. what the
speaker expects at the learning time.
The final version of the denotation of Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna appears in (4.63). The possibility
of expressing unexpectedness or surprise is incorporated as not-at-issue, because it cannot be challenged or
denied (see section 4.6.1). Unexpectedness or surprise arises when there is a clash between what has been
learned and what is expected, i.e., it arises when it is the case that the speaker sp, who has learned that
eventuality e took place relative to some learning time tL (recall that this means that e is now in the belief
worlds of sp; see (4.32)), did not expect e relative to tL. In other words, unexpectedness or surprise arises
when e is in sp’s belief worlds relative to tL but is not in sp’s expectation worlds relative to tL. That
unexpectedness or surprise arises is made explicit by means of a surprise relation that holds of sp, e, tL
and actual world @ iff, at tL in @, sp is surprised about e (having taken place)—if e is in the speaker’s
expectation worlds at tL, the implication vacuously follows.
(4.63) For any topic time tT , predicate P and eventuality e, there is some learning time tL such that
J-sqaKsp,tU ,@(tT , P, e, tL)/J-taynaKsp,tU ,@(tT , P, e, tL) =
at-issue: P (tT , e)& e in@
not-at-issue: tT   tL   tU & sp in@& learn(sp, e, tL,@)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL&
[¬9w0 2 Expsp,tL(@)[e inw] ! surprise(sp, e, tL,@)]
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For illustration, consider examples with present and past mirativity. As for present mirativity, consider
the examples in (4.64)-(4.65) ((4.64)-(4.65) repeat (4.52a) and (4.53a)), which are felicitously uttered in a
context in which the speaker did not expect it to have been raining; she discovers it after seen the wet streets
in the city she is in.
(4.64) Para-sha-sqa!
rain-PROG-sqa




‘It was raining, I learned!’
(Aymara)
The denotation of (4.64)-(4.65) appears in (4.66). (4.64)-(4.65) convey the at-issue meaning that there is, in
the actual world @, a raining eventuality e whose run time includes the topic time tT . (4.64)-(4.65) further
convey the not-at-issue meaning that tT precedes or is equal to the learning time tL, which in turn precedes
or is equal to the utterance time tU (the speech’s now) but does not include the run time of e; (4.64)-(4.65)
also convey the not-at-issue meaning that the speaker, who is in @, incorporates e into her belief worlds at
tL (i.e., sp learns about e relative to tL). Importantly, mirativity arises, because, while sp has learned about
e, she did not expect that e would have occurred (relative to tL).
(4.66) There is a topic time tT , a learning time tL and an eventuality e such that
J-sqaKsp,tU ,@(Jit was rainingKsp,tU ,@, tT , tL, e)/J-taynaKsp,tU ,@(Jit was rainingKsp,tU ,@, tT , tL, e) =
at-issue: rain(e)& e in@& tT ✓ ⌧(e)
not-at-issue: tT   tL   tU & sp in@& learn(sp, e, tL)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL&
[¬9w0 2 Expsp,tL(@)[e inw] ! surprise(sp, e, tL,@)]
Consider now the examples in (4.67)-(4.68), which repeat (4.44)-(4.45). These involve past mirativity: the























‘When I entered the office, Montesinos was deleting videos!’
(Aymara)
The denotation of (4.67)-(4.68) appears in (4.69). (4.67)-(4.68) convey the at-issue meaning that there is, in
the actual world @, an eventuality e of Montesinos deleting videos whose run time includes the topic time
tT , which is the time when the speaker entered the office. (4.67)-(4.68) convey the not-at-issue meaning that
113
tT precedes or is equal to the learning time tL, which in turn precedes or is equal to the utterance time tU
(the speech’s now) but does not include the run time of e, and the speaker, who is in @, incorporates e into
her belief worlds at tL. The mirativity effect arises, because there is a clash between what sp has learned vs.
what she expected.
(4.69) There is a learning time tL and an eventuality e such that
J-sqaKsp,tU ,@(JMontesinos was deleting videosKsp,tU ,@, JI entered the officeKsp,tU ,@, tL, e)/
J-taynaKsp,tU ,@(JMontesinos was deleting videosKsp,tU ,@, JI entered the officeKsp,tU ,@, tL, e) =
at-issue: delete(m, v, e)& sp,m, v, e in@& tT = time sp entered office& tT ✓ ⌧(e)
not-at-issue: tT   tL   tU & learn(sp, e, tL)& ⌧(e) 6✓ tL&
[¬9w0 2 Expsp,tL(@)[e inw] ! surprise(sp, e, tL,@)]
Ultimately, present and past mirativity in sentences with Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna are the result of
the same issue: what is relevant is that there is a clash between what is learned by the speaker (i.e., some
relevant eventuality is, at some relevant learning time, in the speaker’s belief worlds) and what is expected
by her (i.e., that eventuality is not in the speaker’s expectation worlds at the relevant learning time).25
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the past tense markers -sqa in Cuzco Quechua and -tayna in Southern Aymara in
connection to indirect evidentiality. It has provided a means to tell apart the two different analyses of tense
markers in connection to indirect evidentiality that have been proposed in the formal literature, namely, an
analysis in which the speaker’s perception plays a crucial role, which is used by Faller (2004) to analyze
sentences with -sqa, and an analysis in which the notion of a learning time is incorporated, which is used by
Klose (2014) to analyze sentences with -tayna. Ultimately, I claimed that the latter is to be preferred. I have
also provided the first systematic comparison between Cuzco Quechua and Southern Aymara from a formal
semantics perspective, which gives support to the well-known descriptive statement in the Andean literature
that the grammars of these languages are very very similar (Cerrón-Palomino 2008). Finally, I have made
the novel empirical observation that, in addition to the expression of surprise that extends into the speaker’s
current speech as a result of something unexpected occurring (Rett & Murray 2013), it is possible to express
25While this chapter has proposed an analysis that covers most uses of Quechua -sqa and Aymara -tayna, there is one that is not
addressed, namely, the use of these markers when talking about dreams. This use is reported by Faller (2004) (although it remains
unaccounted for), and has been confirmed for Aymara in my own fieldwork. The discussion of dreams is part of a bigger issue in
these languages in that it is not restricted to the markers discussed here; the so-called near past markers in both languages, which
are normally tied to the presence of direct evidence, can also be used to discuss dreams. This topic is left for future research.
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surprise about something that occurred well before the speaker’s current speech with sentences with -sqa
and -tayna. The learning time analysis adopted was extended to account for these cases as well, making
explicit a link between learning and (un)expectedness.
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On clauses with multiple evidentials:
examining the case of Southern Aymara and
beyond
Abstract: This chapter discusses the phenomenon of the co-occurrence of different evidentials in the same
(matrix) declarative clause. The focus is on Southern Aymara, an understudied Andean language, which has
three evidentials: the direct =wa, the indirect -tay and the reportative siwa. After providing an overview of
the Southern Aymara evidential system, I make the novel observation that the evidentials in this language can
co-occur in the same clause, in particular, that all three evidentials can co-occur in the same clause, which
constitutes a novel case in the cross-linguistic picture. I propose a semantic analysis that makes explicit
how the different evidential meanings involved are compatible with each other. Then, I briefly discuss the
cross-linguistic variation in this domain (Aikhenvald 2004), and make a suggestion as to how such variation
can be accounted for.
Keywords: evidentiality, at-issue, not-at-issue, speech act, indexical shift, typology, Aymara
5.1 Introduction
Evidentiality is a grammatical category whose core meaning encodes the source of information an individual
(the evidence holder) draws on regarding a piece of information (Aikhenvald 2004) (see also Aikhenvald
2018). For illustration, consider (5.1) in Southern Aymara (Aymara), henceforth, Aymara. Aymara is a
suffixal and to some extent agglutinative language whose unmarked word order is SOV. (5.1) is a sentence
with the Aymara reportative evidential—evidentials appear in boldface in the examples throughout this
chapter. (5.1) conveys the core meaning that it rained in Puno. Due to the presence of the evidential, this
sentence contributes an additional meaning indicating that the speaker’s evidence for stating that it rained in
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p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
The descriptive and typological literature on evidentiality has further identified that, in a handful of lan-
guages, it is possible to have more than one evidential in the same clause (see Aikhenvald 2004 and refer-
ences therein). This chapter discusses the presence of multiple evidentials in the same (matrix) declarative
clause from a formal perspective. In particular, in this chapter I focus on the novel observation that Aymara
allows clauses with multiple evidentials, and provide an analysis of this case.
According to descriptions of the language (Hardman 2001; Cerrón-Palomino 2008; Cépeda 2011; Coler
2014; Klose 2014, 2015), Aymara has three evidentials. In addition to the reportative evidential free mor-
pheme siwa in (5.1), there is a direct evidential enclitic, =wa, and an indirect evidential suffix, -tay, which
are exemplified in (5.2). (5.2a), with the direct =wa, is felicitously uttered when the speaker saw that it
rained in Puno. More generally, the direct =wa is to be understood in terms of the notion of the best pos-
sible grounds, i.e., “the evidential value that the speaker possesses the best possible source of information
for the type of information conveyed by the utterance” (Faller 2002:123). (5.2b), with the indirect -tay, is
felicitously uttered when the speaker was told that it rained in Puno, or inferred that it rained in Puno based





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has indirect evidence for p.’
1I assume the following conventions for the glosses: the piece of information for which evidence is provided contains a
proposition, and will be referred to as the scope proposition p; the kind of evidence the speaker has for the scope proposition,
namely, the evidential contribution, will be referred to as the evidential proposition ep. These conventions may not be followed for
clarity of exposition in some cases.
2Abbreviations: 1 = first person, 2 = second person, 3 = third person, ABL = ablative, ACC = accusative, AG = agentive, APPL
= applicative, AUX = auxiliary, CL = classifier, COMP = comparative, CUST = customary, DECL = declarative, DEIC = deictic, DET
= determiner, DUR = durative, DYN = dynamic, ERG = ergative, EXC = excessive, EXIS = wide-scope existential, f = feminine,
FIRSTH = firsthand, FOC = focus, INFR = inferred, INT = interrogative, LIM = limitative, LOC = locative, MASC = masculine, MOD =
modal, NEG = negation, NMZ = nominalizer, nsg = non-singular, PST = past, REFL = reflexive, REM.P = remote past, REP = reported,
REPORT = reportative evidential, S = (intransitive) subject function, TER = terminative, TOP = topic.
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Aymara evidentials can co-occur in the same clause. This is illustrated in (5.3) with the indirect and the
reportative evidentials co-occurring. (5.3) is felicitously uttered when the speaker was told that Mary was
sick; that report is, in turn, the result of indirect evidence (suppose that the person who told the speaker that







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on indirect
evidence).’
Interestingly, all three evidentials can co-occur in the same clause, as in (5.4)—a case like this has not been
previously reported in the literature. (5.4) is felicitously uttered in a scenario in which the speaker was told
that Mary was sick; that report is, in turn, the result of another report, which is based on the best possible
grounds (e.g., suppose that Mary herself gave this information to the individual that tells the speaker that
Mary was sick). Differently put, the evidential contributions together are to be understood as follows: the
speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Mary was sick (the contribution of the reportative
evidential); the report is based on another report (the contribution of the indirect evidential), which is the







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
possible grounds, which are indirect evidence).’
This chapter provides the first formal analysis that makes explicit how different evidential meanings can
be combined in the same clause in natural language. Specifically, I propose an analysis where the Aymara
reportative is illocutionary in nature (Faller 2002; Murray 2010, 2014, 2017), whereas the direct and indirect
evidentials are propositional in nature (Faller 2007; Matthewson et al. 2007; Peterson 2010; von Fintel &
Gillies 2011). I show that the evidential meanings of such evidentials can be brought together in Aymara
without them being incompatible. I further touch on the cross-linguistic picture of clauses with multiple
evidentials based on the handful of languages that have been reported to allow such clauses (see Aikhenvald
2004 for an overview), and indicate some directions in this line of research.
The data discussed in this chapter are based on two sources of information: previous literature, in
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particular, Hardman (2001), Cerrón-Palomino (2008), Coler (2014), and Klose (2014, 2015), and original
fieldwork with two consultants. They are speakers of the dialect of Pomata (province of Chicuito, department
of Puno), which is spoken by 13,637 speakers (Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica e Informática 2010); the
data presented in this chapter has been corroborated with these speakers. The methodology used for the
fieldwork involved the presentation of contextual scenarios using Spanish as an auxiliary language, which
was followed by a request for a felicity judgment on a particular grammatical sentence given that contextual
scenario (see Matthewson 2004; Davis et al. 2014; Bochnak & Matthewson 2015 for discussion regarding
the soundness and validity of the aforementioned methodological choices).
This chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 presents an overview of the Aymara system of eviden-
tials, focusing on them separately. Section 5.3 introduces Aymara clauses with more than one evidential.
Section 5.4 provides an analysis of the Aymara clauses with one and more than one evidentials. Section 5.5
turns to the cross-linguistic picture of clauses with multiple evidentials. Section 5.6 is the conclusion.
5.2 Aymara clauses with one evidential
In this section, I provide an overview of the Aymara evidential system focusing on clauses with one eviden-
tial. Section 5.2.1 discusses the kinds of evidence associated with each evidential. Section 5.2.2 addresses
the issue of whether the evidential contribution of the Aymara evidentials is at-issue or not-at-issue. Sec-
tion 5.2.3 discusses whether the speaker is committed to the scope and evidential propositions. Section 5.2.4
addresses the issue of whether the evidentials under consideration are modals or not. Section 5.2.5 discusses
whether the evidentials under consideration are illocutionary or not. Section 5.2.6 summarizes the discus-
sion.
5.2.1 Kinds of evidence
Aymara has three evidentials: the direct evidential enclitic =wa, the indirect evidential suffix -tay, and the
reportative evidential free morpheme siwa (see Hardman 2001; Cerrón-Palomino 2008). I characterize each
evidential in terms of the conditions under which uttering a sentence with that evidential is felicitous (i.e.,
what kind of evidence a speaker must have, so that she can use a particular evidential).3
3In this section, I make reference to the evidence available to the speaker (without touching on issues regarding, e.g., an attitude
holder) for ease of exposition.
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The direct evidential =wa has been characterized in terms of the speaker having first-hand information
(Cerrón-Palomino 2008). Specifically, the Aymara direct evidential is to be understood in terms of the
notion of the best possible grounds, which was first used to characterize the Cuzco Quechua (Quechua)
direct evidential -mi (Faller 2002; see also McCready 2015; Matthewson 2018)—it is worth pointing out that
Cuzco Quechua and Aymara are typologically very similar (see, e.g., Cerrón-Palomino 2008 for extensive
discussion).4 In a nutshell, =wa conveys the meaning that the speaker has “the best possible source of
information” relative to the type of information of the proposition under consideration (Faller 2002:123).
The question is what counts as “the best possible source of information.” As is well-known, a major
distinction that have been identified in the evidential literature regards that of direct and indirect evidence
(see Willett 1988 for seminal work in this regard; see Faller 2002 for critical discussion of evidential hierar-
chies; see also Matthewson 2018).5 Direct evidence is tied to direct perception, which can be thought of as
direct visual perception for current purposes. Indirect evidence basically covers reportative and inferential
evidence. As discussed in the literature, while direct evidence is preferable over indirect evidence, repor-
tative and inferential evidence cannot be ranked. As for an evidential conveying the best possible grounds,
what is relevant is to determine what kind of evidence would be best for the proposition under considera-
tion, where the most direct access to the information is best (Faller 2002:18). Thus, if the information under
consideration is observable, then direct (visual) perception would have to be the evidence that the speaker
has to use such an evidential. Only in the absence of such a possibility, other sources (i.e., indirect evidence)
may count as the best possible grounds.
Recall example (5.2a) in this regard. Raining eventualities are, in general, observable, so, by uttering
(5.5), with =wa, it has to be the case that the evidence she has comes from direct perception, as this is the





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
4More recently, McCready (2015) discusses a number of issues in connection to the notion of reliability in general, and,
specifically, in connection to the notion of the best possible grounds as discussed by Faller (2002). Here I assume Faller’s notion of
the best possible grounds, which suffices for current purposes. I refer the reader to McCready (2015) for detailed discussion where
reliability and best possible grounds are modeled making use of probabilities. This approach can, in principle, be made compatible
with the current discussion, but I leave this task for the future.
5I set aside some additional complications that Faller discusses, which involve authorities, general knowledge, etc. For current
purposes, the distinction between direct and indirect evidence as applied to personal information suffices.
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There are cases, however, in which direct perception is unfeasible. Specifically, I address cases where the
best possible grounds are based on indirect evidence. Consider (5.6). Suppose that Mary is sick (and one
cannot tell by looking at her that she is indeed sick); Mary herself tells the speaker that she is sick. Based on
Mary’s report, who knows best about her health, the speaker can utter (5.6) felicitously—i.e., Mary’s report





p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The case in (5.7) involves inferential evidence. Suppose that the speaker looked for a notebook in her
backpack (and did so thoroughly), but did not find it. The absence of the notebook in the backpack is,
strictu sensu, non-observable, but she can safely infer that this is the case. This is the most direct way in








p: ‘The notebook wasn’t in the backpack.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The indirect evidential -tay falls under the characterization of indirect evidentials in the sense of Willett
(1988): some expression with -tay can be uttered felicitously if what is stated is based on reportative or
inferential evidence, i.e., if what is stated was told to the speaker or if what is stated is an inference drawn
from available evidence (Hardman 2001; Klose 2014)—there is no preference for one type of evidence
(see the discussion above). For illustration, consider (5.8), which repeats (5.2b). A speaker can utter (5.8)
felicitously in two scenarios. For instance, (5.8) can be uttered when the speaker infers that it rained in
Puno based on, e.g., the wet streets in the city in combination with the assumption that wet floors in this city
normally mean that it rained. (5.8) can also be uttered felicitously when the speaker was told that it rained in
Puno. As expected, a sentence with -tay cannot be uttered felicitously in the presence of direct evidence.6,7
6Klose (2014) sketches an analysis of -tay as a temporal evidential (see also Cerrón-Palomino 2008; Gonzalo Segura 2011; see
Koev 2011, 2017 in particular for an analysis of temporal evidentials). He provides evidence in which -tay can be used in contexts
that are not discussed here (e.g., it can be used in mirative contexts). Providing a detailed discussion of -tay alone exceeds the scope
of this chapter. To the best of my knowledge, the simpler description assumed in the chapter and the more detailed one pursed by
Klose do not make any difference with regard to the main claims made in this chapter.
7A question arises here regarding what the difference is when uttering sentences with =wa vs. -tay. Based on the discussion in






p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has indirect evidence for p.’
The reportative evidential siwa is used to indicate that the speaker has reportative evidence for making some
claim, i.e., that the speaker was told what she is stating (see Willett 1988). Consider (5.9), which repeats
(5.1). Given that siwa is a reportative evidential, a speaker can utter (5.8) felicitously only if she was told







p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
To sum up, Aymara has three evidentials: the direct evidential enclitic =wa, the indirect evidential suffix
-tay, and the reportative evidential free morpheme siwa. =wa’s evidential contribution is to be understood
as the best possible grounds, -tay is an indirect evidential, where indirect evidence subsumes inferential and
reportative evidence, and siwa can be used when the speaker’s information comes from a report.8





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
An additional question arises when considering instances where both =wa and -tay are, in principle possible, e.g., cases like the





p: ‘Mary was sick.’





p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has indirect evidence for p.’
As discussed for (5.3), the sentence in (ii) is felicitously uttered when Mary’s report is the most direct access to the relevant
proposition. When considering (iii), with -tay, the source of evidence is also a report, but, crucially, this report does not constitute
the most direct access to the information under consideration (e.g., somebody other than Mary told the speaker that she is sick).
In this case, there is an implication that this is not the most direct evidence that is available to the speaker (as would follow from
standard Gricean reasoning), i.e., this report is not the most direct access to the relevant information. It should be noted, as will
become explicit in section 5.2.3, that this type of weakening effect does not affect the commitment of the speaker to the scope
proposition. It only affects the evidential proposition in that there is a better source of evidence. It is worth mentioning as well that
not having the best possible grounds does not mean that the evidence that the speaker has is poor; it only means that there is a better
source of evidence.
8In section 5.2.3, I show that sentences with =wa and -tay crucially differ from sentences with siwa in that the former commit
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5.2.2 At-issue vs. not-at-issue
One of the main issues discussed in the literature on evidentials is what is the layer of meaning to which
the evidential contributes. This discussion comes in different guises, which share the position that the
evidential contribution does not form part of the scope proposition. For instance, it has been claimed that the
evidential contribution is illocutionary (Faller 2002). It has also been claimed that the evidential contribution
is presuppositional (Izvorski 1997; Matthewson et al. 2007; Sauerland & Schenner 2007; Peterson 2010;
von Fintel & Gillies 2011). In an attempt to emphasize what these approaches have in common (i.e., that
the evidential contribution is not part of the scope proposition), it has been claimed that the evidential
contribution is not-at-issue (Murray 2010, 2014, 2017). In this section, I adopt Murray’s approach, namely,
that the evidential contribution is not-at-issue.9 This is what will be shown regarding the Aymara evidentials.
I focus on the direct challengeability test, which targets the property of whether it is possible to challenge
the scope proposition and whether it is possible to challenge the evidential proposition. One such test
involves following up a sentence with a reply (made by a different speaker) with an expression such as
That’s not true or You’re mistaken; then, a correction is proposed, which could target either the scope or
the evidential proposition.10,11 The previous literature points out that, while it is possible to challenge the
scope proposition, it is not possible to challenge the evidential proposition. This is taken to suggest that the
evidential contribution is not-at-issue; if this were the case, it should be possible to challenge the evidential
proposition—since the scope proposition can be challenged, it is at-issue.
In what follows, I apply the challengeability test to the Aymara sentences with evidentials. It is shown
that, while the scope proposition can be challenged, the evidential proposition cannot be challenged. This
is taken to suggest that the evidential contribution of the Aymara evidentials is not-at-issue—the scope
proposition would be at-issue. The example in (5.10a), which repeats (5.2a), shows the challengeability test
applied to a sentence with the direct evidential =wa. (5.10a) is followed by a continuation that challenges
the scope proposition by stating that the scope proposition is not true (5.10b), or the evidential proposition
the evidence holder to the scope proposition, whereas the latter need not.
9See Korotkova (2016, 2020) for a problematization of not-at-issue meanings in connection to evidentiality.
10See Korotkova (2016) for potential issues with following up with That’s not true in that it may not fully grasp the complete
range of challengeability possibilities in connection to evidentials. In Aymara, the That’s not true and the You’re mistaken follow-
ups are indistinct in that they yield the same results: the evidential contribution is not-at-issue, which is the relevant feature here.
Based on the recommendation of two anonymous reviewers of a peer-reviewed journal, I make use of the That’s not true follow-up.
11See Tonhauser et al. (2013) for additional discussion with regard to tests in connection to not-at-issue meaning in general. The
challengeability test discussed in the main text suffices to distinguish the scope proposition (which here is characterized as at-issue)
and the evidential proposition (which here is characterized as not-at-issue). See Korotkova (2016, 2017, 2020) and Murray (2017)
for discussion in connection to evidentials in particular.
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by stating that the speaker does not have the relevant evidence (5.10c). As discussed in section 5.2.1, here
the best possible grounds are the result of direct perception, as the type of information conveyed by the
scope proposition is observable in principle. The contrast between (5.10b)-(5.10c) shows that while the
scope proposition can be challenged, the evidential proposition cannot be challenged.12 This suggests that





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
























‘That’s not true. You didn’t see that.’
Similar considerations hold when considering sentences with -tay. In this case, (5.11a), which repeats (5.2b),
is followed by a continuation that challenges the scope proposition (5.11b) or the evidential proposition
(5.11c). The test is applied in a scenario where the speaker has reportative evidence for the scope proposition.
As with regard to (5.10), the contrast between (5.11b)-(5.11c) suggests that the evidential contribution of





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’






















‘That’s not true. You weren’t told that.’
The same pattern arises in sentences with siwa. When (5.12a), which repeats (5.1), is followed by a con-
tinuation challenging the scope proposition (5.12b) or the evidential proposition (5.12c), only the former is
12Similar considerations apply when the best possible grounds correspond to indirect sources of evidence, as in connection to
(5.6)-(5.7).
13The reader may note, in what follows, that the tests include =wa in non-final position. This takes place, for instance, when a
correction is proposed (as in, e.g., the challengeability test) or when negation is present. I set aside these cases, since they touch on
issues the lie beyond the scope of this chapter. My only focus is on the cases where =wa occupies a final position, which is its most
natural position in the cases I examine.
14Similar considerations apply when the indirect evidence under consideration is inferential.
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possible. Thus, in this case as well, the evidential contribution, that of siwa here, is not-at-issue—the scope







p: ‘It rained in Puno.’






















‘That’s not true. You weren’t told that.’
Based on the discussion in this section, I conclude that the evidential contribution of the Aymara direct ev-
idential =wa, indirect evidential -tay and reportative evidential siwa is not-at-issue—the scope proposition,
on the other hand, is at-issue.
5.2.3 Commitments of the speaker
In addition to the issue of the locus of the scope and evidential propositions, the issue of whether the speaker
is committed to the scope and evidential propositions is also of relevance in the characterization of sentences
including evidentials cross-linguistically. Overall, the consensus is that, while the speaker may or may not
be committed to the scope proposition, she is always committed to the evidential proposition (see Murray
2017 for a recent cross-linguistic overview; see also Faller 2002, 2019; Anderbois 2014). As shown in this
section, in the case of the Aymara evidentials, while the speaker is committed to both the scope and the
evidential proposition when uttering sentences with the direct =wa and the indirect -tay, when considering
15As has been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Faller 2002; Murray 2017), the evidential proposition may be indirectly
challenged, which is generally possible with not-at-issue meanings (Potts 2005). An indirect challenge involves uttering a follow-
up that asks the speaker to be explicit about the evidence that she has. In this sense, this challenge does not state that the speaker
does not have the relevant evidence (which is what a direct challenge does); instead, it asks for clarification. In Aymara, an indirect
challenge of the evidential proposition is possible with all three evidentials. I exemplify this with the direct =wa. Stating (ib) as a
follow-up to a sentence with =wa as in (5.10a) (repeated below) is possible (under some circumstances, e.g., when the addressee has
grounds to question the speaker, because, e.g., the speaker usually lies). Recall that this is a case where the best possible grounds





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
b. Uñja-ya:-ta-ti(-sti)?
see-PST-2-INT(-actually)
‘Did you (actually) see that?’
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sentences with the reportative siwa, the speaker must only be committed to the evidential proposition.
A test that has been used in the literature to this end involves following up the relevant sentence with
a continuation that targets the commitment of the speaker to the scope proposition or her commitment to
the evidential proposition. With regard to the scope proposition, the continuation is of the form but I don’t
think/believe it’s true, which targets whether the speaker is committed to the scope proposition. With regard
to the evidential proposition, the continuation makes reference to the kind of evidence the speaker has, e.g.,
if the evidence is direct, it could be something like but I didn’t see that, or if the evidence is reportative, it
could be something like but nobody said that to me. This test targets whether the speaker must be committed
to the evidential proposition.
These tests are applied to Aymara below. First, consider the case of the direct =wa, which is exemplified
in (5.13) (see (5.2a)). (5.13) shows that the speaker is committed to both the scope proposition (5.13a) and
the evidential proposition (5.13b), since both the continuation saying that the speaker does not believe that
it rained (5.13a) and the continuation saying that the speaker does not have the relevant evidence (i.e., she













‘It rained in Puno, but I don’t think it’s true.’













‘It rained in Puno, but I didn’t see that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for (stating that) it rained in Puno.’
A similar pattern arises in the case of the indirect -tay, as shown in (5.14) (see (5.2b)): the speaker is
committed to both the scope proposition (5.14a) and the evidential proposition (5.14b). Thus, an attempt by
the speaker saying that she does not think that the scope proposition is true is infelicitous (5.14a); an attempt
to say that she does not have the relevant evidence is infelicitous as well (5.14b). Here the scenario is one in
which the speaker has reportative evidence. As my consultants mention, the evidence in this case (i.e., the
report) needs to be reliable; otherwise, they would not utter a sentence with -tay (she would use siwa if she













16Similar considerations apply in scenarios where the best possible grounds are indirect.
17Similar considerations apply in a scenario where the indirect evidence under consideration is inferential.
126
‘It rained in Puno, but I don’t think it’s true.’











‘It rained in Puno, but I wasn’t told that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has indirect evidence for (stating that) it rained in Puno.’
In contrast to =wa and -tay, the reportative siwa, exemplified in (5.15) (see (5.1)), shows that the speaker
need not be committed to the scope proposition (5.15a); she must be committed to the evidence that she has
(5.15b). For this case, suppose that the speaker has reportative evidence, but her source is somebody who
frequently lies. In such a case, it may be possible for the speaker to say that she does not think that it is true
that it rained in Cuzco (5.15a), but she cannot question the reportative evidence that she has, as shown by
the infelicity of (5.15b)—after all, she does have reportative evidence, regardless of whether the information















‘It rained in Puno, but I don’t think it’s true.’













‘It rained in Puno, but I wasn’t told that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for (stating that) it rained in Puno.’
Thus, with regard to the commitments of the speaker in connection to the Aymara evidentials, the direct
=wa and the indirect -tay show a similar behavior in that the speaker is committed to both the scope and
the evidential propositions in the presence of these two evidentials. The reportative siwa displays a different
behavior: when considering expressions with this evidential, the speaker may not be committed to the scope
proposition, but she has to be committed to the evidential proposition.
5.2.4 Modal vs. non-modal
A question that arises when discussing evidentials is whether, on top of providing evidence for some propo-
sition (i.e., being a propositional evidential), which is required at the very minimum, they involve a modal or
an illocutionary component (i.e., whether they should be analyzed as modal evidentials or illocutionary ev-
identials) (see Murray 2017 for an overview). This and the following section focus on whether the Aymara
evidentials should be analyzed as propositional evidentials, modal evidentials or illocutionary evidentials
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by testing whether modal (section 5.2.4) and illocutionary (section 5.2.5) components should be incorpo-
rated to their meanings. The discussion suggests that =wa and -tay are propositional evidentials (see also
section 5.3.4 for some syntactic considerations), and siwa is an illocutionary evidential.
This section, in particular, discusses whether Aymara evidentials should be analyzed as modals, i.e.,
whether they involve quantification over possible worlds, and are restricted to epistemic backgrounds—
in the literature, the claim that an evidential may be analyzed as a modal is commonly tied to indirect
evidentiality. This claim has been made for many languages, such as Bulgarian (Slavic) (Izvorski 1997;
Smirnova 2013), English (Germanic) (von Fintel & Gillies 2011), Gitksan (Tsimshianic) (Peterson 2010),
St’at’imcets (Salish) (Matthewson et al. 2007), among others. In what follows, I apply two tests in this
regard to Aymara clauses with evidentials (see Matthewson et al. 2007 for a systematic discussion of the
tests; see also Faller 2002). In particular, I discuss the test in which the scope proposition is known to be
true, and a variation of the direct challengeability test discussed in section 5.2.2, which specifically targets
modal statements. I argue that Aymara evidentials should not be analyzed as modals (see Mandelkern 2019
for relevant discussion, in particular, in connection to indirect evidence).
Turning to the tests, the first one to be discussed involves knowing that the scope proposition is true.
The reasoning here is that, given that modal statements make a weaker claim than the simple assertion of
the scope proposition, if the speaker knows that the scope proposition is true (i.e., she is in a position of
making a stronger claim), uttering a modal statement is infelicitous—it would be a violation of Grice’s
Quantity Maxim. This is the case mainly in the presence of indirect evidence (if the evidence is direct, the
speaker then has enough grounds to make a simple assertion, not a modal statement, at least under normal
circumstances). Thus, in English, if the speaker knows (for whatever reason) that it is raining in Puno, she
would not utter It may/must be raining in Puno (this would be infelicitous); she would utter It is raining in
Puno instead.
I apply this test to the Aymara clauses under consideration. For the case with =wa, consider (5.16)
((5.16) repeats (5.7)). This is a case that involves an inference, specifically, the best possible grounds are
based on inferential reasoning after thoroughly searching for the notebook in the backpack. In this case,
while unlikely, technically the possibility exists that the notebook is actually in there. Even though this is
the case, uttering (5.16) is felicitous, which indicates that the speaker actually takes it for granted that the
scope proposition is true—i.e., (5.16)’s scope proposition is not ‘The notebook mustn’t be in the backpack’.
This suggests that, when uttering a sentence with =wa, the speaker is making a strong statement, like a
128








p: ‘The notebook wasn’t in the backpack.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
For the case of -tay in (5.17) ((5.17) repeats (5.2b)), the scenario I consider is one in which the speaker
has reportative evidence for the scope proposition.18 In the presence of -tay, if the speaker knows that the
scope proposition is true (for instance, the speaker saw on television that it rained), it is felicitous to utter a
sentence with -tay. As in the case of =wa, this suggests that, when uttering a sentence with -tay, the speaker






p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has indirect evidence for p.’
If the same scenario is used when a sentence with siwa is considered, as in (5.18) ((5.18) repeats (5.9)), no
infelicity arises, which is as expected, because the speaker may (but need not) be committed to the truth of
the scope proposition. Thus, it is possible to utter a sentence with siwa in this case. This piece of evidence







p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
It is worth pointing out that modals in Aymara behave differently, specifically, they behave as was indicated
above for English, where using a sentence with a modal is infelicitous. This is shown in (5.19). The scenario
to be considered is the one indicated for (5.17)-(5.18): suppose that the speaker watches on TV that it is
raining in Puno—thus, the speaker knows that the scope proposition is true. Uttering a sentence with a
modal in Aymara is infelicitous. This suggests further that the Aymara evidentials do not incorporate a
modal component.






‘It may be raining in Puno.’
The second test that I discuss is a variation of the direct challengeability test discussed in section 5.2.2,
which specifically targets modal propositions. The discussion in that section challenged the scope propo-
sition and the evidential proposition. What was not attempted there was a challenge of a modal statement.
As Matthewson et al. (2007) show (see also Faller 2002, 2007; Papafragou 2000, 2006), (at least some)
sentences with epistemic modals allow challenge. The test considered below involves tinkering the modal
base on which the scope proposition finds support, in particular, it involves the denial of one or more of
the premises in that modal base in an attempt to narrow it down—the scope proposition, in this sense, is
not (directly) denied. For illustration, consider (5.20), which is a case where there is a challenge where
the ordering source plays a prominent role. (5.20) is an example in St’at’imcets involving a reportative
evidential—Matthewson et al. (2007) claim that ku7 in (5.20) is a modal evidential. The reasoning here is
that if there is a(n at-issue) modal component in the case under consideration, it should be possible to chal-
lenge it. In particular, (5.20) focuses on the ordering source, in particular, on the reliability of the source of
the report. If such a challenge is possible, then, the argument continues, there would be a modal component,
i.e., the evidential that is examined would be a modal evidential.
Context: Bill is a liar; he always lies and never tells the truth. You never believe what he says. Yesterday,
you heard Bill telling me that Buffy St. Marie is coming to Mt. Currie to give a concert. That was the first
you had heard of it; you don’t know whether it’s true or not, but you usually don’t believe what Bill says so



















“[reportedly] Buffy St. Marie is coming to Mt. Currie.”













“That’s not true; Bill is a liar.”
(Matthewson et al. 2007:224)
With regard to Aymara, I make use of the following scenario, which is similar to the one used by Matthewson
et al. (2007): C is a liar; C never tells the truth. B never believes what C says. Yesterday, B heard C telling
A that Mary was sick (this was the first time B heard about it)—C would be Mary if the sentence uttered has
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=wa; C would be someone other than Mary, e.g., Susi, if the sentence uttered has -tay (see footnote 7). B
does not know whether that is true, but B does not usually believe what C says, and thinks that C is probably





p: ‘Mary was sick.’





p: ‘Mary was sick.’







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
B reacts towards A by saying (5.23). Importantly, this follow-up is infelicitous, which suggests that the
Aymara evidentials do not incorporate a(n at-issue) modal component, since it is not possible to cancel
out the reliability of the report (which would be crucial in the ordering source). In this regard, one of my
consultants mentions that A must have had her reasons to say what she said; in this case, she must have
had her reasons to believe that what was said was true (i.e., that C was being truthful at least in this case),










‘That’s not true. Mary/Susi is a liar.’
5.2.5 Illocutionary vs. non-illocutionary
The debate involving evidentials also concentrates on whether such markers should be analyzed as illocu-
tionary. This is the case, for instance, in the analysis of the Cuzco Quechua evidentials pursued in Faller
(2002) (see Faller 2007, 2012, 2019 for additional discussion of these markers). Other evidentials, on the
contrary, are explicity argued to be non-illocutionary, as has been done for the St’at’imcets evidentials men-
tioned in section 5.2.4—in this case, the evidentials are argued to be epistemic modals (Matthewson et al.
19I make use of a scenario involving reportative evidence, because it was difficult for speakers to question that heavily the source
of information when considering sentences with =wa in the case of instances with direct and inferential evidence (not such qualms
were mentioned when considering a scenario involving inferential evidence in the case of -tay).
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2007). The literature has proposed a test to determine whether an evidential is illocutionary (see Faller 2002,
and, more recently, Korotkova 2016, 2017, 2020 for discussion in this regard). If an evidential is illocution-
ary, it allows quotative uses, i.e., the report of a speech act made by third party (in addition, illocutionary
evidentials also allow non-quotative uses). This test works best in the presence of reportative evidence (in
the absence of somebody else’s words, other types of evidence may not be tested this way), and questions
(instead of assertions) are often used to make sure that one is in the presence of a true speech act. Intuitively,
an example of this test involving the quotation of a question would correspond to an English expression such
as Repeating what I heard, who went to the party?.20
The Aymara case is an interesting one in this regard, since all three evidentials are compatible with
reportative evidence (in certain cases, at least). In fact, all three evidentials may appear in interrogative
clauses. The main question is whether they allow quotative uses, i.e., whether they can be used to report a
speech act made by a third party—in addition, the evidentials would allow non-quotative uses. The short
answer is that siwa is the only one that allows quotative uses. Before turning to the examples, it is worth
pointing out as well that, as has been discussed in the literature (see Murray 2017; Bhadra 2020), evidentials
in interrogatives, in particular, when involving non-quotative uses, normally involve a perspective shift in
that the burden of the evidence is transferred to the addressee.21 Using English words, this would correspond
to an expression such as Based on the evidence you have, who went to the party?.
The example in (5.24) illustrates a case with =wa. For the non-quotative use in (i), suppose that the
speaker expects the addressee to have the best possible grounds to answer the question, because she went to
the party the day before, so she would have seen who was there—in this case, no speech act made by a third
party is reported. The non-quotative use is felicitous. For the quotative use in (ii), suppose that somebody
asked the question in the presence of the speaker in a setting where the individuals involved only know that
there was a party the day before and that some people they know should have been there, e.g., they live out
of their home country, are in sporadic touch with people in their home country and saw an announcement
in social media (this way, the best one can do is wonder who went to the party). The day after the party,
the speaker talks over the phone with a person who lives in her home country and might have been to the
party; thinking that the question she heard is of interest, she attempts to reproduce it—thus, the speaker is
repeating the speech act she heard. This quotative attempt, however, is not possible—the quotative use is
20The Aymara case does not allow the report of imperatives, which is similar to its closest kin Cuzco Quecha (Faller 2019). I
leave this issue aside. See AnderBois (2018) for discussion.
21The details with regard to why this is the case lie beyond the scope of this chapter.
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p: ‘Who went to the party?’
ep: (i) ‘The addressee is expected to answer p based on the best possible grounds she has.’
(ii) #‘The speaker reports that somebody asked p.’
The example in (5.25) illustrates a case with -tay. For the non-quotative use in (i), suppose that the speaker,
who did not go to the party, expects the addressee to have indirect (here, reportative) evidence to answer
the question, since the latter has a good friend who went there the day before (the addressee could not go
herself, because she was sick)—thus, no speech act made by a third party is reported.. The non-quotative
use is felicitous. For the quotative use in (ii), suppose that somebody asked the question in the presence
of the speaker. Later that day, the speaker reports the question to the addressee—suppose that they were
talking about the party, and the speaker thinks that the question she heard is of interest, so that she attempts
to reproduce it—thus, the speaker is repeating the speech act she heard. . The quotative use is infelicitous.







p: ‘Who went to the party?’
ep: (i) ‘The addressee is expected to answer p based on the indirect evidence she has.’
(ii) #‘The speaker reports that somebody asked p.’
The example in (5.26) illustrates a case with siwa. The scenarios here are the same as in the case of (5.25),
with -tay. Importantly, in addition to the non-quotative use, the quotative use is possible. This suggests that









p: ‘Who went to the party?’
22Technically speaking, this test shows that siwa can sit in an illocutionary projection, not that it must always be there. It is
worth pointing out, nonetheless, that this test should be understood in connection to the previous discussion of, in particular, the
commitment test. Recall that, in section 5.2.3, it was shown that the speaker need not be committed to the scope proposition,
which, at the very least, means that declarative sentences with siwa do not have the illocutionary force of assertion—as discussed in
section 5.4, I propose that siwa involves the illocutionary force of presentation (Faller 2002, 2019). One could argue that siwa sits in
an illocutionary projection sometimes, but the fact remains that, when it does not sit in such a projection (e.g., when no quotation is
involved), it would still have a strong connection to an illocutionary force that need not commit the speaker to the scope proposition.
The latter is what is of relevance here; ultimately, I adopt an approach where siwa does both things (i.e., introduce an evidential
meaning and introduce an illocutionary force), which suffices for current purposes, since the focus is on matrix declarative clauses
with evidentials.
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ep: (i) ‘The addressee is expected to answer p based on the reportative evidence she has.’
(ii) ‘The speaker reports that somebody asked p.’
If siwa is an illocutionary marker involving reports, as argued for here, a question arises as to how different
siwa is from similar expressions involving the verb say in connection to quotation and indirect discourse (see
Schlenker 2004; Potts 2007; Sharvit 2008; Recanati 2001; Cappelen et al. 2019; Eckardt 2014; Davidson
2015; Maier 2015; Saka & Johnson 2017 for discussion). It is worth pointing out that discussing these
issues in detail lies beyond the scope of this chapter, which aims at giving an account of matrix declarative
sentences (i.e., non-quotative uses) with more than one evidential. In this regard, with respect to the Aymara
evidentials, the mere purpose of applying the test involving quotative and non-quotative uses above is to find
out what kind of markers they are, so that I can be as explicit as possible in showing how their evidential
meanings can be brought together in a unitary semantics of matrix declarative clauses with more than one
evidential. Nonetheless, here I briefly discuss some grammatical differences between siwa and the verb say
in Aymara; I also discuss indexicality with regard to siwa’s complement—in particular, I test whether there
can be indexical shift with first person pronouns.
Consider (5.27)-(5.28). (5.27) is a sentence with the reportative evidential siwa. (5.28) is a sentence
with the verb saña ‘say’—the suffix -ña is the infinitival marker. On the surface, they are similar—in fact,
historically, siwa has evolved from the verb saña ‘say’ (Gonzalo Segura p.c.). Nonetheless, they are different
elements. With regard to their meanings, (5.27), with siwa, is as discussed in the previous sections: there
is a scope proposition, and the speaker has reportative evidence for it. (5.27), with the verb saña ‘say’, in
contrast, conveys the meaning indicating what somebody said; the speaker has the best possible grounds for
this, i.e., the evidential that is present is =wa. It is worth pointing out that the vowel -a in the verb stem of
saña ‘say’ is dropped, so the stem surfaces as s- only, e.g., in (5.28), what is pronounced is si (not sai) to
convey the meaning ‘s/he said’. In the examples to follow in this section, this is always the case, i.e., the









p: ‘You went to the cinema.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
23According to the descriptive literature (see, e.g., Coler 2014), Aymara has two strategies to relate two clauses: one of them is
juxtaposition (roughly speaking, two matrix clauses are put one next to the other, and some linking word may indicate the relation
between them); the other one is embedding, which involves nominalizations. The examples to follow are instances of the first










p: ‘S/he said that you went to the cinema.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
(5.27)-(5.28) are different in several respects. Here I mention four. First, it should be noted that there is an
overt phonological difference in these examples: the verb sara-ta ‘go-2’ in (5.28) is pronounced as sara-t,
i.e., the final vowel is elided; this does not occur in (5.27). Second, in the presence of siwa, it is not possible
to explicitly mention the individual who said the relevant words. This is not the case with the verb saña












p: ‘You went to the cinema.’











p: ‘Mary said that you went to the cinema.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Third, in the presence of the verb saña ‘say’, as with any regular verb, the subject need not be third person
singular, i.e., there could be agreement markers of any grammatical person and/or number (in addition, there
could also be an overt subject, as shown in (5.30)). (5.32) illustrates that this is a verb that allows different
conjugations, which is shown with the third person plural agreement. This is not possible in the case of
siwa, i.e., this is a fixed element that does not allow other conjugations (in addition, there could not be an









p: ‘You went to the cinema.’









p: ‘They said that you went to the cinema.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
Fourth, the evidential =wa can be dropped in the presence of the verb saña ‘say’, whereas this string cannot










p: ‘You went to the cinema.’









‘S/he said that you went to the cinema.’
Besides these features, which support the claim that siwa is a different element when compared to the verb
saña ‘say’, there is a property that is particularly relevant in the current discussion, namely, whether there can
be indexical shift in the presence of siwa. In particular, if sentences with this evidential allow for indexical
shift, it would not be appropriate to claim that examples like (5.26) involve quotation—i.e., the example
would not be conclusive regarding the claim that siwa is an illocutionary evidential. Instead, they would
illustrate some form of indirect discourse, which is a common feature cross-linguistically when expressions
with the verb say are considered—there is an alternative with regard to the value of the pronoun based on
another possible dependency in addition to the speaker. As (5.35) shows, indexical shift is possible with the









‘S/he said that I (=the speaker/s/he) went to the cinema.’
Crucially, sentences with siwa do not allow for indexical shift, which means that (5.26) does involve quo-
tation. Thus, in (5.36), which includes the evidential siwa, the pronoun naya ‘I’ can only be understood
as the speaker. This sentence can be felicitously uttered when the speaker has a poor recollection of what









p: ‘I (=the speaker) went to the cinema.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
The discussion in this section thus suggests that siwa is an illocutionary evidential (since it allows quotative
uses). In contrast, =wa and -tay are non-illocutionary; they are propositional evidentials. As indicated in
this section, nonetheless, the account to be proposed focuses on cases involving non-quotative uses.24
24See the appendix for discussion regarding the grammaticalization of reportative evidentials that derive from the verb say, such
as siwa, as well as discussion about evidentiality in Spanish, which is relevant in this regard. The discussion there further discusses
evidentiality in Spanish in connection to topics discussed in this chapter.
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5.2.6 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the discussion in section 5.2. It shows what the evidential contribution of each eviden-
tial is (direct, indirect or reportative). It further shows how the scope and the evidential propositions fare
regarding the tests (challengeability and commitment). Additionally, it is indicated whether the evidentials
are modal or illocutionary. Expressions with any of the three evidentials share responses for almost all cases.
In all cases, the scope proposition can be challenged, the evidential proposition cannot be challenged, and
none of the evidentials should be analyzed in terms of modality. The differences lie in two respects. With
regard to the commitment test, while the speaker is committed to the evidential proposition in all three cases,
she need not be committed to the scope proposition in only one instance, namely, in the presence of siwa
(in the presence of =wa or -tay, she is also committed to the scope proposition). In addition, only siwa is an
illocutionary evidential. These differences are highlighted.
=wa -tay siwa
(direct) (indirect) (reportative)
Can the scope proposition be challenged? Yes Yes Yes
Can the evidential proposition be challenged? No No No
Is the speaker committed to the scope proposition? Yes Yes No
Is the speaker committed to the evidential proposition? Yes Yes Yes
Is the marker a modal evidential? No No No
Is the marker an illocutionary evidential? No No Yes
Table 1. Overview of the Aymara evidentials
5.3 Aymara clauses with more than one evidential
This section discusses clauses with more than one evidential in Aymara. Section 5.3.1 introduces the possi-
bilities there are with regard to evidentials co-occuring in the same clause, discussing the intuitive meanings
of these clauses. Section 5.3.2 discusses the challengeability possibilities there are (see section 5.2.2) in
clauses with more than one evidential. Section 5.3.3 applies the commitment tests in section 5.2.3 to clauses
with more than one evidential. Section 5.3.4 discusses some syntactic properties of clauses with more than




In Aymara, it is possible to have more than one evidential in the same clause. In this section, I show that
any two evidentials can appear in the same clause in this language. I also show that all three evidentials can
co-occur in the same clause. The latter is of relevance, since this case has not been found up to date in the
cross-linguistic picture (Aikhenvald 2004).
Focusing first on clauses with two evidentials, (5.37), which repeats (5.3), is a sentence in which the
indirect -tay and the reportative siwa co-occur. Interestingly, with regard to the evidential proposition,
(5.37) can only mean that the speaker has reportative evidence (the contribution of siwa), and the reportative
evidence is based on indirect evidence. For instance, (5.37) is felicitously uttered against a scenario in
which the report is based on another report, e.g., Mary’s mom told the individual talking to the speaker that
Mary was sick.25 This evidential proposition cannot be understood in terms of the speaker having indirect







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on indirect
evidence).’
Aymara also allows for clauses where the direct and the reportative evidentials co-occur. This is exemplified
in (5.38). The evidential proposition is to be understood in terms of the speaker having reportative evidence
(the contribution of siwa) for stating that Mary was sick—e.g., Mary’s mom told the speaker that Mary was
sick. The report that was told to the speaker is based on the best possible grounds (the contribution of =wa),
for instance, Mary herself told her mom that she was sick. The evidential proposition cannot be understood








p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
possible grounds).’
The third possible instance of multiple evidentials in Aymara involves clauses with the direct and the indirect
25Similar considerations apply for an inferential scenario.
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evidentials, as exemplified in (5.39). The evidential contribution in this case is to be understood as the
speaker having the best possible grounds (the contribution of =wa) for the scope proposition that Mary was
sick; at the same time, the speaker has indirect evidence for this proposition (the contribution of -tay). This
sentence is felicitously uttered in a scenario where Mary told the speaker that she was sick (for instance, the
speaker could not tell from looking at her that she was sick, and she tells the speaker that this is the case;





p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p (and the best possible grounds are based on
indirect evidence).’
A question arises here as to why it is possible to have =wa and -tay co-occurring, since, in particular, -tay
would not be adding any new content—one could tell from the presence of =wa itself that the evidence
is indirect in the case indicated above. I would like to suggest that having both evidentials is actually
informative in an exchange (see Davies & Arnold 2019 for a recent overview on informativeness). When
a sentence with =wa is uttered, the addressee can infer what kind of evidence counts as the best possible
grounds for some utterance depending on the type of information that is conveyed, which is the evidential
contribution of this marker (see section 5.2.1). Note that this involves some kind of reasoning: the addressee
has to draw a conclusion (regardless of how obvious it could be). The presence of -tay actually alleviates this
process by overtly indicating that the evidence the speaker has is indirect. Thus, having both =wa and -tay
co-occurring is actually informative. In this regard, my consultants make a comment to sentences like the
one in (5.39) in a similar vein. They say that having -tay specifies the kind of evidence the speaker has (they
further say that the evidence available to the speaker has to be very strong, i.e., the best possible grounds).
The discussion has thus shown that any two evidentials can co-occur in the same clause in Aymara.
Interestingly, Aymara constitutes a unique case in the cross-linguistic scenario (see Aikhenvald 2004) in that
26As expected, it would be infelicitous to utter a sentence with -tay and =wa in a scenario where the evidence the speaker has is
the result of direct observation, as shown in (i). Suppose that the speaker’s source of evidence is the result of direct perception (i.e.,





p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p (and the best possible grounds are based on indirect evidence).’
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all three evidentials can co-occur in the same clause. This is exemplified in (5.40), which repeats (5.4). The
evidential contributions are to be understood as follows: the speaker has reportative evidence for stating
that Mary was sick. The report is based on the best possible grounds (the contribution of =wa), which are
indirect evidence (the contribution of -tay). As example of a scenario where (5.40) is uttered felicitously,







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
possible grounds, which are indirect evidence).’
It is important to note that there is a contrast between sentences with more than one evidential with and
without siwa with regard to who the evidence holder is. If siwa is absent, as in (5.39), the evidence associated
with =wa and -tay is tied to the speaker. If, on the other hand, siwa is present, as in (5.37), (5.38) and (5.40),
only the reportative evidence is tied to the speaker; the evidence associated with =wa and -tay is tied to the
source of the report. This suggests that, at least on the surface, there is an evidential holder shift, which is
tied to the presence or absence of siwa.
5.3.2 Challengeability
Section 5.2.2 determined that the evidential contributions of the Aymara evidentials are not-at-issue. The test
used there in connection to this was the direct challengeability test. In addition to showing what properties
carry over from clauses with one evidential to clauses with more than one evidential, this section discusses
the following issue: in the presence of more than one evidential, what evidential contribution is actually
challenged? In particular, the relevant cases are the ones where siwa is present, since, as was discussed in
the previous section, there are two pieces of evidence involved.
As discussed in section 5.2.2, the direct challengeability test involves an addressee following up a sen-
tence uttered by the speaker with That’s not true, and then a correction targeting the scope or the eviden-
tial proposition is proposed. As expected, while the scope proposition can be challenged, the evidential
proposition in clauses with more than one evidential cannot be challenged, i.e., the evidential proposition is
not-at-issue. The sentences to be challenged are the ones in (5.41), which repeat (5.37)-(5.40)—as discussed








p: ‘Mary was sick.’








p: ‘Mary was sick.’






p: ‘Mary was sick.’








p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the
best possible grounds, which are indirect evidence).’
The follow-ups appear in (5.42)—they apply to all the examples in (5.41), since the same scope proposition
is present, and the relevant evidence is reportative (see below for more discussion regarding challenging
other sources of evidence). (5.42a) challenges the scope proposition; (5.42b) challenges the evidential
proposition. (5.42) shows that the scope proposition can be challenged (so it is at-issue), but the evidential






















‘That’s not true. You weren’t told that.’
The evidence that was targeted in the previous examples was reportative. In (5.41c), with =wa and -tay, there
is one piece of evidence, which is reportative, making this case straightforward. The interesting case arises in
the presence of siwa in combination with the other evidentials (i.e., examples (5.41a), (5.41b) and (5.41d)),
because there are two pieces of evidence. Here is where the question stated above, i.e., the question as to
what evidential contribution is actually challenged in the presence of more than one evidential, becomes
relevant. Intuitively, one would expect that the speaker can only be held accountable for the reportative
evidence that she has. In what follows, I show that this is case. To do so, I make use of a case with =wa and
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siwa in which the former involves direct visual evidence and the latter involves reportative evidence. The
relevant example appears in (5.43), where the speaker was told that it rained in Puno, and the source of that







p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on the best possi-
ble grounds).’
The follow-ups in (5.44) challenge the reportative evidence (5.44a) and the direct evidence (5.44b) targeting
whether the speaker has these kinds of evidence. With regard to the former, this challenge is infelicitous,
because the addressee cannot challenge the evidence that the speaker has (this is the common case cross-
linguistically, and specifically in Aymara, as has been discussed in this chapter). With regard to the latter,
this challenge is also infelicitous, but for a different reason: my consultants made the comment that the
addressee would not say something like this, because it does not make any sense to question the speaker for
























‘That’s not true. You didn’t see that.’
In fact, the more specific challenge in (5.45) is also infelicitous. Importantly, the comment that my con-
sultants made is the same: the addressee cannot challenge the evidence that the speaker has (although the















‘That’s not true. You didn’t hear that from an eyewitness.’
While suggestive, the problem is that both forms of direct challenge of the evidential proposition are infe-
licitous, so it seems unwarranted to conclude something based on them. Here is where the indirect chal-
lengeability test becomes relevant, since it makes it possible to ask the speaker to be more explicit about the
evidence that she has (see footnote 15). As Murray (2017) discusses, it is possible, in general, to question
the evidence that the speaker has. By doing so, one is not saying that the speaker is wrong; one is merely
142
asking for clarification or ratification of what was stated by means of evidentials. If the speaker can only
be held accountable for the evidence that she has—i.e., for the reportative evidence, and not for the di-
rect evidence—, then indirectly challenging the reportative evidence should be possible, whereas indirectly
challenging the direct evidence should not be possible. This is indeed the case. This suggests that the rele-
vant evidence under consideration is reportative—while the report is based on some other form of evidence
(and the speaker can mention what evidence the source of the report has when answering the question), the







‘And who told you that?’
b. #Uñja-ya:-ta-ti(-sti)?
see-PST-2-INT(-ACTUALLY)
‘Did you (actually) see that?’
The discussion in this section has further shown that the evidential contribution of the evidentials in Aymara
is not-at-issue—the scope proposition is at-issue, which is as expected as well. Importantly, in cases with
siwa, where there is a report that is based on the source of the report’s evidence, the only piece of evidence
that the speaker can be held accountable for is the reportative one.
5.3.3 Commitment
Section 5.2.3 established that the speaker is always committed to the evidential proposition. Section 5.2.3
was also telling in that the speaker need or need not be committed to the scope proposition. While in the
presence of =wa and -tay there is commitment to the scope proposition, with siwa this need not be the case.
In addition to showing what properties carry over from clauses with one evidential to clauses with more than
one evidential, this section discusses the following issue: will the speaker be committed or not to the scope
proposition? The answer could, in principle, go either way, since there are evidentials for each case.
The examples in (5.47), with all combinations of evidentials in Aymara, show that the speaker is com-
mitted to the evidential proposition—which is as expected, given that this is the case in sentences with one
27In fact, a more specific indirect challenge, as the one in (i), is felicitous, which suggests even further that =wa’s evidential









‘Did you actually hear that from an eyewitness?’
28Similar considerations apply in cases with -tay and siwa where the reportative evidence is based on inferential evidence.
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evidential, as discussed in 5.2.3. Building on the sentences (5.37)-(5.40), where the scenarios that were
discussed involve reportative evidence, the test makes use of the continuation but I wasn’t told that, i.e., the













‘Mary was sick, but I wasn’t told that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on indirect













‘Mary was sick, but I wasn’t told that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on the best











‘Mary was sick, but I wasn’t told that.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds (and the best possible grounds are based on













‘Mary was sick, but I wasn’t told that.’
ep:‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
possible grounds, which are indirect evidence) for (stating that) Mary was sick.’
The interesting case regards the commitment test targeting whether the speaker is committed to the scope
proposition, since, while with =wa and -tay there is commitment to the scope proposition, with siwa this
need not be the case. The pattern that emerges is that, whenever siwa is present, the speaker need not be
committed to the scope proposition, as in (5.48a) (where -tay is also present), (5.48b) (where =wa is also
present) and (5.48d) (where both =wa and -tay are present). In the absence of siwa, i.e., when only =wa and
-tay are present, as in (5.48c), the speaker is committed to the scope proposition. Overall, the conclusion is
that when siwa is present, it overrides the commitments brought in when =wa or -tay is present.
29In line with the discussion in section 5.3.2 in connection to challenging the evidential proposition, an interesting question arises
regarding cases with =wa and siwa, or -tay and siwa, since there are two (interconnected) sources of evidence. For illustration,
consider (i), which includes =wa and siwa. The best possible grounds the report is based on are the result of direct perception (i.e.,
the source of the report saw that it rained in Puno). No infelicity arises, as would be expected (which is in line with the discussion
in the previous section). Since the speaker does not have that kind of evidence, she can state that she does not actually have it. In















‘It rained in Puno, but I didn’t see that.’

















‘Mary was sick, but I don’t think it’s true.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on indirect















‘Mary was sick, but I don’t think it’s true.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on the best













‘Mary was sick, but I don’t think it’s true.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds (and the best possible grounds are based on















‘Mary was sick, but I don’t think it’s true.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
possible grounds, which are indirect evidence) for (stating that) Mary was sick.’
The discussion in this section has shown that, with regard to the commitments of the speaker, there is a split
in clauses with more than one evidential, which crucially lies in whether siwa is present or not. In clauses
with more than one evidential, as in clauses with one evidential, in the presence of siwa, the speaker need
not be committed to the scope proposition, but she must be committed to the evidential proposition. If siwa
is not present, i.e., if the sentence has only =wa or -tay, or if both are present, the speaker is committed to
both the scope and the evidential propositions.
5.3.4 Clauses with evidentials as matrix monoclauses
In the presence of more than one evidential, a question arises with regard to whether the evidentials in the
sentences under consideration belong to the same clausal domain. The alternative would be that the eviden-
tials under consideration create different (syntactic) domains.30 In this section, I argue that sentences with
more than one evidential in Aymara belong to the same matrix clausal domain. The literature has proposed
different tests in this regard depending on the complex predicate under consideration (e.g., causatives), as
well as language specific properties (see, among many others, Alexiadou et al. 2006; Folli & Harley 2007;
Yoon 2007; Pylkkänen 2008; Serratos 2008; Moulton 2009; Bowers 2010; Harley 2013; Jung 2014; Wurm-
brand & Shimamura 2017; Wurmbrand 2018).
30The discussion in this section was prompted by a review I got at a peer-reviewed journal.
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In what follows, I discuss a test involving negation that has shown cross-linguistic validity with regard
to whether two elements are in the same (syntactic) domain. Specifically, across languages, there are ex-
pressions involving negation, such as lift a finger in sentences like Mary didn’t lift a finger, that require that
negation and the verb phrase including the object be in the same clausal domain, so that the meaning of
the expression is preserved—in this case, the meaning ‘do nothing’ would be preserved. If this is not the
case, i.e., if the expression is split in two different domains, such a meaning cannot be conveyed. Thus, for
instance, a sentence such as Bill didn’t claim that Mary lifted a finger does not convey the meaning that
the claim about Mary is that she didn’t lift a finger—in this sentence, what Mary did was (literally) lift a
finger.31 This means that, in this example, there are two (clausal) domains: negation is in one domain and
the verb phrase is in a different domain.
In Aymara, a phrase similar to lift a finger in English is exemplified in (5.49). The expression kunsa
luraña ‘do shit’ conveys the meaning ‘do nothing’ when appearing with negation, as illustrated in (5.49)—
otherwise, i.e., in a sentence without negation, this expression means ‘do something in a terrible way’. Note
that there are two elements involved in marking negation in this example: one of them is jani ‘not’; the other









‘Mary didn’t do shit.’
To convey the intended meaning, negation and kunsa luraña ‘do shit’ have to be in the same clausal domain,
as is the case in (5.49), which is a matrix declarative clause. That this is so can be shown with a case
involving subordination, i.e., via a case where there are two different domains (the matrix clause and the
subordinate clause). In particular, what I show is that splitting negation and kunsa luraña ‘do shit’ makes
the intended meaning go away, which means that they need to be in the same clausal domain.
In Aymara, subordination involves the presence of a nominalizer or a subordinator, both of which make
use of nominal agreement markers (see Coler 2014 for extensive discussion in this regard). One such
nominalizer is the suffix -ta. Sentences with nominalizations involve nominal case and nominal agreement
patterns, such as genitive case and person agreement markers (which vary depending on the person of the
possessor). This is illustrated in (5.50b)—the matrix counterpart of the embedded clause in (5.50b) appears
31I do not discuss the issue of NEG-raising in English here.
32I assume that Aymara is a head final language, which is a standard assumption for Andean languages, as pointed out to me by
Liliana Sánchez (p.c.).
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in (5.50a). The verb lup’iña ‘think’ takes a nominalized complement. The subject of the nominalized
complement is marked with genitive (-na) and there is an agreement marker, -pa, which is third person


















‘Rose thought that Mary built a house.’
What is relevant here is the subordination of the expression under consideration, namely, negation and kunsa
luraña ‘do shit’. (5.51) shows a case where (5.49) is subordinated—the intended meaning is preserved. With
regard to negation, note that only jani ‘not’ appears in the nominalized complement, whereas the negative
suffix -ka does not (in contrast to (5.49), where -ka does appear)—adding -ka to the embededded verb
yields ungrammaticality. Here I adopt a position where jani ‘not’ is VP-adjoined. -ka, on the other hand,
heads NegP, which is located above high aspect, as discussed below in this section (see Bošković 2012 and
references therein for discussion regarding two types of negation, namely, adverbial/adjunct negation and
negation as the head of NegP).33 This position is based on the fact that, as will be shown below in this













‘Rose thought that Mary didn’t do shit.’
If negation appears in the matrix clause, and kunsa luraña ‘do shit’ appears in the embedded clause, the














‘Rose didn’t think that Mary did something in a terrible way.’
The question that needs to be addressed is what happens with the expression under consideration, negation
and kunsa luraña ‘do shit’, when evidentials are involved. In particular, if each evidential creates a new
domain, then clauses with more than one evidential would not convey the meaning ‘do nothing’.34 The
33NegP would still be located below the projections headed by the evidentials. See footnote 36.
34It is worth pointing out that, if each evidential introduces a new (syntactic) domain, there would have to be a null verb
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sentences in (5.53) include the expression under consideration in cases with one evidential per clause. As









p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’









p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’











p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
Turning to clauses with more than one evidential, consider the examples in (5.54). In the cases with two
evidentials, i.e., (5.54a)-(5.54c), it would be conceivable to think of the presence of two domains, where
negation is higher up, e.g., in the domain of siwa in (5.54a)-(5.54b) or in the domain of =wa in (5.54c),
and kunsa luraña ‘do shit’ is in the lower domain, e.g., in the domain of =wa in (5.54a) or in the domain
of -tay in (5.54b)-(5.54c).35 In the case with all three evidentials, i.e., (5.54d), there are potentially three
domains, where negation would be located in a higher domain, e.g., the domain of siwa, and kunsa luraña
‘do shit’ is located in a lower domain, e.g., the domain of =wa or -tay. Intuitively, these sentences denote
the proposition that It is not the case that Mary did shit, where there are different domains—this would be
similar to the case with subordination in (5.51). This, however, is not what these sentences mean. They can
only mean that Mary didn’t do anything (i.e., the meaning where negation and kunsa luraña ‘do shit’ are in
the same clause), which suggests that the evidentials are located in the same domain.36
whenever there is no overt verb (i.e., =wa and siwa would be accompanied by null verbs). As I show below, it does not seem to be
the case that each evidential belongs to a different domain, so there would be no null verbs in the sense noted here.
35The evidential domains could be split in the opposite direction, in particular, in the case with =wa or -tay (arguably, since
-siwa is an illocutionary evidential, it would be in a higher domain when compared to =wa and -tay). The conclusion stated in the
main text would not change.
36If one is to really poke the syntactic spine involved in (5.54), one finds the following. Among the elements that are of interest,
namely, negation and the three evidentials, NegP, headed by -ka, is the lowest projection, -tay is higher than NegP (in the TP area,
which is consistent with the fact that it is a verb suffix), and =wa and siwa are located in the left periphery, with siwa heading the
highest projection (which is illocutionary). With regard to =wa, it is worth pointing out that it has being argued that it is involved in
focus marking, which suggests that =wa would be located in the left periphery (Klose 2015; Martı́nez Vera 2018b) Under standard
assumptions (see, e.g., Rizzi 1997), CP elements incorporate properties regarding, e.g., information structure, evidentiality, etc.,
which, crucially, do not create separate domains. This would mean that the evidentials would be located in the same domain, as












p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’












p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’










p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’












p: ‘Mary didn’t do shit.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the
best possible grounds, which are indirect evidence).’
The discussion thus shows that evidentials in Aymara are in the same domain. In fact, a stronger claim can
be made, namely, that evidentials in Aymara are in the same matrix clause. To argue that evidentiality in
Aymara is a matrix clause phenomenon, I show that these evidentials cannot appear in embedded clauses,
i.e., in embedded clauses like the one discussed in (5.51)—this fact makes it relevant to determining the
size of embedded clauses in Aymara. This discussion is telling as well with regard to the relative syntactic
position of evidentials in Aymara; crucially, the discussion to follow is consistent with the proposal that =wa
and -tay are propositional evidentials, as suggested in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5, since they are located high
in the syntactic spine—as argued in section 5.2.5, siwa is an illocutionary evidential, which means that it is
located very high in the syntactic spine.
While the discussion with regard to examples like (5.51) has shown that embedded clauses in Aymara
involve nominalizations, what was only very briefly indicated was the size of the embedded clauses, i.e.,
what is the highest projection that they can include prior to being closed off by a nominalizer. In what
follows, I show that the highest projection that can be included in Aymara embedded clauses is high as-
pect. For illustration, consider the matrix sentences in (5.55). (5.55a) shows a sentence without any aspect
markers. Aymara has two kinds of aspect markers, namely, low (or inner) aspect markers and high (or gram-
matical) aspect markers (Gonzalo Segura 2011). (5.55b) shows a sentence with a low aspect marker, the
terminative-su, which adds the meaning that the theme was completely built. (5.55c) shows a sentence with
149
a high aspect marker, the durative -ska, which adds the explicit indication of a timespan to the building of a
house.37 (5.55d) shows a sentence with both -su and -ska, i.e., a sentence with projections for both inner and
grammatical aspect. As the literature has discussed, -ska is a grammatical aspect marker located above inner
aspect (Gonzalo Segura 2011; see, e.g., Baker 1985 for additional discussion). Under standard assumptions
(see, e.g., Merchant 2015), since -ska is a grammatical aspect marker, it would occupy a relatively high




























‘Rosa was building a house (and completed it).’
Of relevance here is to show that embedded clauses in Aymara may include a projection as high as gram-
matical aspect. Projections that are higher than aspect, such as agreement markers between the verb and
the subject, e.g., -i in (5.55), cannot appear in embedded cluases. This is illustrated in (5.56). Importantly,
inner and grammatical aspect can appear in the embedded clause, but nothing higher than that is present, for











‘Mary thought that Rose was building a house (until it was completed).’
The relevant question regards the distribution of the evidentials in embedded clauses. (5.57) shows that they








p: ‘Rosa was building a house (and completed it).’
ep: The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.








p: ‘Rosa was building a house (and completed it).’









p: ‘Rosa was building a house (and completed it).’
ep: The speaker has reportative evidence for p.
Crucially, adding the evidentials to the nominalized complements in (5.56) is not possible, as shown in
(5.58). This suggests that the evidentials are located higher than grammatical aspect (AspectP) in the struc-
ture, i.e., the lowest evidentials can be located in Aymara is a relatively high position in the IP area—as












‘Mary thought that Rose was building a house (until it was completed).’












‘Mary thought that Rose was building a house (until it was completed).’














‘Mary thought that Rose was building a house (until it was completed).’
ep: Mary has reportative evidence (for stating) that Rose was building a house (until it was
completed).’
The discussion has thus shown that the evidentials in Aymara are in the same matrix domain—i.e., all three
evidentials appear in the same domain, which has to be a matrix clause.39 The discussion has further shown
that evidentials in Aymara are located very high in the structure, which is relevant, in particular, with regard
to the claim that =wa and -tay are propositional evidentials: these evidentials would be located in syntactic
positions where they can take arguments whose meaning is propositional. Note that this conclusion suffices
for current purposes: siwa is an illocutionary evidential, and =wa and -tay are propositional evidentials—as
is discussed in section 5.4, I pursue an analysis in which the semantic contribution of =wa and -tay is sym-
38While I illustrate the ungrammaticality of embedded clauses with evidentials in some specific positions, more generally,
ungrammaticality arises regardless of where the evidentials are located in the embedded clause.
39An issue that is left for future research regards a systematic study of islandhood in Aymara.
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metric, so no difference arises with regard to which one is located higher up in the structure. Nonetheless,
it is worth noting that the literature suggests that =wa is located in the left periphery (Klose 2015; Martı́nez
Vera 2018b), whereas -tay is located in the IP (Klose 2014; see footnote 6), which would indicate that, in the
syntactic spine, =wa is located higher up than -tay. For concreteness, this is the position that I adopt here.
5.4 Proposal
This section analyzes the Aymara system of evidentials. Section 5.4.1 introduces the formal setup. Sec-
tion 5.4.2 gives an account of clauses with one evidential. Section 5.4.3 turns to clauses with more than one
evidential.
5.4.1 Formal setup
I adopt an approach where the denotation of linguistic expressions is a pair formed by an at-issue layer A
and a not-at-issue layer N , i.e., hA,Ni. The at-issue layer corresponds to the proffered content (i.e., what is
proposed) and the not-at-issue layer corresponds to the imposed content (i.e., what is understood as a given)
(Anderbois et al. 2015).40 I assume that the interpretation function J·K applied to linguistic expression ↵,
i.e., J↵K, gives a pair as output, which is represented as hJ↵KA, J↵KN i.41
I assume type e (for individuals), type s (for worlds) and type t (for truth values). I further assume
that complex types can be formed from simpler types, i.e., if  , ⌧ are types, then h , ⌧i (abbreviated as
 ⌧ ) is a type (they are functions from D  to D⌧ ). I also assume dot (·) types, i.e., if ⇢,  , ⌧ ,   are types,
then h⇢ ·  , ⌧ ·  i is a type (i.e., it is a function from D⇢ ⇥ D  to D⌧ ⇥ D ). For current purposes, only
illocutionary markers are understood in terms of dot types; the general idea is that dot types apply to pairs and
introduce discourse elements that are relevant for interpretation (see Krifka 1992 et seq.)—as will become
explicit in this and the following sections, the discourse components that are of relevance here are (public)
commitments, which are tied to illocutionary markers in that they introduce commitments to at-issue and
not-at-issue meanings (see Faller 2019).
With regard to truth values, I assume that, in addition to true and false, there is an irrelevant truth value,
represented as #, which means that it cannot be determined whether a relevant expression is true or false,
40The not-at-issue meaning that is mainly discussed here is the evidential contribution of the Aymara markers (see, e.g., Murray
2017 for a similar approach). I set aside the discussion of different kinds of not-at-issue meanings. See Korotkova (2016, 2020) for
recent discussion.
41This approach is loosely inspired in Karttunen & Peters (1979) and Potts (2005).
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and being undetermined means that such an expression is ignored (see, e.g., Ciucci & Dubois 2012, 2013
for an overview). Specifically, I assume that the not-at-issue layer, but not the at-issue layer, may denote
#—i.e., the not-at-issue layer of linguistic expressions may be irrelevant. Importantly, this means that a
sentence may be deemed true or false based on the at-issue layer only if the not-at-issue layer’s denotation
is irrelevant. I make two assumptions with regard to the logical metalanguage in this regard. First, I assume
that if any n-place predicate P applies to a1, ..., an such that ai’s denotation is irrelevant, then the denotation
of such a predicate applied to its arguments is also irrelevant. Second, I assume that if a (non-irrelevant)
predicate is conjoined with an element whose denotation is irrelevant, the denotation of the conjunction is
determined by the former.
In addition, I assume variable assignment g, which, for current purposes, is only applied to free variables
of type e in a given context (see Korotkova 2015, 2016). For these variables, I use indices k, k0, etc. As
standard, free index variables are assumed to be in the set of natural numbers (see Lewis 1979; Heim 1994;
Stanley 2000; Barker 2002 for relevant discussion). The relevant individuals in this regard are the speaker,
the addressee or a third party (i.e., someone different from the former two) (see Faller 2002, 2019). In
connection to this, I adopt a context parameter c tied to these individuals, which are represented as cs for the
speaker and ca for the addressee (Krifka 2014, 2015; Korotkova 2016).
(5.59)-(5.60) introduce the composition rules that are used in what follows to provide an explicit ac-
count of clauses with evidentials in Aymara—the role of indices is discussed in section 5.4.2. Some com-
ments are in order with regard to these rules. As briefly discussed above, I adopt a distinction between
non-illocutionary and illocutionary elements. The rules in (5.59) apply to non-illocutionary elements com-
bining with non-illocutionary elements. The rule in (5.60) applies to illocutionary elements combining with
non-illocutionary elements. The rules (in particular, (5.59)) make explicit that at-issue meanings can only
combine with at-issue meanings. When non-illocutionary elements are considered (see (5.59)), it is worth
noting that not-at-issue meanings can only manipulate the at-issue meaning from its argument (  in (5.59));
if there is a not-at-issue component in the argument (  in (5.59)), it is passed along (see Potts 2005). Note
that rule (5.59b) is similar to Predicate Modification (Heim & Kratzer 1998) in that there is a variable that
applies to the elements that are conjoined, which are of the same type, namely  ⌧ , where the   element
is abstracted away such that the same element of this type is applied to both conjuncts (this becomes rele-
vant in section 5.4.3 when discussing clauses with more than one evidential). When illocutionary elements
are considered (see (5.60)), the illocutionary element under consideration (↵ in (5.60)) can manipulate the
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not-at-issue meaning from its argument (  in (5.60))—as is shown in this and the following sections, illo-
cutionary elements introduce commitments towards at-issue and not-at-issue meanings (see Faller 2019 in
particular for discussion of this in connection to evidentiality).
(5.59) Non-illocutionary composition rules
a. Let   be a branching node with daughters ↵,  , where J↵Kc,gA , J↵K
c,g
N 2 D ⌧ , J K
c,g
A 2 D 








A ) ^ J K
c,g
N i.
b. Let   be a branching node with daughters ↵,  , where J↵Kc,gA , J↵K
c,g
N 2 Dh ⌧, ⌧i and J K
c,g
A ,








A )( ) ^ J K
c,g
N ( )]i.
(5.60) Illocutionary composition rule
Let   be a branching node with daughters ↵,  , where J↵Kc,g 2 Dh · ,⌧ ·⌧i, J Kc,gA 2 D , and
J Kc,gN 2 D  or J K
c,g





For concreteness, consider a simple English case without an evidential in (5.61).
(5.61) It rained in Puno.
I assume that (5.61) has the L(ogical) F(orm) in (5.62), where object S combines with the illocutionary
marker ASSERT.
(5.62) [ ASSERT [S it rained in Puno ]]
The denotation of S in (5.62) appears in (5.63); S denotes the at-issue proposition that it rained in Puno; S’s
not-at-issue meaning is irrelevant.
(5.63) Jit rained in PunoKc,g = h w[rained-in-Puno(w)],#i
Turning to ASSERT (and, more generally, to illocutionary markers), I adopt an approach whereby illocu-
tionary meanings carry the commitments of relevant individuals (e.g., the speaker), in particular, by uttering
some proposition, they make a public commitment (towards some other individual, e.g., the addressee) to
the truth of that proposition (at least for the purposes of a particular exchange) (Gunlogson 2001, 2008;
Farkas & Bruce 2010; Krifka 2014; Murray 2014; Portner 2018)—the commitment may be towards at-issue
and not-at-issue content (Faller 2019). In this regard, I adopt relation commit, which takes two individuals,
x and y, as well as a proposition, and holds iff x is liable for the truth of that proposition towards y (see
Krifka 2014, 2015; Korotkova 2016, 2017; Wood 2016). This is stated in (5.64).
(5.64) For individuals x, y, and proposition p, commit(x, p, y) holds iff x is liable for the truth of p
towards y.
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The denotation of ASSERT is stated in (5.65)—JASSERTKc,g 2 Dhst·st,t·ti; (5.65) is slightly revised in (5.69)
in section 5.4.2. The at-issue layer indicates that some individual, the speaker in this case, is liable for the
truth of the at-issue proposition its argument denotes towards some other individual, the addressee here. The
not-at-issue layer indicates a commitment as well, namely, that some individual, the speaker here, is liable
for the truth of the not-at-issue (i.e., evidential) proposition its argument denotes (see section 5.4.2).
(5.65) For any S such that JSKc,gA 2 Dst, and JSK
c,g





N i) = hcommit(cs, JSK
c,g
A , ca), commit(cs, JSK
c,g
N , ca)i.
The denotation of (5.62) appears in (5.66), where rule (5.60) applies. (5.62) is true iff the speaker is liable
for the truth of the proposition that it rained in Puno towards the addressee—this is the at-issue meaning;
the not-at-issue layer’s denotation is irrelevant (and, as such, is ignored).
(5.66) J(5.62)Kc,g = hcommit(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], ca),#i
5.4.2 Clauses with one evidential
This section discusses the semantics of expressions with one evidential in Aymara. As discussed throughout
this chapter, Aymara has an illocutionary evidential, the reportative siwa, and two non-illocutionary eviden-
tials, the direct =wa and the indirect -tay. First, I discuss the cases with =wa, then I turn to the cases with
-tay, and, finally, I discuss the cases with siwa.
I assume that sentences with =wa have the LF in (5.67).
(5.67) [[S0 S =wak0 ] ASSERTk ]
Recall that =wa is a direct evidential whose contribution is to be understood in terms of the notion of the best
possible grounds (see section 5.2.1). I represent the best possible grounds as relation BPG between individual
x, proposition p and world w, BPG(x, p, w), which holds iff x has the best possible grounds for p at w (see
Murray 2017), where the best possible grounds are to be understood as that (unique) piece of evidence x has
for p such that this piece of evidence constitutes the most direct source of evidence x has access to for p at w
relative to the type of information p conveys. The denotation I propose for =wa applied to S, which denotes
an at-issue proposition, is stated in (5.68). The at-issue meaning of =wa is an identity function that passes
along the at-issue meaning of its argument—i.e., J=wakKc,gA 2 Dhst,sti. As for the not-at-issue layer, the
at-issue proposition that S denotes is mapped into an evidential proposition where some individual has the
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relevant evidence (the best possible grounds) for that proposition—i.e., J=wakKc,gN 2 Dhst,sti. The individual
with the evidence is tied to index k, which is brought in by =wa. Variable assignment g will assign a value
to the index (see the discussion below).42
(5.68) For any S such that JSKc,gA 2 Dst, J=wakKc,g(JSK
c,g





The denotation of ASSERT in (5.65) is slightly revised below. The only difference between (5.65) and (5.69)
is that this illocutionary marker now introduces an index that is assigned a value, which is the speaker—
in this sense, the meaning of this marker does not change in that the same individual is committed to the
relevant proposition.
(5.69) For any S such that JSKc,gA 2 Dst, and JSK
c,g





N i) = hcommit(cs, JSK
c,g




The issue that needs to be discussed in more detail at this point is why these indices are adopted here. While
an account of sentences with more than one evidential is delayed until section 5.4.3, it is worth pointing
out already that having indices is motivated by the possibility of having more than one evidence holder in
clauses with more than one evidential. Specifically, as discussed in section 5.3, in clauses with more than
one evidential when siwa is present, there are two evidence holders: the speaker has some piece of evidence
(namely, reportative) and the source of the evidence has evidence for the relevant proposition (what kind
of evidence is determined by =wa and/or -tay). What this means here is that the evidence holder in the
cases of =wa and -tay in particular is not fixed, i.e., it must be possible to allow for different (i.e., at most
two) evidence holders depending on the case under consideration. Specifically, when siwa is present, the
evidence holder tied to the evidential contribution of =wa and -tay is a third party, not the speaker (note
that this means that there are two evidence holders); otherwise, i.e., in the absence of siwa, the evidence the
evidence holder tied to the evidential contribution of =wa and -tay is the speaker (in this case, there is only
one evidence holder).
As mentioned above, the approach adopted here assumes that assigning a value to an index is done
when illocutionary markers are combined. What this means here is that, in the absence of siwa (which is
an illocutionary marker), the indices introduced by =wa (or -tay, as discussed below) should be assigned a
value corresponding to the speaker—this is the role of ASSERT in connection to the indices: in (5.69), the
42The presence of the index is crucially tied to the shift with regard to who the evidence holder is, in particular, in cases where
the reportative evidential is present. See the discussion below in this section; see also section 5.4.3 for examples.
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index is assigned a value corresponding to the speaker. In the presence of siwa, as discussed below, the
index is assigned a value corresponding to a third party. This means that, even though each evidential and
illocutionary marker lexically introduces its own index, all the indices receive the same interpretation. To
guarantee that this is in fact the case, I propose the rules in (5.70), which are inspired by the literature on
indexical shift (see Schlenker 1999, 2003; Safir 2004; Anand 2006; Lim 2010; Sudo 2012, 2014; Deal 2014;
Korotkova 2015; Messick 2017; see also Lewis 1980; Kaplan 1989). These rules apply by cases in that they
state how to resolve the presence of indices depending of which rule in (5.59)-(5.60) apply—in this sense,
the rules in (5.70) do not replace or supersede (5.59)-(5.60); the rules in (5.70) simply specify what to do
with the indices when they are present. Intuitively, the rules in (5.70) say that an index that is introduced
lower in the structure should be replaced by an index that is introduced higher in the structure.43
(5.70) Index identification
Let   be a branching node with daughters ↵k, [S0 S k0 ].
a. If rule (5.59a) applies, then J Kc,g =




N (J[S0 S k0 ]K
c,g[g(k)/k0]
A ) ^ J[S0 S k0 ]K
c,g[g(k)/k0]
N i.
b. If rule (5.59b) applies, then J Kc,g =




N (J[S0 S k0 ]K
c,g[g(k)/k0]
A )( )^J[S0 S k0 ]K
c,g[g(k)/k0]
N ( )]i.
c. If rule (5.60) applies, then J Kc,g = J↵Kc,g(hJ[S0 S k0 ]K
c,g[g(k)/k0]
A , J[S0 S k0 ]K
c,g[g(k)/k0]
N i)
To illustrate how this system works, recall example (5.2a), repeated below, where the speaker saw that it
43There are at least two questions that arise at this point. The first one regards whether index identification could be implemented
syntactically, by means of, for instance, co-indexing. This alternative, I believe, is actually viable. I do not have a principled reason
to prefer the semantic mechanism proposed in the main text over a syntactic mechanism—in this sense, settling this issue is left
for future research. Nonetheless, I would like to point out that both mechanisms would be similar in spirit in that there would be
several lexical items that introduce a (potentially different) index and a mechanism needs to be proposed, so that the indices receive
the same interpretation in the end. The rules in (5.70) do this by replacing a lower index with a higher index; a syntactic approach
would need to specify the conditions under which co-indexing would take place.
The second issue I would like to raise regards the relation between the composition rules that apply to non-illocutionary markers,
i.e, the rules in (5.59), as well as the link between the index identification rules in (5.70a)-(5.70b), which (may) apply if the former
rules have applied. For instance, one could state that one rule in each pair is the elsewhere case (while the other one would constitute
a marked case). In this regard, this chapter has shown that several possibilities can in fact occur. For instance, sentences with one
evidential (in particular, =wa or -tay) would suggest that that rule (5.59a) constitute the elsewhere case (in that this is the only rule
that would apply in this case). Sentences with both =wa and -tay indicate that (5.59b) is also required; however, in these cases, rule
(5.59a) must also apply (see the denotations below in this and the following sections for additional details). What this means, more
generally, is that, while rule (5.59a) always applies, this is not the case with regard to rule (5.59b). Pending additional research,
this would suggest that rule (5.59a) constitute the elsewhere case—this is actually closely tied to the assumption in my system that
at-issue meanings are required (not-at-issue meanings may not be present). If this reasoning is on the right track, then something
similar could be stated in connection to rules (5.70a)-(5.70b) as well: since these apply depending on whether (5.59a) or (5.59b)
apply, assuming that one of them needs to apply (which is the case whenever =wa or -tay are present, since they always introduce
indices in the approach adopted here), rule (5.70a) would constitute the elsewhere case. It is worth pointing out, however, that rules
(5.70a)-(5.70b) may not apply at all—in addition to the application of rules (5.59a)-(5.59b), there must be a particular syntactic
configuration where at least two indices are present. While this has not been the focus here, this would actually be the case when
an evidential such as =wa or -tay is not present (see the discussion regarding example (5.61) above, where, adopting the approach







p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p.’
The LF of (5.71) is as in (5.72) (I make use of English words in this and the LFs to follow for ease of
exposition):
(5.72) [[S0 [S it rained in Puno ] =wak0 ] ASSERTk ]
The denotation of (5.72) is stated in (5.73). In this case, in addition to index identification (5.70), rules
(5.59a) and (5.60) apply—recall that rule (5.59a) is the one where an non-illocutionary marker combines
with an argument whose not-at-issue meaning is irrelevant; rule (5.60) applies so that ASSERT combines
with its argument. (5.72) conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth of the proposition that it rained in
Puno towards the addressee—this is at the at-issue level. (5.72) also conveys that the speaker is liable for
the truth of the evidential proposition that the speaker has the best possible grounds for the proposition that
it rained in Puno—this is at the not-at-issue level.
(5.73) J(5.72)Kc,g = hcommit(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], ca),
commit(cs, q, ca) ^ q =  w0[BPG(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], w0)]i
Turning to -tay, I assume that sentences with this evidential have the LF in (5.74).
(5.74) [[S0 S -tayk0 ] ASSERTk ]
Recall that -tay is an indirect evidential (see section 5.2.1). As in the case of =wa, the at-issue meaning is
an identity function that passes along the at-issue meaning of -tay’s argument—i.e., J-tayKc,gA 2 Dhst,sti. As
for the not-at-issue meaning, I formalize the evidential meaning of -tay in terms of relation IND between
individual x, proposition p and world w, IND(x, p, w), which holds iff x has indirect evidence for p at
w, where indirect evidence may be reportative or inferential (see Murray 2017). The not-at-issue layer
of this evidential, as was the case when discussing =wa, is also a function from (at-issue) propositions to
(evidential) propositions—i.e., J-tayKc,gN 2 Dhst,sti. As in the case of =wa, -tay also incorporates index k
of type e. Variable assignment g will assign a value to the index. g(k) is the individual with the relevant
evidence.
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(5.75) For any S such that JSKc,gA 2 Dst, J-taykKc,g(JSK
c,g










p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has indirect evidence for p.’
The LF of (5.76) is as in (5.77).
(5.77) [[S0 [S it rained in Puno ] -tayk0 ] ASSERTk ]
The denotation of (5.77) is stated in (5.78)—this is similar to cases with =wa, as in (5.73) in that, in addition
to index identification (5.70), rules (5.59a) and (5.60) apply. (5.77) conveys that the speaker is liable for
the truth of the proposition that it rained in Puno towards the addressee—this is at the at-issue level. (5.77)
also conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth of the evidential proposition that the speaker has indirect
evidence for the proposition that it rained in Puno—this is at the not-at-issue level.44
(5.78) J(5.77)Kc,g = hcommit(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], ca),
commit(cs, q, ca) ^ q =  w0[IND(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], w0)]i
Turning to the reportative siwa, I assume that sentences with this evidential have the LF in (5.79).
(5.79) [ S siwak ]
The analysis I propose for siwa is different from the one proposed for =wa or -tay, in that siwa, in addition
to incorporating an evidential meaning (i.e., a reportative meaning), also introduces illocutionary meanings,
given that it is an illocutionary marker (i.e., it is similar to ASSERT in this regard).45 With regard to the at-
issue meaning of siwa, following Faller’s (2002, 2019) analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative, I propose
that the illocutionary meaning of siwa applied at the at-issue layer is that of presentation, i.e., a proposition
is presented, where presentation is to be understood as the relation present, such that present holds of
individuals x, y and proposition p iff x makes proposition p salient towards y; put differently, the speaker
44Note that this account shows that the only difference between sentences with =wa and -tay lies in the evidence that the relevant
individual has. This is a good result, since, as was discussed in footnote 7 and section 5.2.3, the judgment that speakers report is
that there is no difference with regard to the commitment of the speaker to the truth of the scope proposition, which is tied to the
liability for its truth, which is introduced by an illocutionary marker (see below for an explicit discussion regarding how this account
captures the commitment properties of the cases under consideration).
45As anticipated in section 5.2.5, the analysis pursued here is intended for the non-quotative uses of siwa. See Korotkova (2016,
2017) and references therein for relevant discussion.
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puts a proposition on the table (without being liable for its truth) (Faller 2019). This is stated in (5.80).
(5.80) For individuals x, y, and proposition p, present(x, p, y) holds iff x makes p salient towards y.
With regard to the not-at-issue layer, I formalize the evidential meaning of siwa in terms of relation REP
between individual x, proposition p, individual y, and world w, REP(x, p, y, w), which holds iff x has re-
portative evidence for p coming from y at w (see Murray 2017). Importantly, this means that there is an
individual, different from the speaker or the addressee, who is the source of the proposition under consid-
eration (see Faller’s 2019 distinction between animator and principal, where the animator, the speaker here,
introduces the proposition under consideration, and the principal, somebody different from the speaker or the
addressee here, commits herself to that proposition). Note as well that, as an illocutionary marker (i.e., simi-
lar to ASSERT), siwa brings in the meaning that some individual is committed to the evidential proposition(s)
under consideration. While the discussion in this section focuses on cases where there is only one evidential,
so that there is one evidential proposition such that the speaker is committed to it, it may well be the case that
there is another evidential proposition such that the source of the report given to the speaker is committed
to it (see the discussion about sentences with more than one evidential in section 5.3; see section 5.4.3 for
more discussion with regard to the analysis of those sentences; building on Faller 2019, this means that not
only is the principal committed to the scope proposition, but also to the evidential proposition on which her
assertion is based). In addition, siwa sets the assignment of the value of index k, which here is somebody
different from the speaker or the addressee—this is particularly relevant when considering cases with more
than one evidential, which are discussed in section 5.4.3. Based on these considerations, the denotation of
siwa is stated in (5.81)—in a similar vein to the discussion with regard to ASSERT, JsiwaKc,g 2 Dhst·st,t·ti.
(5.81) For any S such that JSKc,gA 2 Dst, and JSK
c,g





N i) = hpresent(cs, JSK
c,g
A , ca),
commit(cs, w[REP(cs, JSKc,gA , g(k), w)], ca)^ commit(g(k), JSK
c,g
N , cs)^g(k) 6= {cs, ca}i.







p: ‘It rained in Puno.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
The LF of (5.82) is as in (5.83).
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(5.83) [[S it rained in Puno ] siwak ]
The denotation of (5.83) is stated in (5.84). Rule (5.60) applies in this case, so that siwa combines with
its argument. (5.83) conveys that the speaker presents the proposition that it rained in Puno towards the
addressee—this is at the at-issue level. (5.83) also conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth of the evi-
dential proposition that the speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that it rained in Puno, whose
source is a third party—this is at the not-at-issue level; since the commit relation in (5.81) is irrelevant, it is
ignored to determine the truth of the whole.
(5.84) J(5.83)Kc,g = hpresent(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], ca), commit(cs, q, ca)^
q =  w0[REP(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], g(k), w0)] ^ g(k) 62 {cs, ca}i
Before turning to clauses with multiple evidentials, recall Table 1, repeated below. My account provides an
analysis where siwa is an illocutionary marker, whereas =wa and -tay are not—in addition, no modal com-
ponent is included (see section 5.2.4). The account makes explicit why the evidential meaning of evidentials
cannot be directly challenged; this is done here by assigning this meaning into the not-at-issue layer. This
is not the case of the scope proposition, which is at-issue, and can thus be challenged. My proposal also
accounts for the different commitments of the speaker. In the case of the evidential meaning, the speaker is
commited to the relevant evidence (direct, indirect or reportative). However, this uniformity is not the case
with regard to the scope proposition. In the case of =wa and -tay, the speaker is committed to the scope
proposition. This need not be the case in the presence of siwa: the speaker only makes the scope proposition
salient, but need not be liable for its truth, so commitment need not arise in this case.46
46I would like to briefly comment on a particular issue that arises in connection to the illocutionary force of presentation (which
is tied to siwa in the current analysis), and challenging the scope proposition and committing to it. On the one hand, the scope
proposition can be challenged by stating that it is not true. These challenges seem to target the truth of the proposition—a correction
to the expression uttered by the speaker is proposed. In this sense, it would seem like a speaker uttering a sentence with siwa is
actually making an assertion. However, the illocutionary force of presentation does not make the speaker liable for the truth of
the proposition (which is the role of assertion with regard to the at-issue layer in the current approach). In this regard, a question
arises: how can one challenge the truth of a proposition or a speaker being liable for the truth of a proposition if the speaker has not
really stated that she is liable for a proposition being true? This issue has been recently addressed by Faller (2019). In a nutshell,
Faller’s proposal is that, while the speaker is not technically liable for the truth of this proposition, in the absence of explicit
disagreement, she actually proposes this proposition (in the conversation under consideration). This follows from a pragmatic
Collaborative Principle, which requires that evidence be provided in the presence of discrepancies with regard to the proposition





Can the scope proposition be challenged? Yes Yes Yes
Can the evidential proposition be challenged? No No No
Is the speaker committed to the scope proposition? Yes Yes No
Is the speaker committed to the evidential proposition? Yes Yes Yes
Is the marker a modal evidential? No No No
Is the marker an illocutionary evidential? No No Yes
Table 1. Overview of the Aymara evidentials
5.4.3 Aymara clauses with more than one evidential
This section shows how my proposal accommodates clauses with multiple evidentials. What is shown is that
the evidential meanings of the Aymara evidentials are compatible. My focus is on three examples, namely,
one in which the direct =wa and the indirect -tay co-occur, one in which it is shown that the indirect -tay
and the reportative siwa co-occur, and one in which all three evidentials co-occur.
Consider first sentence (5.39), repeated below, where =wa and -tay co-occur—recall that, in this case,





p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has the best possible grounds for p (and the best possible grounds are based on
indirect evidence).’
This sentence has the LF in (5.86). As in the clauses with one of these two evidentials only, the illocutionary
element ASSERT is also present.
(5.86) [[S00 [S0 [S Mary was sick ] -tayk00 ] =wak0 ] ASSERTk ]
The denotation of (5.86) appears in (5.87). In addition to index identification (5.70), rule (5.59b) applies
so that the evidential proposition of -tay is passed along; this rule also guarantees that the two evidential
propositions under consideration, i.e., the one brought in by =wa and the one brought in by -tay, are true in
the same worlds—for this to be the case, there must be one piece of evidence that is indirect and constitutes
the most direct source of evidence the relevant individual has access to for the proposition under consider-
ation (see section 5.4.2). Rule (5.60) applies so that ASSERT combines with the result of combining =wa
and its argument. (5.86) conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth of the proposition that Mary was sick
towards the addressee—this is at the at-issue level. (5.86) also conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth
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of the evidential proposition that the speaker has the best possible grounds, which are indirect evidence, for
the proposition that Mary was sick—this is at the not-at-issue level.
(5.87) J(5.86)Kc,g = hcommit(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w), ca], commit(cs, q, ca)^
q =  w0[BPG(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], w0)^ IND(cs, w[rained-in-Puno(w)], w0)]i







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on indirect
evidence).
This sentence has the LF in (5.89).
(5.89) [[S0 [S Mary was sick ] -tayk0 ] siwak ]
The denotation of (5.89) appears in (5.90). In addition to index identification (5.70), rule (5.59a) applies so
that -tay and its argument combine (this is a case where the argument’s not-at-issue denotation is irrelevant),
and rule (5.60) applies so that siwa combines with the result of combining -tay and its argument. (5.89)
conveys that the speaker presents the proposition that Mary was sick towards the addressee—this is at the
at-issue level. (5.89) also conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth of the evidential proposition that the
speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Mary was sick; her source is a third party who has
indirect evidence for this same proposition—this is at the not-at-issue level.47
(5.90) J(5.89)Kc,g = hpresent(cs, w[was-sick(m,w)], ca), commit(cs, q, ca)^
q =  w0[REP(cs, w[was-sick(m,w)], g(k), w0)] ^ commit(g(k), r, cs)^
r =  w00[IND(g(k), w[was-sick(m,w)], w00)] ^ g(k) 62 {cs, ca}i
A case with all three evidentials is illustrated below ((5.91) repeats (5.4))—recall that this is a case where
the speaker has reportative evidence, and the third party has the best possible grounds, which are indirect







p: ‘Mary was sick.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p (and the reportative evidence is based on the best
47Similar considerations apply to sentences with =wa and siwa, the only difference being the evidential meanings brought in by
the evidentials.
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possible grounds, which are indirect evidence).’
This sentence has the LF in (5.92). Note that the difference in the LFs in (5.86) and (5.92) lies in the
illocutionary element that is present (ASSERT in (5.86) and siwa in (5.92)).
(5.92) [[S00 [S0 [S Mary was sick ] -tayk00 ] =wak0 ] siwak ]
The denotation of (5.92) appears in (5.93). In addition to index identification (5.70), rule (5.59a) applies so
that -tay and its argument combine (this is a case where the argument’s not-at-issue denotation is irrelevant);
rule (5.59b) applies so that =wa combines with the result of combining -tay and its argument (see the
discussion of example (5.85) for details with regard to having a sentence with =wa and -tay); rule (5.60)
applies so that siwa combines with the result of combining =wa and its argument. (5.92) conveys that
the speaker presents the proposition that Mary was sick towards the addressee—this is at the at-issue level.
(5.92) also conveys that the speaker is liable for the truth of the evidential proposition that she has reportative
evidence for the proposition that Mary was sick; her source is a third party who has the best possible grounds
(which are indirect evidence here) for this same proposition—this is at the not-at-issue level.
(5.93) J(5.92)Kc,g = hpresent(cs, w[was-sick(m,w)], ca), commit(cs, q, ca)^
q =  w0[REP(cs, w[was-sick(m,w)], g(k), w0)] ^ commit(g(k), r, cs)^
r =  w00[BPG(g(k), w[was-sick(m,w)], w00) ^ IND(g(k), w[was-sick(m,w)], w00)]
^ g(k) 62 {cs, ca}i
The current analysis naturally accounts for the fact that, as expected, there is no difference when the chal-
lengeability test is applied to clauses with one or more than one evidential: the scope proposition can be
challenged; the evidential proposition cannot be challenged. Similar considerations apply when discussing
the commitment test applied to the evidential proposition: there always is commitment to the relevant evi-
dence. Note that this same analysis also accounts for the contrast regarding the commitments of the speaker
in clauses with multiple evidentials. As discussed in section 5.3.3, regardless of the presence of =wa or -tay,
when siwa is present, the speaker need not be committed to the scope proposition; in contrast, when siwa is
absent, the speaker has to be committed to the scope proposition. This contrast follows naturally by means
of ASSERT and siwa—in the current analysis, sentences without siwa have ASSERT—, since the speaker is
liable for the truth of the relevant at-issue proposition only when ASSERT is present.
More generally, the discussion in this section has shown that there is nothing in the meanings of the
evidentials, in particular, in their not-at-issue layer, where the evidential meaning has been captured, that
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prevents them from co-occurring in the same clause. Semantically, this suffices for it to be possible to have
more than one evidential in the same clause in some language. Intuitively, this means that the semantics
proposed makes the evidential meanings of the evidentials under discussion compatible. This property can
be captured formally, as in (5.94). In particular, the discussion has been concerned with the not-at-issue
layer of evidentials, which take an argument with a propositional at-issue meaning. Importantly, the claim
made here is that the evidential meanings of different evidentials applied to some at-issue proposition can
(all) be true—based on the previous discussion, it is assumed that the index to which each evidential makes
reference is assigned the same individual value and that there is (at least) a world in which the relevant
not-at-issue meanings are true.48
(5.94) Evidential Compatibility
For any evidentials ↵,   in syntactic structure S0 of the form [S0 ... [ ↵ [   S ]]] such that




N apply to JSK
c,g








A )(w) = 1].
5.5 Clauses with more than one evidential cross-linguistically
As is well-known, the literature on evidentials has increased in the last decades. For instance, only from
a theoretical perspective, a number of different evidential systems has been studied. Languages with more
than one evidential that have been studied from a formal perspective include the following: Tibetan (Sino-
Tibetan) (Garrett 2001; Kalsang et al. 2013), Cuzco Quechua (Quechua) (Faller 2002, 2007, 2012, 2019),
Korean (Altaic) (Chung 2006, 2007; Lee 2011), St’at’imcets (Salish) (Matthewson et al. 2007), Japanese
(Altaic) (McCready & Ogata 2007), Cheyenne (Algonquian) (Murray 2010, 2014, 2017), Gitksan (Tsimshi-
anic) (Peterson 2010), Spanish (Romance) (Demonte & Fernández-Soriano 2013, 2014), Bolivian Aymara
(Aymara) (Klose 2014, 2015). However, none of these works discuss the possibility of having more than
one evidential in the same clause. In fact, works addressing whether languages allow for clauses with more
than one evidential are rather few. The typological survey by Aikhenvald (2004) only mentions the fol-
lowing languages: Comanche (Uto-Aztecan) (Charney 1993), Xamatauteri (Yanomami) (Ramirez 1994),
Bora (Bora-Witoto) (Thiesen 1996; Wise 1999), Kamaiurá (Tupı́-Guarani) (Seki 2000), Tsafiki (Barba-
coan) (Dickinson 2001), Qiang (Sino-Tibetan) (LaPolla 2003), Eastern Pomo (Pomoan) (McLendon 2003),
48Here I am setting aside whether the evidentials take as argument a not-at-issue proposition for simplicity, since the focus is on
making explicit how the different evidential meanings applied to some at-issue proposition may be compatible. In this regard, the
discussion in the previous sections has made explicit how such an argument can be accommodated.
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Shipibo-Konibo (Panoan) (Valenzuela 2003), and Jarawara (Arawá) (Aikhenvald 2004).
Taking the discussion in Aikhenvald (2004) as the starting point, this section provides an overview of
clauses with multiple evidentials cross-linguistically and suggest a restriction in this domain. While tentative
and by no means conclusive, the discussion in this section raises some issues regarding who the evidence
holder is, what is the piece of information (in general, a proposition) for which there is evidence, and in what
sense the evidential contributions are compatible (see the definition of evidential compatibility in (5.94)).
For ease of exposition, I make the assumption that the examples under discussion are monoclausal. It is
worth keeping in mind that research on these languages is required to settle the issues that will be discussed
in what follows. Aikhenvald (2004:88-92) proposes that there are four language types in connection to
clauses with more than one evidential, as indicated in (5.95). The cases Aikhenvald discusses contain two
evidentials at most—the Aymara case involving three evidentials that has been discussed in this chapter is
the first one that has been attested thus far (see section 5.3.1).
(5.95) Types of languages allowing clauses with multiple evidentials
a. Two different evidentials mark information acquired by the author of the statement in differ-
ent ways for different constituents of a clause.
b. Information acquired by the author of the statement comes from two sources.
c. Information is acquired by the author of the statement from different but interconnected
sources.
d. Information can be acquired from several different independent sources by different recipi-
ents.
The language type in (5.95a) involves the presence of two evidentials; there is one evidence holder, the
speaker, who has different kinds of evidence for different constituents of the clause. The only language that
has been reported to fall under (5.95a) is Jarawara. An example appears in (5.96). There are a direct and
a reportative evidential. While the direct is attached to the whole clause, the reportative is buried inside
an NP; in this sense is that Aikhenvald characterizes this case as involving attachment of the evidentials to
different constituents.49 The speaker has direct evidence for the proposition; in addition, she has reportative















49To the best of my knowledge, a semantic analysis of evidentials applying to (apparently) non-propositional denoting con-
stituents has not been proposed in the literature.
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‘Then the day dawned on us (FIRSTHAND) (lit. we with-dawned) at the place REPORTED to be
(customarily) the mouth of the Banawá river’
(Aikhenvald 2004:88)
There is an intuitive sense in which the evidential contributions of the two evidentials are compatible. A
speculation making this explicit could be as follows. Suppose that, in this case, there are two propositions
(not one), i.e., in addition to the proposition that the day dawned on some people (at some place), there
is another proposition tied to the constituent in square brackets in (5.96), namely, the proposition that that
place is the mouth of the Banawá river. The evidentials apply to two different propositions, which means
that the evidence holder, that is kept constant, would have evidence for them both.
The language type in (5.95b) involves a proposition for which there are two (independent) sources of
evidence. Languages that fall under (5.95b) are Jarawara, Qiang, Shipibo-Konibo and Xamatauteri. (5.97)
illustrates this type with Xamatauteri. There is one evidence holder, the speaker, who has two sources of
evidence for the proposition that the snake bit him, namely, an inference based on general assumptions, and


















‘The snake must have bitten him’ (confirmed by the wound)
(Ramirez 1994:90)
The language type in (5.95c) refers to information acquired by the author of the statement from different
but interconnected sources. This type has been discussed in this chapter with Aymara clauses with the
reportative siwa, and the direct =wa or the indirect -tay. In addition to Aymara, languages that fall under
(5.95c) are Tsafiki, Bora and Eastern Pomo. As was shown in section 5.4.3, these evidential meanings are
compatible.
The language type in (5.95d) is a case with two different evidence holders; there is no relation between
the evidence they have for the relevant proposition. This language type is similar to the previous one (5.95c)
in that one of the evidentials has to be reportative—specifically, this language type is instantiated in story-
telling. Languages that fall under this type are Eastern Pomo and Comanche. (5.98) is from Eastern Pomo.
The speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that he started to walk out; independently, the main
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character of the story being narrated by the speaker has non-visual sensory evidence for the same proposi-





‘Then he started to walk out, it is said (the old man villain, who is blind, heard the hero start to
walk out)’
(Aikhenvald 2004:92)
In what follows, I propose a tentative generalization that captures a source of variation across different
examples. Specifically, I propose that, in clauses with more than one evidential, there may be at most two
evidence holders with evidence for the same proposition, stated in (5.99).51
(5.99) Variation in clauses with more than one evidential
Languages where evidentials can co-occur may vary in that there may be one or two evidence
holders with evidence for the same proposition.
The relevant language types are (5.95c) and (5.95d), which have the interesting property that there must be
a reportative evidential for it to be possible to have two different evidence holders—in the case of the type
in (5.95c), the two evidence holders are interconnected in that the speaker has reportative evidence and the
source of the report is made (somewhat) explicit; in the case of the type in (5.95d), the two evidence holders
are not interconnected.
If one is to take the Aymara case as reference, it would actually be a particular kind of reportative,
namely, an illocutionary reportative. This, I suggest, may not be accidental: (illocutionary) reportative
evidentials are needed for types (5.95c)-(5.95d) to arise. Under the analysis proposed in this chapter for
illocutionary evidentials (see sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3), the particular property illocutionary reportatives
would have is that they bring in an index whose value may not be the speaker. In fact, recall, in this
regard, that the index always receives the same value in my analysis, so there can be at most two evidence
holders, thus providing initial grounds supporting (5.99). This generalization follows from the particularity
of (illocutionary) reportative evidentials discussed above, which is stated in (5.100).
50The Aymara cases with =wa and -tay would not fall under Aikhenvald’s (2004) classification, where there would be two
evidentials whose evidential contributions pick out one piece of evidence. A new type would be needed for such a case.
51There are two more sources of variation across examples, namely, that there may be one or two propositions for which some
evidence holder has evidence (see the type in (5.95a), where there was an evidential attached to a constituent in the sentence),
and that there may be one or two sources of evidence for some proposition and evidence holder (see the type in (5.95b)). These,
however, appear to be accidental in that the examples include at most two evidentials. With regard to the former, it is conceivable
to introduce an additional constituent with an evidential (e.g., another NP) that introduces a third proposition. With regard to the
latter, it is conceivable to add a third evidential that brings in an additional source of evidence.
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(5.100)Universal Property of (Illocutionary) Reportative Evidentials
Only (illocutionary) reportative evidentials can introduce an index whose value may not correspond
to the speaker.
Intuitively, this follows from the fact that there is a report and somebody else must be responsible for having
an additional piece of evidence. This may ultimately be tied to the special properties that (illocutionary)
reportative evidentials have been claimed to have, e.g., they are the ones allowing quotative vs. non-quotative
uses (see, e.g., Anderbois 2014; Korotkova 2016, 2017 for relevant discussion). If true, this property would
restrict the cross-linguistic possibilities of clauses with multiple evidentials.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the phenomenon of the co-occurrence of more than one evidential in the same
matrix clause. The focus has been on Southern Aymara, an Andean language which has three evidentials: the
direct =wa, the indirect -tay and the reportative siwa. I provided an overview of the evidential system in this
language and discussed the main properties of clauses with one and more than one evidential. I provided
a formal analysis of clauses with multiple evidentials in this language, showing how different evidential
meanings can be brought together without them being incompatible. I further discussed the cross-linguistic
picture of languages that allow for clauses with more than one evidential. I introduced different types of
languages and suggested that, in these clauses, there can be two evidence holders at most. I tied the latter to
(some) reportative evidentials, thus restricting the typological possibilities in this domain.
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Appendix. On the grammaticalization of
reportative evidentials and evidentiality in
Spanish
This appendix discusses issues regarding the grammaticalization of reportative evidentials, such as Ay-
mara siwa. It also discusses topics about evidentiality in Spanish, which are relevant in connection to the
grammaticalization of this kind of evidentials, as well as other topics of general interest in the domain of
evidentiality, in particular, in connection to issues discussed in chapter 5.
What one finds in the case of siwa is part of a widespread phenomenon where the verb say has undergone
grammaticalization, in particular, it has become a reportative evidential marker (see Saito 2019, to appear
for recent discussion; see Aikhenvald 2004 for discussion in connection to evidentiality in particular; see,
among many others, Hopper & Traugott 1993; Roberts & Roussou 2003; van Gelderen 2011 for general
work in grammaticalization). From a phonological point of view, siwa incorporates the verb stem of the
verb saña ‘say’ in Aymara, namely, s-, and the third person subject agreement, which appears as a default
agreement marker in the language. From a syntactic point of view, siwa has lost its external argument, i.e.,
it cannot be overtly inserted in the syntax, as shown in (5.31) (across languages, such an argument may
well be present semantically in connection to this kind of markers, but, importantly, the external argument
does not appear in the syntax). These are precisely two crucial properties that evidentials that evolve from
the verb say have. For Saito (2019, to appear), these properties follow from the root
p
SAY preserving its
phonological (as well as semantic) properties, so that it is pronounced as say, but is decategorized, i.e., there
is no verbalizer to which it attaches, so that, under the assumption that the verbalizer introduces the external
argument in the syntax, the external argument cannot be introduced—as for the semantic properties, the
evidential under consideration takes a proposition as argument, just as the full verb.
Saito (2019, to appear) further argues that evidentials that come from the verb say normally involve a
structure involving a C and
p
SAY. Adopting a view where the CP is split (see, e.g., Rizzi 1997), this seems
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to be the case of siwa in that the verb say incorporates into an element in the split CP, namely, =wa (see
Klose 2015; Martı́nez Vera 2018b for discussion suggesting that =wa is in the CP). There are other languages
where this is also seems to be the case. One prototypical case in this regard is American Spanish dizque (see
Kany 1944; Travis 2006; Cruschina 2008; Demonte & Fernández-Soriano 2013, 2014; see Travis 2006 for












p: ‘Emily went to the cinema.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
As shown by Saito, dizque displays the properties mentioned above. The phonological features of the verb
say, decir in Spanish, are preserved, in particular, what surfaces, as in the case of Aymara, is the third person
conjugation of the verb, namely, diz- (there has been some reduction in this form, which synchronically is
dice). From a syntactic point of view, as in the case of Aymara siwa, there is no external argument—from a
semantic point of view, dizque takes a proposition as its argument. Importantly, in addition to the presence
of the verb say, Spanish dizque also displays an overt instance of a C, namely, que. This constitutes evidence
for Saito’s proposal in that there is in fact a structure involving a C and
p
SAY.
In connection to dizque and, more generally, to evidentiality in Spanish, I would like to point out
three directions for further research. The first one concerns the issue regarding upward vs. downward
grammaticalization—upward grammaticalization involves a reanalysis process whereby a lower (lexical) el-
ement incorporates into a higher functional element; downward grammaticalization illustrates the opposite
reanalysis process, namely, the functional element is located below the lexical one (so incorporation takes
place downwards). For instance, Roberts & Roussou (2003) claim that there is only updward grammatical-
ization, whereas, for instance, van Gelderen (2004), van der Auwera (2010) and Saito (to appear) challenge
this position and suggest that there are instances of downward grammaticalization as well. Here I would like
to suggest that Spanish constitutes an ideal case to test this distinction. In this regard, consider the Spanish
evidential que, which is also a reportative evidential (Etxeparre 2007, 2010; Demonte & Fernández-Soriano











p: ‘Emily went to the cinema.’
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ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
There is a crucial difference between que and dizque: while the former is an illocutionary evidential (De-
monte & Fernández-Soriano 2013, 2014), the latter is not (Cruschina 2008). In a similar vein to what was
discussed in connection to the Aymara evidentials in this section, the evidentials in Spanish show a similar
distinction: only que allows quotative uses—the judgment reported here differs from that of Demonte &
Fernández-Soriano (2013, 2014). Thus, (A.3) shows that a third party’s speech act (a question here) can be
reproduced with que, but not with dizque (see the context for (5.25) in the main text in this regard)—the













p: ‘Who went to the party?’












p: ‘Who went to the party?’
ep: ‘The speaker reports that somebody asked p.’
In addition, dizque (but not que) involves the implicature that the speaker doubts that the scope proposition
is true (Travis 2006; Cruschina 2008). This can be tested by means of standard tests, for instance, by trying
to cancel such an implicature. This is only possible with dizque, as shown in the contrast in (A.4)—this is





















‘Emily went to the cinema. In fact, I believe that is the case.’





















p: ‘Emily went to the cinema. In fact, I believe that is the case.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Emily went to the cinema.’
This is consistent with the literature about evidentiality, which shows that non-illocutionary evidentials may
involve a modal component, whereas this is not the case with illocutionary evidentials (but see Faller’s 2002
discussion of the Cuzco Quechua conjectural chá). This is relevant with regard to upward and downward
grammaticalization in that if reportative evidentials that come from the verb say incorporate into the C that
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is higher up in the clause, no modal component is in principle expected—this would be the case of Aymara
siwa, which does not involve a modal component. Spanish dizque, however, involves a modal implicature,
which would suggest that it has incorporated into a lower C and, as such, can involve a modal component as
the one discussed here.
The second issue I would like to raise here builds on the doubt implicature discussed above. In recent
work, Faller (2019) discusses sentences with reportative evidentials where there is no necessary commitment
of the speaker towards the scope proposition—this is the case of Aymara siwa, as discussed in section 5.2.3.
In a nutshell, Faller proposes that, in such cases, while the speaker is not technically liable for the truth
of this proposition, in the absence of explicit disagreement, she actually proposes this proposition (in the
conversation under consideration). This follows from the pragmatic Collaborative Principle, which requires
that evidence be provided in the presence of discrepancies with regard to the proposition under consideration
(see section 5.4.2, in particular, footnote footnote 46, for additional discussion in connection to Aymara
siwa). Sentences with que and dizque display a similar behavior: the speaker need not be commited to the
scope proposition. This is shown below by means of a follow-up that overtly states that the speaker does not

























‘Emily went to the cinema, but I don’t believe that is the case.’

























p: ‘Emily went to the cinema, but I don’t believe that is the case.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Emily went to the cinema.’
Here I show that que and dizque are relevant to test a prediction of the Collaborative Principle. The Collab-
orative Principle states that, in the absence of overt disagreement (for instance, the speaker herself expresses
here disagreement, as in (A.5)), the meaning conveyed by the sentence under consideration is actually pro-
posed (and, ultimately, accepted) in the conversation. Importantly, when a proposition is accepted, the
discourse participants (e.g., the speaker) may state something that makes explicit that they will act based on
the truth of that proposition (see the extensive literature on performativity and language that can be traced
back to Austin; see Geurts 2019 for a recent take with regard to some links between linguistic meanings
and actions). If the truth of the proposition, on the other hand, is questioned, it is unlikely that discourse
participants (e.g., the speaker) will state something by which they will act on the assumption that the rele-
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vant proposition is true. Intuitively, this can be illustrated by the contrast below. Only when the proposition
is (adopted as) true will the speaker state something that prompts her to act based on the truth of such a
proposition.
(A.6) a. Mary is at the hospital. I will visit her later today.
b. I doubt that Mary is at the hospital. #I will visit her later today.
The Collaborative Principle predicts that sentences with reportative evidentials (where there need not be
commitment to the scope proposition) will allow the discourse participants (e.g., the speaker) to act based
on the truth of the proposition that the sentence with the reportative denotes. In this sense, I propose a test for
this prediction which involves a follow-up, made by the speaker, for instance, who indicates an action she
will take, building on the previous proposition. Importantly, the prediction of the Collaborative Principle is
borne out, as the example with que below shows: it is possible for the the speaker to follow-up by expressing

























‘Emily is at the hospital. I will visit her in the afternoon.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Emily is at the hospital.’
The case of dizque is interesting in this regard, since, as mentioned above, it involves a doubt implicature.
As such, sentences with dizque should not be subject to the Collaborative Principle in that, given that the
speaker expresses her doubt towards the scope proposition (i.e., she doubts that the scope proposition is true),
it should be infelicitous for her to express her intention to act based on the truth of such a proposition—in
this sense, the lexically driven implicature preempts the application of the Collaborative Principle, which is

























‘Emily is at the hospital. I will visit her in the afternoon.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Emily is at the hospital.’
The third and final issue I would like to raise concerns clauses with more than one evidential in Spanish.
Here I make the novel observation that Spanish allows clauses with both que and dizque. Intuitively, (A.9)
has the evidential meaning that the speaker has reportative evidence for the relevant scope proposition.
Importantly, (A.9) does not convey the meaning that the speaker has reportative evidence and that the source
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p: ‘Emily is at the hospital.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for p.’
It is worth pointing out as well that sentences with both que and dizque are telling in connection to the two
issues discussed above. On the one hand, these sentences further suggest that dizque is not placed in an
illocutionary projection—this would be the projection where que is located. On the other hand, the doubt
implicature that dizque brings in is preserved. Thus, (A.9) cannot be followed up by an statement that
conveys that the speaker acts on the scope proposition, as shown in (A.10), which is relevant in connection



























‘Emily is at the hospital. I will visit her in the afternoon.’
ep: ‘The speaker has reportative evidence for the proposition that Emily is at the hospital.’
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linguistically. In Marua Frascarelli (ed.), Phases of interpretation, 187–211. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Anand, Pranav. 2006. De De Se: Massachusetts Institute of Technology dissertation.
Anderbois, Scott. 2014. On the exceptional status of reportative evidentials. Semantics and Linguistic
Theory 24. 234–254.
Anderbois, Scott. 2016. Illocutionary mirativity: the case of Yucatec Maya bakán. Semantics of Under-
Represented Languages in the Americas 9. 1–16.
AnderBois, Scott. 2018. An illocutionary account of reportative evidentials in imperatives. Semantics and
Linguistic Theory 27. 459–479.
Anderbois, Scott, Adrian Brasoveanu & Robert Henderson. 2015. At-issue Proposals and Appositive Impo-
sitions in Discourse. Journal of Semantics 32. 93–138.
Asher, Nicholas. 2000. Truth conditional discourse semantics for parentheticals. Journal of Semantics 17.
31–50.
Asher, Nicholas & Alex Lascarides. 2003. Logics of Conversation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Atlas, Jayd. 1991. Topic/comment, presupposition, logical form and focus implicatures: The case of focal
particles only and also. Journal of Semantics 8. 127–147.
Atlas, Jayd. 1993. The importance of being “Only”: testing the neo-Gricean versus neo-entailment
paradigms. Journal of Semantics 10. 301–318.
Baker, Mark. 1985. The Mirror Principle and Morphosyntactic Explanation. Linguistic Inquiry 16. 373–415.
Barker, Chris. 2002. The dynamics of vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy 25. 1–36.
Beaver, David & Brady Clark. 2008. Sense and Sensitivity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Beaver, David & Elizabeth Coppock. 2014. Principles of the Exclusive Muddle. Journal of Semantics 31.
371–432.
Beck, Sigrid. 2006. Intervention Effects Follow from Focus Interpretation. Natural Language Semantics
14. 1–56.
Bhadra, Diti. 2020. The semantics of evidentials in questions. Journal of Semantics 37(3). 367–423.
Bochnak, M. Ryan. 2016. Past time reference in a language with optional tense. Linguistics and Philosophy
39. 247–294.
Bochnak, M. Ryan & Lisa Matthewson (eds.). 2015. Methodologies in Semantic Fieldwork. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
176
Bonomi, Andrea & Paolo Casalegno. 1993. Only: association with focus in event semantics. Natural
Language Semantics 2. 1–45.
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